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Science, Philosophy and Faith

JACQUES MARITAIN

I SHALL use the two words *science* and *philosophy* in the sense which they have acquired in modern times, according to which science designates above all the mathematical, physico-mathematical and natural sciences, or, as one is also wont to say, the positive sciences, the sciences of the phenomena; *philosophy* designating above all metaphysics and the philosophy of nature.

Truly speaking, the problems of science and philosophy have been renewed and become extraordinarily complicated in our time. First, the crisis in the growth of modern physics, while launching science itself on an entirely new path, has liberated it from many pseudo-dogmatisms and much pseudo-metaphysics, and especially from the materialism of the physicists "of the Victorian Age," as Eddington says, with their pretense to "explain," *some day*, the essence of bodies, according to mechanistic determinism, and even to account for the occurrence of every single event in the universe. This crisis has made physics more conscious of its own nature.

Secondly, and at the same time, a considerable work has also been accomplished by the theoreticians of science, by logicians and by logisticians. Finally, this crisis of growth has not only diminished the dogmatic pretensions of experimental science; it has also deeply transformed in this domain (and by contagion, in certain other spheres), the work and the methods of reason; it has taught reason a sort of exhilarating freedom, a *new and terrible freedom*, to repeat the words used by Dostoievsky in quite a different manner. Yes, and as it were in compensation, a tendency toward systematic interpretation, imposing very rigorous rules and seeking a sort of logical purism, has been developed by certain theoreticians. I have in mind the logicians of the Viennese School. It is by referring to the theories of the Viennese School, which represent one of the most remarkable of contemporary trends in epistemology, that I should like to try to present the conceptions of science, philosophy and suprarational knowledge which I believe to be true, and which are linked to the principles of what could be termed the critical realism of Aristotle and of Thomas Aquinas.

I shall divide this paper into four parts. In the first and longest part, I shall deal with the theory of the science of phenomena as it is offered to us by logical empiricism on the one hand, and by what I call critical realism on the other. Secondly, I shall try to characterize briefly suprarational knowledge; thirdly, philosophical knowledge. Finally, in the fourth part, I should like to point out a few of the characteristic connections between the problems that concern degrees of knowledge, and the problems of civilization which occupy our thoughts at the present time.

I

Let us then begin with the theory of the science of phenomena, as it is presented on the one hand by the Viennese School, and on the other hand by the critical realism which takes its inspiration from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

The name of "Viennese Circle" was first mentioned in 1929. At the origin it was meant to designate a philosophic association created in Vienna by Moritz Schlick, who has since met with a tragic death. It now designates a group of scientist-philosophers, whose common orientation is a *logical empiricism* due to quite different historic influences, in particular to the influence of Mach and Avenarius, that of Poincaré and of Duham, of Peano, of Russell and of James, and to that of Einstein. Besides Moritz Schlick, the chief representatives of this school are Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Otto Neurath and Hans Reichenbach.

When, about fifteen years ago, Einstein came to Paris for important scientific discussions at the *College de France*, I was very much interested in the manner in which, in answer to questions about time and simultaneity, he invariably replied: "What does this mean to me, a physicist? Show me a definite method by which measurements can be made physically certain, in terms of which this or that observed result will be given this or that name, and only then will I know what you are talking about." It seems to me that the same question underlies the researches of the Viennese school: *What does this mean to me as a scientist?* The main point for this school is to distinguish those assertions which *have a meaning* for the scientist from assertions which *have no meaning* for the scientist.

In pursuing this analysis, the Viennese logicians have thrown light upon the fact that assertions which *have a meaning* for science are not those

which concern the nature or the essence of that which is, but rather regard the connections between the designations or symbols, which our senses, and especially our instruments of observation and measurement, enable us to elaborate concerning that which *appears to us* in our *Erlebnisse*, as the Germans say, that is, in our lived experiences. It is not with the being of things that science is occupied; it is with the mathematical links, which can be established between these designations taken from things, and which alone make possible—I say in the proper order and in the proper plane of science—a communication or a well established language, an *intersubjectivation*, submitted to fixed rules of signification.

If I say *this table*, these words do not mean for the scientist a hidden substance, presenting itself to me under a certain image and with certain qualities, of which substance, moreover, he can know nothing as a physicist. They mean a certain set of perceptions, linked by expressible regularities—the *permanent possibility of sensation* of which John Stuart Mill spoke—linked to a certain number of mathematical and logistic designations, which render it *intersubjectivable*.

If I say *matter*, this word does not mean for the physicist a substance or a substantial principle, about the mysterious nature of which he might question himself and, if wise, answer with Du Bois-Reymond: *ignorabimus*. For the scientist, the word *matter* only means a certain set of mathematical symbols, established by microphysics and submitted, moreover, to continual revision, wherein certain highly designable observations and measurements are expressed according to the rules of differential calculus or of tensorial calculus and according to the syntax of certain general theoretical constructions, which are also of a provisional character, such as the quantum theory or the syntheses of wave-mechanics.

Generally speaking, all reference to *being*, or essence in itself, is eliminated as *lacking meaning for the scientist*; and naturally the rational necessities disappear at the same time. What philosophers call the first principles of reason express at best certain regularities likely to be verified in certain cases, and likely not to be verified in others, according to the logical treatment to which we submit our *Erlebnisse*. The discussions concerning scientific determinism and Heisenberg's principle of indetermination, have cast light on this point, in so far as the principle of causality is concerned, or more exactly speaking, so far as concerns the recasting of the idea of causality in the domain of experimental science.

All this means that the intellect is a sort of indispensable *witness* and regulator of the senses in scientific work, remaining all the while—if I may express myself thus—*external* to this work. The senses and the measuring instruments *alone see* in science, and the intellect is there only to transform, according to the rules of mathematical and logical syntax, the signs expressing what has thus been seen. The intellect is set up in the central office of the factory, where it checks, and submits to more and more extensive calculations, all the indications which are conveyed to it. It remains outside the quarters where the work is being directly accomplished, and is forbidden to enter.

The theory of experimental science offered by the Viennese suffers, in my opinion, from certain peculiar errors which especially concern the notion of logical work and the notion of sign and above all, from that delusive purism to which every positivist conception of science is naturally exposed. The School of Vienna ignores what Meyerson has so acutely pointed out: the incurably realistic tendency of the science of phenomena. If it seems to give an account of the logical structure toward which science tends, as toward its ideal limit—science as already completed, and more and more perfectly rationalized—this school neglects certain profound characters of science *in the making*, that is, of the process of research and the work of scientific discovery. However scandalous for positivist orthodoxy, this work can be performed only with a feeling for the subjacent importance of the causes and essences of things, that is, in the climate, however obscure to the scientist himself, of the ontological mystery of the universe.

But, so far as a certain characteristic structure of science is concerned, above all of science completed and rationalized, this theory insists upon a fundamental truth which, in fact, the Viennese logicians have not discovered (rather they have received it from the scientists), and which is due to the self-awareness which modern science, and especially physics, has achieved. The truth is, that science—science in the modern sense of the word—is *not* a philosophy, and consequently claims, if I dare use this barbarism, to deontologize completely its notional lexicon. I should like to note, as regards this precise point, that the consideration of the sciences of phenomena, as they have developed in modern times—novel, indeed, by relation to the cultural state of antiquity and the medieval world—this consideration carried out in the light of the epistemological principles of the Aristotelian

critical realism would lead us to general views strikingly similar to those of the school of Vienna.

Now, what is important, it seems to me, is to distinguish (and this the Viennese school has omitted to do) two ways of analyzing the world of sensible reality and of constructing the concepts relevant thereto. I have given these two kinds of analysis of sensible reality the following names: the one, *empiriological analysis*; the other, *ontological analysis*.

If we observe any kind of material object, this object is—while we observe it—the meeting point, as it were, of two knowledges: sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. We are in the presence of a kind of sensible flux, stabilized by an idea, by a concept. In other words, we are in the presence of an ontological or intelligible nucleus manifested by a set of qualities perceived *here and now*—I do not say *conceived*, I say *felt* qualities, objects of actual perception and observation.

As to the sensible reality, considered as such, there will thus be a *resolutio*, a resolution of concepts and definitions, which we may call *ascendant*, or ontological, toward intelligible being—a resolution in which the sensible matter always remains there and plays an indispensable rôle, but indirectly and at the service of intelligible being, as connoted by it; and there will be on the other hand a resolution *descending* toward the sensible matter, toward the observable as such, in so far as it is observable. Not that the mind ceases to refer to being, for that is impossible—being always remains there—but being passes into the service of what is sensible, of what is observable, and above all of what is measurable. It becomes an unknown factor assuring the constancy of certain sensible determinations and of certain measures. In fact, the new aspect which modern science presents is precisely this *descendant resolution*, a procedure which the ancients had not thought of making an instrument of science.

In this empiriological analysis, characteristic of science in the modern sense of the word, the permanent possibility of sensible verification and of measurement, plays the same part that essence does for the philosopher; the permanent possibility of observation and measurement is for the scientist equivalent to, and a substitute for, what essence is to the philosopher. One may here behold something like an effort against the natural slope of the intellect, because one must turn back, if one is to grasp what is essential and properly constitutive here, to the act of sense itself, to a physical opera-

tion to be performed, to an observation of a measurement. It is this observation to be made, this act of sense, which will serve to *define* the object.

If one understands this, one has understood the views of an Einstein, for instance, in physics, and the opposition more apparent than real between the philosopher and the scientist on such matters as time or simultaneity. This opposition is immediately solved, because the type of definition is essentially different in the two cases. For the physicist conscious of the epistemological exigencies of his discipline, science tends to construct definitions, not by essential ontological characters, but by a certain number of physical operations to be performed under fully determined conditions. On the other hand, all science tends in a certain way, and however imperfectly, to explanation and deduction, to a knowledge of the *why*. Therefore, empiriological science will necessarily be obliged to seek its explicative deductions in mere *ideal constructions*, though founded on the real, and which can be substituted, as well-founded explicative *myths* or *symbols*, for the *entia realia*, the real entities, those causes of ontological order which the intellect seeks when it follows its natural slope. Such an elaboration of ideal entities grounded in reality—the most significant examples of which are encountered in mathematical physics, but also in such nonmathematical disciplines as experimental psychology, and through which real causes are reached in a blind fashion—such an elaboration is linked to the aspect of art or fabrication, whose importance in empiriological science has often been observed with reason. The *essence*, the *substance*, the *explicative reasons*, the real causes are thus reached in a certain fashion, in an oblique and blind manner, through substitutes which are well-grounded myths or symbols, ideal constructions, which the mind elaborates from the data of observation and measurement, and with which it goes out to meet things. Thus, these basic notions, primitively philosophical, are recast and phenomenalized.

It has been justly observed that in the image which the physicist makes of the world, "certain traits really express, not nature, but the structure of the real, and in this there is a certain adequation. For instance, the atom of Bohr signifies the table of Mendelieff; the undulatory theory signifies light's interference."¹ Thanks to ideal constructions, to *entia rationis*, the real is thus grasped.

I do not know how to translate this word, *ens rationis*; it designates

¹ F. Renoirte, in *Philosophie et Sciences, Studies of the Thomist Society*, V. III, p. 35.

certain objects of thought, as the universal, the predicate, the privation, the transfinite number, and so forth, which I conceive intelligibly, but which cannot exist outside my mind. Let us say, if you like, *ideal entity* or *logical entity* or *being of thought* or *being made in the mind*, *being not expressing a reality* (though possibly grounded in reality).

Certain facile minds, which imagine themselves strong, have often scoffed at the *entia rationis* of the Schoolmen. Yet here we have seen that the theory of the *ideal entity grounded on reality* alone furnishes us with an accomplished and satisfactory interpretation of the paradoxical twofold character—at the same time *realist* and *symbolic*—of the sciences of phenomena, which makes them appear, at first glance, so disconcerting.

The misfortune of the Viennese is that they are philosophers. This can be immediately seen from the way they insist on the truths they have grasped, while they blunt their point, as Pascal says. By a positivist conceptualization, by a bad conceptualization, the school of Vienna impairs—a phenomenon often observed—a good intuition, the reflexive intuition by which modern science becomes more and more conscious of itself.

The essential error of this school is to confuse that which is true (with certain restrictions) of the *science of phenomena*, and that which is true of *all science* and of *all knowledge* in general, of all scientific knowing. It is to apply universally to all human knowledge that which is valid only in one of its particular spheres. This leads to an absolute negation of metaphysics, and the arrogant pretension to deny that metaphysical assertions have any meaning.

I have earlier referred to what has no meaning *for the physicist*. If one simply suppresses these three little words—"for the physicist"—one will declare: that which has no meaning *for the physicist* has no meaning *at all*. This is a uniformization, a brutal way of restricting human science, which is not preceded by a critical examination of the life of the mind, and which cannot be so (for one would then have to enter into metaphysics in order to deny its possibility); a uniformization which, finally, is based only on the positivist superstition concerning positive science. But metaphysics does not let itself be done away with so easily. Before deciding that the question, "Does a primary cause of being exist?" has no meaning, we should first ask ourselves whether the question, "Does the philosophy of the school of Vienna exist?" is not a question deprived of meaning.

The objection has been justly raised against the Viennese position that

if the meaning of a judgment consist in its method of (experimental) verification—not only in the usage proper to experimental sciences, but in an absolute manner; if any judgment which cannot be thus verified is devoid of meaning—then this school's own theory has no meaning, because it is incapable of being verified in this manner. It is incapable, even in principle, of space-time verifications. The theory of the Viennese is, in fact, a *philosophical* theory, a *philosophy of science*, and in my opinion, the principle which I have just mentioned, the principle of the necessity of logico-experimental verification, is true in regard to the function of judgment in the *empiriological sciences*; but it is true *only in this domain*. A philosophy which generalizes this principle and extends it to the entire field of knowledge, seeing in it an exigency of the nature of all judgments truly valuable for knowledge—such a philosophy thus destroys itself.

The Viennese entirely ignore the mode of resolving the concepts which we have described as *ontological*, and which occurs in the direction of intelligible being. They do not see that, if it is true that all knowledge properly speaking supposes an intersubjectivation submitted to fixed rules of significance, such an intersubjectivation is not met with only on the plane of scientific knowledge, but also on the philosophical plane, where it acts, however, in quite a different way, and refers above all, not to an operation of the external senses, but to an intelligible perception. The school of Vienna does not see that the meaning of a judgment is derived from the intelligible objects which it composes or divides in the act of being. If—in empiriological sciences—meaning implies a possibility of physical verification, it is because, in this particular case, the objects of such notions are themselves, as I have said, conceived in relation to the operation of the senses. The chief point in criticizing neopositivism is a warning to us of the irremediable mistake caused by a *univocist* conception of knowledge, and as a reminder, by antithesis, of the great words by which Saint Thomas condemned Descartes before his day: "It is a sin against intelligence to want to proceed in an identical manner in the typically different domains—physical, mathematical, and metaphysical—of speculative knowledge."

II

It is remarkable, in fact, that logical neopositivism looks at the degrees of knowledge of the suprarational order with less disfavor than at the highest degrees of an order entirely rational, namely, metaphysics and philosophy.

Generally speaking, the school of Vienna manifests no hostility toward religion, and certain representatives of this school, perhaps in memory of Bolzano and Brentano, show a certain sympathy for the work of the theologians, whom they prefer to university philosophers.

Led by this preference, I shall treat of the positions of critical realism with regard to knowledge taken in its fullest extent, by starting with the highest degrees of knowledge, those which deal with the suprarational order. Thus I come to the second part of this paper, which will concern suprarational knowledge.

According to the classical doctrine which corresponds to the common experience of the believer, faith is not a *science* or *perfect knowledge*, because its object is neither *seen* nor *proven* by the intelligence, but only *believed* from the testimony of the Primal Truth. Thus it still implies an inquiring movement of the intellect—a movement toward vision. But faith is very real and *genuine knowledge*, and by means of revealed words it adheres vitally to the substance of the things we hope for, to the actual *thing* which is its object, that is, the intimate and personal being of God. While concerning what infinitely overreaches our natural means of grasping and verifying, nevertheless these dogmatic formulae of divine origin, heard in our heart, have a meaning for us, a meaning at once dark and illuminating, thanks to what can be called the superanalogy of faith. For in the knowledge of faith, it is from the very core of the transintelligible mystery, from the very heart of the Deity, that knowledge descends in order to return thither—in other words, that the free generosity of God chooses, in the intelligible universe which affects our senses, objects and concepts which God reveals to us as analogical signs of what is hidden within Him, and which He uses to declare Himself to us in our language.

We are here facing a type of knowledge which absolutely transcends the empirical knowledge characteristic of the science of phenomena. It is of another order, a divine and supernatural order. The power of apprehension is not in this case the natural light of reason, but light of a divine order received as a free gift. Within such a knowledge, the intelligence, under the action both of voluntary consent and of grace, knows, without seeing it, the Truth which will some day be its eternal joy.

Now, there are linked to divine faith two types of science or of perfect knowledge, taking the word *science* not in its modern meaning, but in its classical and very ample meaning of: *knowledge through causes and necessary*

reasons; two kinds of science which are at the same time wisdoms, that is to say where knowledge is brought about in the light of *primary* causes. They can be called the *wisdom of reasoning faith*, or discursive theology, and the *wisdom of loving faith*, or mystical theology.

Although discursive theology exists in us in an imperfect state, because it works on principles which it does not itself see, and which are seen only by the intelligence of the separated spirits who see God, it is nevertheless in its essence truly and actually *perfect knowledge*, a *science*, because it is capable to a certain extent of penetrating its object, which is God, with demonstrative certitude, and by means of causes and necessary reasons (that is to say, here, through God Himself). It is attached, through the intermediary of faith, to the knowledge which God has of Himself, and proceeds from the principles of faith by means of conceptual necessities. It is a communicable knowledge, a knowledge of the rational *mode*, but the *root* of which is supernatural, or supranatural.

Above this knowledge, above discursive theology, is the wisdom of loving faith, or mystical theology. Let us note that the theologians of old insisted that it has the character of *perfect knowledge* or *science*. In point of fact, it also is able to penetrate its object, which is God, with proven certitude, and by means of causes and necessary reasons (that is to say, through God Himself). But here conceptual necessities are no longer the proper means of attaining knowledge. The means is rather the connaturality of love or the assimilation of love with God. And thus the very mode of knowing is here supernatural, or supranatural. It is an incommunicable knowledge, a science which does not consist in learning, but in suffering the things divine, a supreme science, the darkest, the most humanly naked, and not for the wise but for the poor, because it is not founded on concepts but on the love of charity.

We were saying previously that in the science of phenomena, the intelligence remained *outside* of the work of knowledge. Here, not only is man's intelligence *within* the knowledge, but so also are his love, his entire being, the whole human Ego, with the divine Persons abiding within it. I too have wished to dwell on the fact that although mystical contemplation is a nescience with respect to all our natural means of thought, and, as the pseudo-Dionysus and Saint John of the Cross both said, a ray of darkness for the intelligence, it is nevertheless a knowledge and a science of a pre-eminent kind, a knowledge whose recognition as the highest in itself and

as surer than the philosopher's knowledge, is the claim to greatness of such a mindful philosopher as Mr. Bergson; thus is made more obvious to us the analogical amplexness of the word *science* when it recovers its true meaning, and we see what a misery it is for the spirit to limit knowledge to the form which, although it is noble and worthy in itself, is still the lowest form of which this analogical amplexness is capable, the form of empiriological knowledge characteristic of physico-mathematical science, and generally of the sciences of phenomena.

III

Let us now consider the third point I mentioned at the beginning of this paper: what characterizes philosophical knowledge in the outlook of critical realism.

I have just noted that for Christian tradition there are in the suprarational order, two kinds of wisdom—contemplation by union of love and discursive theology—which are, properly speaking, *scientiae*, knowledge of a perfected and completed type (not in the modern sense of the word *science*, but in the very ample sense of knowing well founded on causes or reasons of being).

Now, if contemplation and theology can be a knowledge of a perfected and complete type, it is first of all because there can be in the rational order a knowledge which is a wisdom—a wisdom accessible to our natural powers of inquiry and demonstration. Is it possible that the intellect—which knows itself and judges itself, and which knows and judges reflexively the nature of science—should be unable to enter itself in the work of knowledge, that is, to *see into* the nature of things? Can it be condemned to remain always on the outside of this work, in the rôle of a witness and a regulator of the senses, as happens in the science of phenomena? There must be such a science, a knowledge in which the intellect is on the inside, and where it freely develops its deepest aspirations, the aspirations of intellect *as intellect*. That is metaphysics.

Metaphysical wisdom is in its essence a purely natural wisdom. It is in terms of natural and rational evidences that this wisdom is entirely developed. And though from the point of view of exercise, one should—as Plato said—philosophize with one's entire soul, from the point of view of specification, it is the intellect alone of man which is here engaged. Metaphysical wisdom is illumined by the intelligibility of being disengaged and

in a pure state (I mean without intrinsic reference to any construction of the imagination or to any experience of sense), at the highest degree of abstractive intuition. Its formal object is *being* according to its proper mystery—*being as being*, as Aristotle said.

If positivism old and new, and Kantism do not understand that metaphysics is authentically a science, a knowledge of a perfected and completed type, it means that they do not understand that the intellect *sees*. For them, sense alone is intuitive, the intellect having only a function of connection and of unification. Let them be silent! for we cannot say "I," we cannot utter a noun of the language, without testifying that there are objects in things, that is, centers of visibility, which our senses do not reach, but which our intellect does. Of course, there is no *angelistic*, intellectual intuition, in the sense of Plato and Descartes—I mean an intuition which does not need the mediation of the senses; of course there is nothing in the intellect which does not originally derive from sensible experience. But it is precisely the activity of the intellect which disengages from this experience and brings to the fire of immaterial visibility in act, the objects which sense cannot decipher in things, and which the intellect sees. This is the mystery of abstractive intuition. And in these objects which it sees, the intellect knows, without seeing them directly, the transcendent objects which do not exist in the world of sensible experience. This is the mystery of analogical intellection. The problem of metaphysics reduces itself finally to the problem of abstractive intuition and to the question whether, at the summit of abstraction, being itself, in so far as it is being—permeating the world of sensible experience, yet exceeding this world on all sides—is or is not the object of such an intuition. It is this intuition which makes the metaphysician. Everybody does not have it. And if we ask why positivism, old and new, and Kantism ignore this intuition, we shall be bound finally to admit that it is because there are philosophers who see, and philosophers who do not see.

I still have to indicate that in the perspectives of critical realism, metaphysics does not constitute the whole of speculative philosophy, but only its highest category.

Below metaphysics and above the sciences of the empiriological type, there exists another degree of knowledge, that of the *philosophy of nature*. The philosophy of nature knows the same world as the empiriological sciences, the world of change and movement, of sensible and material

nature; but the resolution of concepts is made here in intelligible being, not in the observable and the measurable as such. Here, again, the intellect perceives being abstractively, but not, this time, being according to its proper mystery; it perceives being in so far as the latter is invested with material motion and according to the proper mystery of the world of becoming; and it is clear, that, if human intelligence is capable of abstractive intuition, it must exercise this power first in that order which is most con-natural to human intelligence, namely, the order of sensible nature. A philosophical knowledge of movement, of transitive action, of corporeal substance, of living organism, of sensitive life, helps thus to complete—by proceeding according to an entirely different noetic type and conceptual lexicon—the empiriological notions obtained about nature by the science of phenomena and of experimental detail, that is, by science in the modern sense of the word.

I will not dwell further here on the problems relative to the philosophy of nature. I shall end this discussion by repeating that if neopositivism is right, there is only one science, the science of phenomena. And there is no wisdom. Blinded by logical empiricism, the intellect is a slave in the service of sensitive apprehension.

If Thomist realism is right, all the truth that neopositivism has discerned concerning the sciences of phenomena is maintained and saved. But above the sciences of phenomena, there are other categories of science which are categories of wisdom, because they reach, in its very mystery, and yet in quite different ways, being itself, that being after which the intellect thirsts and hungers. And above the work of man in time, accomplished in order to subjugate material nature, there is the activity of man in the eternal, an activity of wisdom and of love, by which the intellect and the heart of man interiorize to themselves an infinite good—not dominated, not capable of domination, but which finally gives its self as the object of fruition.

IV

I have tried to outline what would be, according to the principles of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the organization of the universe of knowledge. Whatever one's philosophical standpoint may be, if one does not admit of an internal differentiation and an internal hierarchy, arising from the distinction among determining intelligible objects in the world

of knowledge, one would try in vain to recapture that unity to which the human spirit aspires.

Specialization and departmentation in the realm of science, as they approach infinity, make of the scientist competent in a fraction of a fraction of a part of knowledge an ignoramus before all other things, more of a stranger to the vast world than primitive man with his infantile mythology. Each one's conceptual equipment and vocabulary become incommunicable, and we thus become strangers to each other; human thought enters into the confusion of Babel. If it is to emerge from this confusion, and if conversation and collaboration are to be resumed among workers in the various scientific fields, it can be only on condition that the value of the higher disciplines and the internal hierarchies of knowledge be recognized anew; that a valid critique of knowledge and a valid philosophical training enable the theologian and the philosopher to listen to science, and the scientist to listen to philosophy and theology, and finally, that science and wisdom be reconciled.

But I have not forgotten that this conference of men of science stands for the defense of civilization and liberty. I shall conclude, therefore, by pointing out how the subject I have treated pertains to this cause.

There is no unity of the multiple without order in diversity, and therefore, without a hierarchy of degrees. In the world of politics, one of the ills of modern democracies was the false ideology which led many to believe that a democratic society must be a *nonhierarchal whole*. The most obvious practices of democratic societies belie this assertion, but it would be better for the inevitable differentiations and hierarchies to be accepted and understood by the mind than to be borne in fact blindly and unwillingly.

In reality, the authentic democratic principle, for the very reason that it opens the political life to all men and puts political justice and legal relations in first place, is a principle essentially organic. It tends toward an organization of liberties, which is in itself inconceivable without centers of organization that are relatively autonomous yet subordinated to each other. It tends toward hierarchies founded on liberty. A nonhierarchal social whole can never be anything but an anarchic dust where each individual or each clan wants to be king, or a totalitarian conglomeration of slaves ruled by the demigods of the Party.

In the realm of social life, however, the principle of the organic hierarchy of liberties, necessary and right as it may be, puts our nature

to the test. For all men are equal in their specific nature and in their essential dignity; there is no difference in essence between this one and that one. Thus, if the structure and the organic functions of the social body necessitate one man's being placed above another, man's reason must make an especially vigorous and realistic effort to recognize the justice of that superimposed functional inequality.

I say now: how will such discernment be possible in the human order, where we have to deal with individual subjects all of the same kind, if we are incapable of recognizing the differentiations and the organic hierarchies in the world of knowledge, where we deal with objects of the understanding, with intelligible natures which are different *in essence* from each other? There are certain minds which, because of a very curious prejudice, are shocked when it is asserted that in the degrees of knowledge theological knowledge occupies a higher place than philosophical knowledge, philosophical knowledge a higher place than mathematical knowledge, and mathematical knowledge a higher place than purely physical knowledge. Yet it is very clear that the architect's art, by virtue of the nature of its purpose, plays a regulating part toward the art of the painter, charged with decorating the walls of the house, notwithstanding the fact that the architect himself may be a nonentity and the painter a decorator of genius. An army in which anybody would be a general is not the army of democracy but of stupidity. A republic of knowledge in which each type of knowledge claimed for itself the architectonic rank, or where it was declared that no one body of knowledge had a higher rank than any other, or a superordinate regulative rôle, would be a republic of ignorance.

Let there be no misunderstanding here. Each scientific discipline is free in its domain and develops autonomously; that is clear, because by definition, it alone is competent regarding its specifying object. Thus, when we say that philosophy is of a higher order than the sciences of phenomena, we do not mean, thereby, that philosophy can enter into the realm of these sciences and willfully decree what is true and what is false; it is not fitted for that. The confusion and tragedies caused during the Renaissance by a theology that wished to prevent the earth from turning and by a decadent Aristotelianism which decreed that it was wrong for the telescope to show spots on the sun, have put the scientific world on guard most rightly against all dictatorship of this kind. What we do mean is that philosophy occupies a higher place in the edifice of knowledge because its object or

purpose, which is concerned with primary causes, reveals to it realities that are more profound and more essential. This diversity of planes superordinate to one another is the basic condition for the autonomy of each order of knowledge. If all the disciplines, diverse in essence, hunted in the same fields, they would inevitably limit each other and collide, ending in a conflict which would soon be chaos. But because, in reality, each one develops upon a distinct plane, each may progress to infinity upon this plane without ever meeting the others. The biologist may progress endlessly in the knowledge of the human being from the standpoint of its physiological and physico-chemical functions without ever coming into conflict with the philosopher who progresses, on his part, in the knowledge of the human being from the standpoint of the relation between soul and matter.

In what sense, however, do we say that the disciplines of higher rank have a regulating or architectonic rôle as regards the others? We mean by that three things: first, it is the metaphysician, for instance, who must know and justify the principles of the other sciences; not the mathematician but the metaphysician must examine the value of the principle of noncontradiction, or ask himself what constitutes the essence of quantity.

In the second place, it is up to those disciplines whose object is more profound and more universal to prevent the mind, when it works in disciplines of less elevated rank, from overstepping the objective limits of these disciplines and falling into errors foreign to them. Thus the paleontologist does not step out of his sphere when he establishes the hypothesis of evolution and applies it to the origin of the human being. But the philosopher must warn him that he is out of his field when he tries to deny for that reason that the human soul is a spiritual soul which cannot emanate from matter, so that if once upon a time the human organism was produced by a mutation of an animal organism, it was because of the infusion of a soul created by God.

Thirdly, the disciplines of wisdom protect the other disciplines against the hidden domination of unconscious metaphysics, and in that way safeguard their liberty and their autonomy. For instance, it would not be difficult to show, along with M. Bergson, that the mechanistic bias and the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism, which have so long fed parasitically upon modern physics and modern psychology, were, all unknown to themselves, in reality of metaphysical origin, and arose from the unconscious domination of Spinoza's philosophy, which was automatically accepted

without critical scrutiny. And it would be easy to multiply the number of such cases.

In truth, the need for order and for unity is inescapable. If one denies the conditions of a true and natural unity, in which the degrees of knowledge—each one autonomous at its level, each one having its own jurisdiction and its own specific truth to know—are distributed according to the nature of their objects, one would ultimately come to ask of the social or political obedience of the thinking subjects, or of their racial or national endowment, an absurd and despotic unity of the spirit. One would dress physics, biology, mathematics, philosophy and theology in the same brown or red shirt. One would proclaim, to the great shame of the human spirit—and we have heard of such things—the constitutional unity and the single dignity of sciences of pure Aryan or German blood, or of sciences of pure Marxist-Leninist persuasion. And they alone, once regimented, would have the right to exist.

If it is denied that there is a true and natural hierarchy of the degrees of knowledge, disposed according to their purpose, one will be led not to suppress all hierarchy, but to subordinate wisdom to science and to ascribe the regulative rôle to the sciences of a lower order, which actually amounts to refusing existence to the higher sciences and to wisdom, and to the truths which it is their mission to dispense among men. Let us not delude ourselves; an education in which the sciences of phenomena and the corresponding techniques take precedence over philosophical and theological knowledge is already, potentially, a Fascist education; an education in which biology, hygiene and eugenics provide the supreme criteria of morality is already, potentially, a Fascist education.

In short, it is simply a question of knowing whether or not one believes in the truth. It is a question of knowing whether, in the different fields of knowledge, the dignity and entire value of our spirit consists in conforming itself to what is. To think that there is no such adequation to reality, that there is no truth, but only opinions all equally worthy of satisfying curiosity, is certainly economical and spares teachers headaches—until it causes the fall of those obstinate heads which would some day refuse adherence to the opinion that it would please a totalitarian Caesar to declare consistent with the conscience of the race or State.

That which constitutes the spiritual essence of totalitarianism is its absolute and active contempt for the truth. Nietzsche proclaimed the death of truth, but the totalitarian regimes understood better than poor Nietzsche

what that meant. Truth is whatever is expedient to the interests, the hatreds and the lusts of the Party, and it changes with them. A man who does not believe in the truth through sheer indolence of mind, skepticism or dilettantism, is what Lewis Mumford calls a passive barbarian. He who does not believe in the truth by virtue of an actual, absolute and working negation of it, and in order to achieve his will to power, has become an active barbarian, ready to sacrifice men's lives and freedom to his desires, just as he has sacrificed the truth.

If we who are gathered here, scientists, philosophers and theologians—we all believe in the truth—if it is truth which each one of us seeks in his own field of endeavor, then we know that there are many mansions in the home of truth, and that the least of these mansions, humble as it may be, is naturally sacred. It is within truth that we wish to communicate with each other and co-operate. And in serving truth we know that we are serving liberty, human fellowship, and the cause of peoples who do not wish to be slaves.

Philosophy and Theology

PAUL TILLICH

PHILOSOPHICAL Theology is the unusual name of the chair I represent. It is a name which suits me better than any other, since the boundary line between philosophy and theology is the center of my thought and work. But has the word Philosophical Theology more than a personal meaning? Has it an objective meaning? Is it a justified combination of words?

Some will give a decidedly negative answer to this question. Theological supranaturalism of continental as well as American types will denounce philosophical theology as a contradiction in terms or, even more, as high treason against theology. On the other hand philosophers and theological humanists may denounce philosophical theology—although perhaps with less fanaticism than the opposite group—as an impure mixture of two incompatible methods of thought. They may admit the right of dealing philosophically with religion as with any other subject. But philosophy of religion is not philosophical theology. Can our name be defended against this double attack?

The answer is implied in the answer to the old question of the relation between philosophy and theology. After at least two thousand years of thought dedicated to the solution of this problem, it is not easy to offer a new solution. Nevertheless it must be tried in every generation as long as theology exists. For the question of the relation of philosophy and theology is the question of the nature of theology itself.

The term philosophical theology points to a theology which has philosophical character. What does this mean? First of all: It implies that there is a theology which has *not* a philosophical but some other character. This, indeed, is the case. As long as theological thought has existed there have been two types of theology, a philosophical one and—let me call it—a “kerygmatic” one. Kerygmatic is derived from the New Testament word “kerygma,” message. It is a theology which tries to reproduce the content of the Christian message in an ordered and systematic way, without referring to philosophy. In contrast to it, philosophical theology, although based on the same kerygma, tries to explain the contents of the kerygma in keen

interrelation with philosophy. The tension and mutual fertilization between these two types is a main event and a fortunate one in all history of Christian thought. The fight of the traditionalists of the Early Church against the rising Logos—Christology, the struggle between the mystics and dialecticians in the early Middle Ages, between Biblicism and scholasticism in the later Middle Ages, between the Reformers and the Aristotelian scholastics, the attack of the Ritschlians on speculative theology, and of the Barthians on a Philosophy of Religion—all this and much more was the consequence of the existence of a philosophical and a kerygmatic theology. The duality is natural. It is implied in the very word theology, the syllable "theo" pointing to the kerygma, in which God is revealed, and the syllable "logy" pointing to the endeavor of human reason to receive the message. This implies further that kerygmatic and philosophical theology demand each other and are wrong in the moment in which they become exclusive. No kerygmatic theology ever existed which did not use philosophical terms and methods. And no philosophical theology ever existed—deserving the name theology—which did not try to explain the content of the message. Therefore the theological ideal is the complete unity of both types, an ideal which is reached only by the greatest theologians and even by them only approximately. The fact that every human creativity has its typological limitations makes it desirable that theological faculties should include a representative of kerygmatic and one of philosophical theology, whether the latter is called apologetics, speculative theology, Christian philosophy of religion, or philosophical theology. The Church cannot do without this type as, of course, it cannot dispense with the kerygmatic type.

It is not my task to enlarge on the nature of kerygmatic theology. The most radical attempt to create a merely kerygmatic theology in our period is made by Karl Barth. But he, in contrast to some of his fanatical pupils, is honest enough to acknowledge that he cannot avoid philosophical language and methods completely, since even our daily life language is shaped by philosophical terminology and philosophical ways of thought. Neither is it my task to deal with the difficult question as to whether there is a third type, namely, mystical theology, as has often been suggested; or whether mysticism, as I would prefer to say, is an element of any religious message and therefore a substantial element in both types of theology.

Now, what is the relation of philosophy and theology and consequently the exact meaning of "philosophical theology"? In order to answer this

question, as far as it can be answered at all, we must try to traverse some difficult ways of abstract thought for which I must beg your patience.

Philosophy asks the ultimate question that can be asked, namely, the question as to what being, simply being, means. Whatever the object of thought may be, it is always something that *is* and not *not is*. But what does this word "is" mean? What is the meaning of being? Santayana, in a very fine analysis of experience, derives all experience from shocks we receive and which disturb the smooth flux of our intuition. I think he is right. And his insight should be used not only for the sake of stopping the vague and detrimental use of the word experience which we find in popular philosophy and theology, but also for a more profound, more Aristotelian description of the experience out of which philosophy is born. It is the philosophical shock, the tremendous impetus of the question: What is the meaning of being; why is there being and not not being; what is the character in which every being participates? Questions like these may be late in their explicit and rational form, although they underlie the most mythological creations. In any case they are essentially human. For man, as the German philosopher Heidegger says, is that being which asks what being is. This question and the shock with which it takes hold of us is especially human. It is the foundation of humanism and the root of philosophy. For philosophy asks the question for being itself. This implies that philosophy primarily does not ask for the special character of the beings, the things and events, the ideas and values, the souls and bodies which share being. Philosophy asks what about this being itself. Therefore all philosophers have developed a "first philosophy," as Aristotle calls it, namely, an interpretation of being. And from this they go on to the description of the different classes of beings and to the system of their interdependence, the world. It is easy to make a simple division between philosophy and theology, if philosophy deals only with the second realm, with sciences and attempts to unite their last results in a picture of the world. But philosophy, before trying a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific and nonscientific experience, tries to understand being itself and the categories and structures which are common to all kinds of beings. This makes the division between philosophy and theology impossible. For whatever the relation of God, world and man may be, it lies in the frame of being; and any interpretation of the meaning and structure of being as being unavoidably has consequences for the interpretation of God, man and the world in their interrelations.

This concept of philosophy may be challenged from different sides. The establishment of a first philosophy may be attacked with the popular argument that it entails a return to old-fashioned metaphysics. The presupposition of this argument is the magic of the syllable "meta" in metaphysics which, in spite of the testimony of all textbooks and lectures on philosophy that it means the book after the physics in the collection of Aristotelian writings, has received the meaning of something beyond human experience, open to arbitrary imagination. But the question of being, the question of a first or fundamental philosophy, is the question of what is nearer to us than anything else; it is we ourselves as far as we *are* and at the same time as human beings are able to ask what it means that we are. It is time to dismiss this abused and distorted word "metaphysics," the negation of which has become an excuse for a terrific shallowness of thought in comparison with which primitive mythology was extremely profound.

Another criticism may come from the claim of epistemology to be the true first philosophy. I would admit that this claim is justified to a great extent. Parmenides, the first and greatest of the ontologists, knew that being and the logos of being, that is, the rational word which grasps being, belong together; or, as we would say, that being is always subjective and objective at the same time. Epistemology is wrong only if it pretends to exist without an ontological basis. It cannot do so. And this insight has caused the breakdown of the epistemological period of philosophy in the last decades. You cannot have appearance without a being that appears, or knowledge without a being that is known, or experience without a being that is experienced. Otherwise appearance or experience become only other words for being, and the problem of being is only stated in different terms.

There is a third criticism we have to face. It may be said that there is no approach for man to the structure and meaning of being, that what being is is revealed to us in the manifoldness of beings and in the world in which they all are united and interrelated to each other. It could be said: Look at minerals and flowers, look at animals and men, look at history and arts and you will learn what being is, but do not ask for being itself above all of them. To this we must answer: You cannot prohibit man from asking the most human question; no dictator can do so even if he appears in the gown of humble positivism or modest empiricism. Man is more than an apparatus for registering so-called facts and their interdependence. He wants to *know*, to know about himself as thrown into being, to know about the powers and

structures controlling this being in himself and in his world. He wants to know the meaning of being because he is man and not only an epistemological subject. Therefore he transcends and always must transcend the "No trespassing" signs, cautiously built by skepticism and dogmatically guarded by pragmatism. The meaning of being is his basic concern, is the really human and philosophical question.

But this statement brings us to the turning point—to the point, namely, in which philosophy shows a kerygmatic and therefore theological character. For this is the task of theology: To ask for being as far as it gives us ultimate concern. Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably, ultimately, unconditionally. It deals with it not as far as it *is* but as far as it is *for us*. In no theological statement can the relation to us be omitted. Without the element of ultimate concern no assertion is a theological one. As a theologian you can speak and you must speak about everything between heaven and earth—and beyond heaven and earth. But you speak of it theologically only if you show how it belongs to our final concern, to that which decides about our being or not being in the sense of our eternal, ultimate meaning and destiny. This is the truth in the much misunderstood assertion that theology is a practical discipline. If practical is understood in contrast to theoretical, that statement is entirely wrong, since truth is an essential element in what concerns us ultimately. If practical means that theology must deal with its subject always as far as it concerns us in the very depth of our being, theology is practical. But since by popular distortion the word practical has received an antitheoretical flavor, and since the Ritschlian school created that definition of theology in order to cut off theology from philosophy, sacrificing truth to morals, it is more adequate to use another term, for instance, to use with Søren Kierkegaard the word "existential." Existential is what characterizes our real existence in all its concreteness, in all its accidental elements, in its freedom and responsibility, in its failure and separation from its true and essential being. Theology thinks on the basis of this existential situation and in continuous relation to it. Asking for the meaning of being, theology asks for the ultimate ground and power and norm and aim of being as far as it is *my* being and carries *me* as the abyss and ground of my existence, for the threatening and promising power over my existence, for the demanding and judging norm of my existence, for the fulfilling and rejecting aim of my existence. In other words: Asking for the meaning of being, theology asks for God. Asking for the powers and struc-

tures constituting the being of Self and the world, their interrelation and their manifoldness, theology asks for the appearance of the ground, power, norm and aim of being in these realms of being. It asks for the way in which man receives or resists the appearance of his ultimate concern. It asks for the way in which nature reveals or hides what concerns us ultimately. It asks for the relation of what concerns us historically to what concerns us ultimately. In other words, it asks for the divine and demonic powers in ourselves, in our world, in nature as well as in history. This is existential thinking; this is theology. But now we have reached again a turning point, this time the point in which theology shows its philosophical character. Dealing with the meaning of being as far as it concerns us ultimately, dealing with man and the world, with nature and history as far as our ultimate concern appears in them, we must know the meaning of being, we must know the structures and powers controlling the different realms of existence.

We have searched for the object or question of philosophy and we have discovered that a theological element, an ultimate concern, gives the impulse to philosophy. We have searched for the object or question of theology and we have discovered that a philosophical element is implied in theology—the question of the meaning and structure of being and its manifestation in the different realms of being. Philosophy and theology are divergent as well as convergent. They are convergent as far as both are existential and theoretical at the same time. They are divergent as far as philosophy is basically theoretical and theology is basically existential. This is the reason that philosophy is able to neglect its existential basis and to deal with being and beings as if they did not concern us at all. And this is the reason that theology is able to neglect its theoretical form and to become mere kerygma. But as theology always has created a philosophical theology, so philosophers always have tried to reach existential significance, to give a prophetic message, to found a sect, to start a religious-political movement, or to become mystics. But in doing so they were philosophical theologians and were considered as such by followers and foes. Most creative philosophers were theological in this sense. Only noncreative philosophy cuts itself off entirely from its existential basis. It has in its hands the shells, not the substance, of philosophy. It is school and not life and therefore not philosophy, but the trading of old philosophical merchandise.

Both philosophy and theology become poor and distorted when they are separated from each other. Philosophy becomes logical positivism pro-

hibiting philosophy from dealing with any problem which concerns us seriously—political, anthropological, religious—a very comfortable flight of philosophical thought from the tremendous realities of our period. Or it becomes mere epistemology, sharpening always the knife of thought but never cutting, because cutting toward a truth which concerns us demands venturing courage and passion. Or it becomes history of philosophy, enumerating one philosophical opinion of the past after the other, keeping itself at a noble distance, faithlessly and cynically; a philosophy without existential basis, without theological ground and power. In the same way theology, denying entirely its philosophical concern, becomes as poor and distorted as philosophy without a theological impulse. Such a theology speaks of God as of a being besides others, subject to the structure of being as all beings are, stars and men and animals, the highest being but not being itself, not the meaning of being and therefore a merciful tyrant limited in power, who may concern us very much, but not ultimately, not unconditionally; whose existence, doubtful as it is, must be argued for as for the existence of a new chemical element or a disputable event in past history. Or such a theology separates man from nature and nature from man, the Self from its world and the world from the Self to which it belongs. It must do so because it does not know of the powers and structures of being which control man *and* nature, the world *and* the Self subjecting both to tragedy and working in both for fulfillment. The unity of being between man and nature is more basic than their difference in consciousness and freedom. A theology which is unable to understand this necessarily oscillates between moralism and naturalism. But being is more than nature and more than morals.

All this is not supposed to be a challenge to a genuine and consistent kerygmatic theology. It is said only against a theology which is not kerygmatic enough to restrict itself from the use of a shallow popular philosophy, or which is not philosophical enough to accept the fundamental concepts of a serious first philosophy.

We have found a convergence and divergence between theology and philosophy with respect to the question asked by both of them. There is another convergence and divergence with respect to the way the question is answered by both of them. The meaning of being manifests itself in the logos of being, that is, in the rational word which grasps and embraces being and in which being overcomes its hiddenness, its darkness, and becomes truth and light. Truth in Greek is *aletheia*: What is not hidden. Being

ceases to be hidden in the word, the logos, the rational form through which it is meaningful and understandable. Being and the word in which it is conceived cannot be separated. Therefore wherever beings are, is logos of being, a form and structure in which its meaning is manifest. But although logos is in every being, it is outspoken only in that being which has the word, the rational word, the word of truth and light, that is, in man. In man the meaning of being can become manifest because man has the word revealing the hiddenness of being. But although every man has the word of truth potentially, not every man has it actually and no man has it perfectly. Therefore philosophy asks for the way in which man can find the revealing word, the logos of being. Only in a vision a few elect can find it, Parmenides answers. Only noble aristocratic souls are able to look into the infinite depth of the soul, Heraclitus indicates. Only he who is guided by a blessed demon can make the right decisions, Socrates confesses. Only for the initiated the idea appears and the darkness of the cave in which human reason is enclosed disappears, Plato prophesies through the mouth of Diotima. Only those who are free citizens can reach the happiness of pure intuition, Aristotle admits. Only a few wise men reach the state of reason in which the logos of being can reveal itself, the Stoics pronounce. Only in one man—the Christian philosophers continue—the logos has appeared completely, full of grace and truth. This is the point in which the convergence of philosophy and theology is most powerful. It was a theological impulse which drove all these philosophers to a statement about the concrete situation in which the logos of being can appear. An existential concern is involved in all those limiting assertions. And, on the other hand, it is a philosophical concept in which the theology of logos expresses its unconditional concern about the message of Christ. Therefore philosophical theology is and must be logos-theology, while an exclusively kerygmatic theology, like that of Barth, denies the logos-doctrine.

I stopped naming philosophers who have asked the question as to the place where the logos of being is manifest. I could continue up to the present. For the medieval philosophers, the Christian Church is the only place where the logos appears at its very center. For the mystics from Plotinus to Spinoza and for all mystics in India, it is the mystical and ascetic elevation over all beings in which the logos of being itself appears. For the philosophers of the modern Enlightenment in all European countries, it is the third and final period of history only, in which the educated and well-bal-

anced man has grown mature for reason. For Fichte blessed life only, and for Hegel the fulfillment of history only, guarantee truth. For Marx it is the participation in the proletarian struggle and the victory in this struggle in which mere ideology is overcome by truth. In all these men, especially in Marx, the question of the place in which the logos of being appears is taken seriously. In all of them theological passion, existential asking, is obvious. Against this cloud of philosophical witnesses, those school—and textbook—philosophers who pretend that philosophy is merely a matter of learning and intelligence vanish into complete insignificance, even if they constitute a larger number than those mentioned. There is no philosophy deserving the name without transformation of the human existence of the philosopher, without his ultimate concern and without his faith in his election for truth in the place to which he belongs.

But here also the divergence must be stated: Philosophy, although knowing the existential presuppositions of truth, does not abide with them. It turns immediately to the content and tries to grasp it directly. In its systems it abstracts from the existential situation out of which they are born. It does not acknowledge any bondage to special traditions or authorities. It transcends them in asking for being itself beyond all singular beings, even the highest, even the asker himself. Philosophy asks on the existential basis of the Greek city-state and the religion of Apollo and Dionysius; but it asks for truth itself and may be persecuted by them. Philosophy asks on the existential and concrete basis of the Medieval Church and civilization. But it asks for the truth itself and may become martyred by them. Philosophy asks on the existential and concrete basis of bourgeois or proletarian society and culture. But it asks for truth itself and may be expelled by them. Philosophy in spite of its existential and concrete basis turns directly to the meaning of being. This is its freedom, and this brings it about that a thinker who intentionally subjects himself to ecclesiastical or national or class bondage ceases to be a philosopher.

Quite differently, the theologian is bound to the concrete and existential situation in which he finds himself and which is not only the basis but also the subject of his work. As a theologian he is bound to the appearance of the logos after he has acknowledged its appearance on a special space in a special time. As a theologian he deals with the transformation of existence in man's individual and social existence, he deals with what concerns us ultimately. As a theologian he cannot transcend his existential situation either

in personal or in social respect. His faith and the faith of his Church belong intentionally to his thought. This is true of the philosophical as well as of the kerygmatic theologian. But the philosophical theologian, as a Christian, tries to show in his work that the existential situation of the Christian Church is at the same time the place where the meaning of being has appeared as our ultimate concern. In other words: He tries to show that Jesus as the Christ is the Logos.

The methodological way in which this must be done cannot be explained in this article. It cannot be shown how conflicts between special forms of philosophy and the Christian message might be overcome if they can be overcome at all and are not rooted in ultimate existential decisions. This is a matter for concrete elaboration. Neither can it be shown why in a philosophical theology, philosophy must provide the concepts and categories and the problems implied in them to which theology gives the answers drawn from the substance of the Christian message. I only want to give the following indications: Philosophical theology deals with the concept of experience and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in experience, to which the answer is: Revelation. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of being and the categories belonging to it and it leads to the existential problem implied in being, to which the answer is: God. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of existence and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in existence, to which the answer is: The Christ. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of life and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in life, to which the answer is: The Spirit. Philosophical theology deals with the concept of history and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in history, to which the answer is: The Kingdom of God. This is the task and the way of philosophical theology following from the basic definitions given above. It is a permanent work going from century to century as philosophy goes on and the life of the Church goes on. The end of this kind of philosophical theology would be the end of the universal claim of the Christian Church, the end of the message that Jesus is the Christ. What has appeared as our ultimate existential concern has appeared at the same time as the logos of being: This is the fundamental Christian claim and the infinite subject of Philosophical Theology.

The Immorality of Science

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

MUCH of our present world predicament is due to the scientific method and to the scientific attitude. Our educational institutions, which pride themselves on being cities of refuge from the reign of irrationality, are themselves largely responsible for the present rule of terror. It is high time, therefore, that our intellectual leaders awake from their academic dreams to face the cold challenge of a world disillusioned and undone by their dreaming. If a new and better world is to arise, our educators must be jolted out of their rationalized complacency into the awareness of the reality of the kind of world which their own lack of understanding has made possible.

The roots of our present world chaos go deep down in history to the time when the scientific method and attitude supplanted theology as the unifying science of all learning. Science, in the broad sense of knowledge, is a social act based upon the accumulation of man's interpretation of his experience as a whole throughout the ages. It aims at individual and social adequacy in terms of living meaningfulness. As the method of the natural sciences, however, became more and more the standard for determining knowledge, the concept of science itself lost its inclusive connotation and became restricted, in common usage, to the natural sciences. Science as knowledge became reduced to one of its narrow and, by itself, immensely insufficient aspects. But not only did knowledge become confused with one of its parts, but the attitude which accompanied this limited method became more and more widespread, until it paralyzed vigorous social and religious thinking. Since civilization cannot do without adequate social and religious guidance and motivation, the scientific method and attitude thus prepared effectively for the present rule of irrationality and hate. Admittedly, science in its proper place, its method, its attitude, its results, constitutes one of the greatest goods of modern civilization. The immorality of science lies in the perversion of its method and attitude by its false extension beyond its proper limits and the consequent prevention of the larger good. One of the most dangerous foes of any civilization is a narrow method. It is because this method with the attitude it brought has been taken as a final and com-

plete truth rather than as merely one approach to a limited aspect of reality, that we have today a world rich in technological progress but devoid of adequate social purpose and dynamic.

How, precisely, did the scientific method and attitude prepare the soil of civilization for the seeds of irrationality and hate? In the first place, they are negative. When science in general became identified with the natural sciences, the test for truth became empirical demonstrability. More and more the inductive method of science in the narrow sense tended to limit its findings to the logico-empirical realm. What could not be publicly verified in an exact manner could not be classified as true. To be scholarly was to give point for point and bit for bit objectively testable evidence. Such a method reduced the sphere of knowledge to a very small area of even the natural sciences. Not only, moreover, was science itself narrowing the field, but philosophy under its influence, especially in the line of English empiricism culminating with Hume, and, in the same way, religious knowledge, became more and more limited to the empirical realm, in the sense that speculative thought was robbed of its power effectively to guide the social process. Gradually, under this limiting influence of science, the negativism of what calls itself positivism arose in many forms: the humanistic positivism of Feuerbach, the sociological positivism of Saint-Simon and Comte, the evolutionary positivism of Spencer, the scientific positivism of much of modern thought, the logical positivism of Carnap and Schlick, to mention but a few—these are indicative of a deep undercurrent eating away the foundations of social and religious rationality by calling its method and attitude ineffective, illusory, and undependable. It is obvious, however, that all positivisms are negative abstractions since no one lives by pure logic or by pure fact. The very stress on validity, whether in the sense of formal or material truth, as the goal and standard of knowledge, rather than on social and religious adequacy, makes for a paralyzing negativity of thought. The scientific method and attitude made for the present world unrest by declaring that it alone could find truth, and, as a result, by leaving without adequate guidance the most important areas of man's life.

Secondly, the scientific method made for our present world chaos by its attitude of detachment. Within the limits of its proper efficacy, the negativity of the scientific method was necessary and good. Just so, within its proper limits and for its special task, the detached attitude of the scientist made science, with all its rich contributions to civilization, possible. But in

the social and religious realms, detachment is death. These fields deal with living wills and cannot treat their material as bits of matter or as quanta of energy. To be truly alive is to be not detached, but committed to something. Life is full of interests and emotions. People will be enthusiastic. They will rise to the challenge of the emotions. Because science has no place for the emotions, in thinking of its method as ideal for all fields it became hopelessly unrealistic. Without adequate social and religious guidance of their emotions, people fell easy prey to fanatical leaders of limited loyalties, of whom the dictators of today are striking examples.

In the third place, the scientific method and attitude were tentative. One result of this idea of tentativeness was liberalism, which taught that any absolute was beyond man's reach, and that men must learn to tolerate each other and to hold their own position open to intellectual review. This tentativeness in its place of intellectual inquiry was of real value, but it became a great evil when it attempted to pervade and benumb the adequate intellectual guidance of emotional commitment. Liberalism by its tentativeness thus became vague, indifferent, and ineffective. Men must commit themselves to something. They crave emotional indoctrination around some definite ideas. The scientific attitude which liberalism embodied and exemplified relied on individual experience without any understanding that the truths of experience are largely a social achievement that must be passed on through careful instruction or be lost. Liberal parents left their children to seek out for themselves these truths, with the result that they often followed the inferior rather than the superior interests. Unguided and confused, they longed for something definite to take the place of what seemed the sophisticated indifference of liberalism's tentativeness.

The scientific method thus made for a negative, detached, and tentative attitude which in its place was necessary and good, but which when it became all pervasive tended to be unrealistic and ineffective, and left an emptiness which became filled with loyalties to inferior ends. It became further destructive by limiting its task to description. Science is always descriptive, never normative. This means that the intellect could describe and arrange material already at hand, but not create norms or rules for people to live by. Value judgments came to be considered nonsense. Religious affirmations were called superstition, or, at best, a matter of private opinion. This descriptive approach, to be sure, was good in its place and

effected desirable results. Under its influence, a little more than a century ago, history for the first time arose to critical powers and helped to free man from much that was untrue. But it was not without its damaging results as well. For with history came in two major defects—the turning of historical scholarship to the past without regard for its responsibility to the present, and a superficial relativism which failed to see the deeper unity and continuity in the historic process. Thus, in order to be descriptive in method, that is to be approved by the reigning ideal of scholarship, men busied themselves more and more with the history of things—of ethics, of philosophy, of theology. The descriptive method demanded material accessible to public verification. As a consequence, scholarly institutions and scholarly journals have eschewed creative thinking, have rejected the very thought needed to guide modern civilization, and have dwelt in the scholarly exactness of a past that became more important to them the less direct bearing it had on present problems. History, like science, had to be pure, not applied; it had to be descriptive, not concerned with present usefulness; and it had to be coldly and factually analytical like science, not synthetic or broadly interpretative for the sake of arriving at wisdom to guide a confused and troubled world. In fact, to be scholarly one had to be so descriptive that nothing but tangible evidence and its exact reproduction was history. One historian said that he recognized archaeology as the highest kind of history, because in it the scholar dealt with things that could be handled, with no question of interpretation read into the facts by a recorder in the past. So abstract became some descriptive scholarship that to be scholarly often became synonymous with being useless. To be of no practical value was honorific in academic circles. But this study of the past by the analytic method could not but lead to a relativistic agnosticism. Description, except in the service of a larger understanding, is of questionable worth unless it be to provide certain men with salaries in order that they may escape the boredom of practical life and still have the satisfaction of the approval of the learned tradition. History, unless it be also an art, is fatal to a wholesome civilization. The study of history, to be sure, is one of the most important ways to obtain truth, but if its end be the small, irrelevant fact and not also the large, relevant insight, it becomes merely a way to avoid today and to doom tomorrow. Basically, the description of the past is for the sake of prescription for the present.

Then, again, the scientific method and attitude made for the stressing of the physical rather than the moral, of the natural rather than the spiritual.

This was inevitable. The physical could be measured more exactly; the physical was open to demonstration; the moral and the spiritual varied with the degree of intellectual attainment and good will of the people concerned. The latter subjects, moreover, face the problem of freedom with its question of oughtness. These two matters, therefore, cannot be competently dealt with on the plane of universal demonstrability. Both the investigator and the free agent to be studied are, with respect to morality and religion, beyond exact measurement. Because the scientific method could not be used here, the subjects themselves lost prestige and authority. The moral and the spiritual could not be adequately approached from the point of view of what is. They must also be approached from the point of view of what ought to be. But into the ought enters the passionate reason, and there it is not pleasant for the investigator to go.

The scientific method and attitude are further responsible for our present world situation by their stress on reason and their lack of training of the will. The horror for the ought, for "preaching" in educational institutions, the pride in truth for the sake of truth, left the will without adequate ends and training. Bertrand Russell in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* a few years ago traced the present world confusion to the overemphasis since the time of Fichte on will rather than on reason. What Russell failed to see was that since that time there has been a crying need for giving will its primary place in the scheme of life. Indeed, it is there whether we wish it or not. The question is what kind of will we are to have. Modern psychology, especially depth psychology, is rediscovering what Aristotle long ago saw, that reason is the slave of willful desire. Reasoning can be used to rationalize as well as to discover the truth. Technological progress can come by reason, but without good will to motivate and guide reason, progress itself can become destructive. Apart from a good purpose expressing the divine in man, progress becomes demonic.

The scientific method and attitude, while necessary and good in their place, nevertheless, by arrogating to themselves the exclusively right approach to truth, became destructive of the best in civilization. The old theology, when it was queen of the sciences, had, to be sure, not given sufficient interest or allowed sufficient scope for independent investigation; but the restrictive theologians of our day, as Whitehead points out, are the scientists, whose method may lead civilization to a thinness and a lack of moral leadership that will eventually destroy it. Of course, the scientists

themselves are not entirely to blame for this. Perhaps even more at fault is the lack of power of insight and conviction on the part of the philosophers and the theologians. This is easy to understand since science produced "results." Science changed our world and gave us material progress as the greatest contribution of the modern era. Then, too, the scientists had a definite demonstrable approach. No wonder that the moral and religious scholars cast a longing eye at the scientific method and tried to adopt it, bag and baggage. This is the tragedy of our times, that the scientific method which produced such results in its own field could not work in these fields. The theologians and philosophers only made themselves less effective and less respected. The unsuitable method produced deplorable results. More and more morality and religion went begging for prestige, while the laurels went to the scientific department. In educational institutions money was raised for it, buildings given to it, and trustees went in search of faculties with scientific training. Men of science supplanted ministers as college presidents. The schools pointed with pride to their physical equipment, to their laboratories, to their demonstrable contribution to scientific knowledge.

But the scientific method made even more subtle inroads on the non-scientific subjects. Especially is this true of religion. Scientific knowledge is itself a social act. It depends upon the ages of discovery. No individual seeker could by himself find any important scientific truth. To attempt to do so would be like trying to build a skyscraper from the vantage point of a lone brick in mid-air at about the eightieth story. Scientific knowledge is an edifice slowly and carefully built over the long ages. Yet the student as he performs a specific test in a laboratory gets the impression that he is testing for himself from the very beginning all that he has been taught. He succumbs to the illusion that he is not accepting anything on authority. Nothing could be further from the truth. Because in religion such a definite physical test is impossible, the scientific method made it easy to believe that religion was not in any way testable. Religious knowledge, too, is a social process in which no individual by himself can find the truth. He depends upon the ages of religious experience. In other words, both scientific and religious knowledge have their conventional side. Science has discovered certain truths that stand testing. Religion also has discovered its truths that stand testing. But religion refers to a total experiential situation that can be tested best not in a laboratory by an isolated individual, but in a whole social complex. Individuals can live for a while on inherited spiritual capital. They

can live parasitically and without much private exertion on the lives of those who keep up the standards of civilization. But let the group or the nation abandon the truths of religion, and mankind is faced with certain disaster. Because of the scientific method and attitude those in schools throughout almost their whole course have been subjected to the attitude that religion is a private concern, without fundamental roots in the universe. The secular attitude in our schools and the aura of embarrassment about religion in our colleges, plus a great many out and out negative and even aggressively anti-religious statements, have sent students out with the feeling that ministers and teachers of religion deal with a subject less in the nature of things than science; whereas actually religion deals with the primary truths of man's relationship with the universe and with his fellow men.

In still another way the method and attitude of science made for moral and religious, and thus inevitably for social inadequacy. Not only did the young and most open to influence start out into active life with a contemptuous or questioning attitude toward religion, but they also started with the false idea that learning can be divorced from personal morality. In science it is true that a person can lead a socially and religiously objectionable life and still be able to impart mathematical or scientific truth. These subjects are objective in the sense that they can be communicated apart from the teacher's personal morality. But the fact is that every teacher teaches more than his subject unless life be not meaningful to him. Every vital personality imparts living as well as purely factual truth. He gives attitudes and points of view whether directly or indirectly. We learn most, moreover, from those whom we admire or trust the most. The student is taught to look up to the scientific teacher, in the broader sense of that term, and to accept his point of view. He counts less on the one professionally interested in the moral and spiritual subjects. When the scientific teacher talks down or lives down the truths of ethics or religion, he inevitably teaches that as much as and perhaps more than his subject. The teacher of science in general deals only with the media of life. The teacher of morality and religion deals with life itself and the rules which must govern it. The former deals with a real which can be impersonal and impose no ought in the sense of personal control and social obligation. The latter must deal with the sometimes painful question of ought. When the teacher of science projects his nonnormative standards into the personal field, the student finds it pleasant to listen. When the psychologist, thinking himself scientific, tells the student

that he should discard his inhibitions in favor of a natural life, the advice finds only too receptive soil. When the pastor, on the other hand, preaches that temptation must be faced and overcome, he is dubbed an "old foggy," out of step with modern learning. Problems of personality and civilization, however, will not down. The disciplines of the ought must ever be with us. It is for this reason that the divorcing of learning from personal morality even in the name of freedom of speech is dangerous.

If this is the situation, if a method which in its place is good, has become immoral by its perversion, by its false extension to fields beyond its proper efficacy, what can be done? What can be done to eliminate a negative, detached, and tentative method not suitable to life? What can be done to supplement inadequate description with adequate prescription?

The only answer is a return to religion. Whitehead is right when he stresses in his *Aims of Education* that all education must be religious in essence. To some extent this is already beginning to take place. Historians are now becoming interpretative. The analytical method is rapidly being supplemented among leading thinkers by the synthetic approach. Scientists themselves are admitting that science as such cannot save the world. At a recent meeting of scientists it was even said that scientists must accept moral and social responsibility. Science, it was stated, cannot remain detached and save the world. This and many other similar instances, like that of Doctor Birkhoff's assertion in his presidential address to the American Association of Science that science must ever operate in an attitude of faith, point in the right direction. But neither history nor science nor any other nonreligious subject can by its method alone save the world. This can be done only by the larger superarching interpretation of reality and social life which is religious in essence. Before this is recognized there can be no radically constructive solution. Even though superficial accretions have gathered around the moral and spiritual laws, the laws themselves cannot with impunity be flouted. These accretions must be weighed in the balance and accepted or rejected according to their inherent truth. Beyond this, of course, there are also several definite, constructive things to be done.

One is frankly to recognize that man's fellowship is more important than any of its media. To admit this is to drop all trust in the power of science or knowledge to save civilization. If man's relation with man and with the universe in which he lives is primary, all problems and solutions lie on the personal, that is, on the moral and religious plane. Progress in the

technological sense then becomes subordinate to purpose. The reasoning processes become subservient to the will which directs them. Learning becomes a matter of the training of the will, of moral indoctrination, as well as of gathering information. Our educational institutions must recognize the spheres of living philosophy, living ethics, and living religion as of key importance and must do all in their power to see that they are under competent leadership and used in the interest of social and religious adequacy. This approach means a revolution of emphasis in the curriculum. The religious and philosophical departments must be no longer merely useful appendices with elective courses, but the very backbone of education, without which education cannot in a true and full sense exist at all. In our public schools, the training of children to disregard religion because it does not hold the position of even a standard subject must give way to some method which Church and State must devise in order to save the world from the forces of destruction which are engulfing them because both of them have been asleep to the fundamental danger which goes much deeper than the menace of dictators or of any other results of their own neglect of fundamental truths.

Another necessary change in emphasis is that social and religious adequacy rather than exact demonstrability must be the final standard. This means not that exact demonstrability need be impaired in the slightest in the fields where it belongs, but that its field must be rigidly limited and made subservient to the larger interests of life for which they themselves exist. The specialist and exact scientist will be none the less appreciated and given every encouragement even though the limited nature of his task be understood. No longer the pure scientist, but the creative thinker who can constructively guide social and religious life must be the ideal scholar. The man who sees things deeply and as a whole, the man with insights and comprehensive view, the man who knows history, who understands social life and who can help realize the ideal must be recognized as the scholar. Lack of belief, then, will no longer be an asset but a liability. The man who fails to understand the ideal and lacks the faith and dynamic to help effect it is inadequate as a scholar, even though he has his limited task to perform. This, of course, will make the idea of the scholar much higher and harder of attainment. As it now is, any person given training, a fair amount of intelligence, and perseverance in accuracy can specialize in an obscure field and be accepted as a scholar by his peers. Long ago Veblen pointed out the artificiality of the learned tradition. Everyone in the field of higher educa-

tion recognizes the barrenness and thinness of a large part of so-called scholarship, and the timidity of many scholars to offer a constructive idea lest it be called opinionate, subjective, or simply "not scholarly." Some scholars in our larger universities come close to being pathological cases because, while feeling the emptiness of their work, they lack courage to break with an established opinion. All this must be changed and social adequacy must once more become an incentive.

Each scholar, in other words, must be valued according to his faith and devotion to the ideal order. Agnosticism and cynicism no longer can be equated with scholarship. A lifting of the eyebrow and a shrug of the shoulder no longer can be considered signs of maturity. Sophomoric sophistication must give way to generous concern for mankind and its problems. To be willing to fail and to see things imperfectly, then gradually to see them more clearly, but never to relinquish the struggle for social and religious adequacy—this must be the new attitude, even on the part of our educational institutions that have all too often been smugly content with limited fields and forgotten the real reason for their existence. Mere learning will have little value apart from social and moral usefulness. Learning for its own sake will, to be sure, be appreciated, but always kept in readiness for the scholar who will see its significance and put it in the service of personal values. Perhaps our first approach must be to change attitudes and find symbols for them. Perhaps we first must convince the world that its present trust in education under a suffocating scientific method and attitude is truly immoral, and that with all perversion it is destined for disaster. Signs of doom are already upon us. The call is for a change of mind and method in the high places of leadership. Upon this change rests the hope for saving the best values of an ideal democracy: the freedom and faithfulness in fellowship, based on God's good will toward the world and toward all mankind. Without an enlightened and committed leadership, the fury must continue to come, until religion becomes persecuted and fanatical under either mob violence and chaos or under tyranny and oppression. But religion is in the nature of things, and even in this worst event its forces, however crude and fanatical their beginnings, will rise, stressing commitment, faith, the discipline of the will, the inseparability of life from ideas, until after dark ages a chastened and a humbled world may repent of its immorality of method and attitude and find in fellowship, faith, and devotion to the ideal its only hope of salvation.

Beyond the Possible

JAN B. KOZAK

"Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

—Matthew 5. 48.

I

THE lawmakers of the old Roman Empire have set down, among others, a very sound legal principle: "*Nemo tenetur ultra posse*"—No one is bound beyond the possible. It was a just and compassionate rule: no one should be indicted for not having performed feats which were out of his human reach, or which circumstances prevented his achieving. It has passed into the legal systems of civilized nations. Only primitive tribes and mobs can hunt down individuals for things they could not help; only tyrants manage to martyr people and entire nations that happen to be standing in their way toward power and conquest; to make hostages of the innocent relatives of their opponents; to punish those who failed to pick their ancestors from among the members of some boastful master race.

During the past few generations, however, the principle that no one is bound to attempt the impossible has become far more than a benevolent legal practice. Nowadays it is an excuse for nearly all our failures; a cushion on which we put our flabbiness to rest; a lullaby to lull our conscience into a comfortable sleep. In most cases it is not clearly formulated—no Latin is required to feel it. Its real seat is not in the sphere of scientific or legal reasoning, but in that of feeling and habit. This attitude is found at the bottom of a large part of modern literature, of our film production, of our economic life, in politics—almost everywhere.

All the time modern man has the vague feeling that science is backing up his self-indulgent bearing. *What, after all, is possible?* Are we not determined by past causes over which we had no control? Are we not being tuned, or put out of tune, by inner secretion and other mysterious chemical processes in our body? Magic words fly past your ears—you are introvert, extrovert, cyclothymic, schizophrenic, something of that and a lot in addition, but anyway, you can't help it. You are a product of heredity, race, environment, economic conditions. You are animated by deep, perhaps

essentially sexual instincts, which are rooted in the opaque depths of the subconscious.

We are not sufficiently aware that those mighty streams of contemporary trends are carrying away much of the fertile soil of our civilization into the oceans of oblivion. Their tributaries are numerous. Here is the fatalism of outdated scientists. Here is psychoanalysis, that modern illness developed to meet a stylish cure. Some tributaries come down from the snowy heights of medical science; others bear the names of prominent psychologists; a whole net of them is named after sociologists, jurists, economists, who put emphasis on a detailed survey of facts and maintain that evaluations and ideals are to be barred from science as mere subjective deceptions, one as good a guess as another. Extensive areas in Europe are inundated by zoological racial theories. One sixth of the habitable globe and many places on other continents are being drained by the swift currents of Marxism.

The crux of the whole situation is that all these trends have had, each in its own special way, real scientific foundations. Applied with circumspection and in the proper place, they can give us useful warnings. Not the rivers, but the muddy floods are dangerous and destructive. Thus—if we are not unreasonable admirers of the sorry thing we call civilization—we find much truth in the scathing criticism of a Bolshevik. He is certainly headlong; he is scoffing at every turn—isn't he a revolutionary? He is wrong insofar as he makes the secondary, inefficient character of ideologies and spiritual principles eternal and necessary law of nature. But take his theory as a diagnosis, a pathological one; take a sharp look at the incompetence of many alleged idealists; see all the wriggling and listen to all the cant that surrounds us, and you will probably often have to ask if many of the "lights" of our times are not like will-o'-the-wisps over a moor; if the real source, the condition of their being is not the moor itself. And likewise we must ask if our instincts and the motives derived from them are not considerably stronger than the old-type rationalist was ready to admit. It is not the facts we mean to question, and it is not the facts the average man knows. What we are discussing is the general atmosphere. Well, the prevailing feeling is something like this: Science has spoken. A general pardon is being given, an alibi for all you are and fail to be, or do and fail to do. Go and get that general indulgence. Modern man is not upset by the overwhelming odds his better self has to face, nor inclined to increase his efforts with set teeth and a new determination. He is not afraid he is losing face. Looking complacently

into the mirror he does not realize that the face it reflects is essentially an animal one. He likes it.

II

Into this close, sleepy air of the prevailing mood a word of the undiluted gospel of Jesus comes down like a flash of lightning.

"Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Why, that's impossible! Of course it is. Why, that's nonsense. Just so, if you are one of the wise of this world. The gospel continues to be a stumbling block, a foolishness. Do you hear the hoarse laughter of millions from the countries ruled by aggressors? "You fools," they tell us, "man is what he eats, and that's bad stuff often enough." "Man is a beast of prey," say the others, "in that he can be perfect indeed." But we need not go that far to get a jogging. Fancy what jibes that verse would call forth in night clubs and music halls, imagine what grins it would produce among the jobbers in the stock exchanges all the world over.

The worst of it is that those people are partly right again. They are certainly more matter-of-fact than Jesus. They do not feel sorry for human deficiencies—in fact they hail them, exalt and exploit them. Reject their *attitude*—you cannot deny many of their *statements*. Meanwhile millions listen to mysterious rites and go home self-contented. Other millions keep their gospel thoroughly dried, neatly canned, to be taken a tin a week or a fortnight. Their ecclesiastical year is a merry round, beginning with a carnival cocktail and ending with sentimental Christmas cookies.

Yet the undiluted gospel of Jesus is anything but comfortable. In a clean-cut contrast to the principle that no one's duty goes beyond the possible, Jesus says: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Which, of course, *is* impossible. And so are many other things, though we have repeated them so often that they have long since ceased to startle us. Who has never been angry with his brother without a cause? Who has never committed adultery by looking on women to lust after them? Who has been so truthful that he need not swear by his head, or heaven, or earth, that his yea and nay be in itself a rock to stand upon? Which of us has the noble mind to love his enemies, to bless those who curse him, to pray for them which spitefully use him and persecute him? I have tried hard, and failed, of course.

We are embarking upon disquieting thoughts indeed. To crown all,

we must add another difficulty, this time of a logical kind. What is perfection? Nothing we know is perfect, though we bestow that attribute rather lavishly on things and persons that win our admiration. Turn it whichever way you will, no other reply is to be found than this: perfection is the complete absence of imperfection. With defects and imperfections we have experience enough. We can think away or even remove one after another in concrete cases. But, if our goal is the idea of perfect perfection—Perfection with a capital P, God's perfection—we never can reach it. It belongs to the class of negative concepts. And negative concepts are empty. The propositions on which we base them say only what this or that object of thought is not. We are free to mean or to intend such objects of thought. However, do what we will, we are unable to fill them. Thus the particular part of the Sermon on the Mount which we are discussing, a word our lips have reproduced so often and so easily, appears not only impossible, but also unintelligible. There is only one method which can give the word a gradually growing meaning: We must try to see and to remove as many imperfections as we can, both in ourselves and in all human affairs. This can illuminate a part of the unknown country ahead. It means a relentless effort, but can be a help at all times. But does this not represent another version of our paradox—not to give up, although we know that the goal is not only unattainable, but also unknowable?

Christianity *is* an impossible religion. Kirkegaard has taught us to regard these impossibilities and paradoxes of the gospel as not merely occasional hot words which we must pass over or at least speak quickly not to burn our mouths, but the very essence of the gospel. Which means that there are no perfect Christians, and never have been. That the religion exists only in a thin solution. That it is impossible to be a Christian otherwise than by intention.

If we center our attention on this paradox as the essence of the gospel, it may do us a good, though hardly a pleasant, service. It will help us to say where this essence is not to be found. Such consequences will hardly be liked by those who claim to be the embodiment of Christian religion, or else, if they do not aspire that high, place the emphasis on easier quarters, such as rites, church, sacraments, apostolic succession, verbal inspiration, miracles, pure doctrine and what not. Intellectual sacrifice is easy—it costs nothing.

This is certainly not intended as provocation. We are simply craving

for bread in a hungry, cruel, war-torn world. The results of the Christian culture are scandalous, let us not deny it. Many a Hindu sage, nay even a pariah, has realized it and voiced it. Our first reaction should be that of humbleness.

But genuine humbleness is not the whole reply that must be given. Jesus apparently did not say this merely to keep down our pride. He actually urges us to attempt the impossible; we cannot get around it. The dilemma is indeed a serious one. No time has probably been less prepared to face the stern, exacting, uncompromising demands of the gospel. On the one hand, the nets of the inevitable and inescapable are closing in upon us. We must acknowledge that there is much truth in the melancholy picture modern science is giving of human nature. The odds against us are real, the more so as those nets which hold so firm feel so soft and cosy. On the other hand, we are clearly being held beyond the possible. What a dualism! Here is the real world, including ourselves as natural beings—raw, rough, impure, deceitful and lazy. And there is the impossible, mysterious goal, a Kingdom manifestly not of this world. And between those two the folly of Christianity.

III

However, there are apparent follies which hide a distant wisdom. The real folly in this case lies in the self-deception. Most baptized people take for granted what isn't granted at all. This complacency is bringing our practical efforts to a standstill at a time when the tasks, personal, economic, social, are assuming monstrous dimensions. It endangers the very existence of Christianity. Even if we call a Christian everyone who desires to be called so, we cannot fail to see that it is a decided minority. Think of the religions of the yellow race, of complicated India, of the Mohammedan world, of such powerful substitutes for religion as the Communist, Fascist and Nazi creeds: you cannot fail to envisage one of the gravest ordeals in Christian history ahead of us. Some of the princes of the Church still seem to think they can profit by playing the game of the mighty while everything is at stake, the very intrinsic meaning of the religion itself. And, not to forget, the continuance of all humanitarian and democratic principles and institutions depends on the issue.

On second thought we find a deeper meaning in the paradox outlined. In fact, the two poles, the reality and the unattainable ideal, are both neces-

sary and vital. There is a theoretical, philosophical, scientific solution to our paradox—but not a practical one.

A certain dualism, a gulf and a tension between the real and the ideal is the necessary condition of all premeditated effort. The effort itself need not be necessarily moral or noble—the faculty of thinking ahead of facts which forms the essence of what we call spiritual functions is an ambiguous gift indeed. It leads, as often as not, into infernal abysses instead of to sunkissed heights of a noble spiritual vision. The chasm between the positive and negative values is certainly greatest in the realm of spiritual values. That is why man can be so much worse than the animal.

High tension between these two poles, the one real, the other consisting largely of spiritual vision, is a vital prerequisite of all morality and, of course, of all moral religion. None of us will deny that we are, to an extent which frightens us at times, fatefully conditioned by past causes, by all that happened before, outside of us as well as in ourselves, in this time-spatial world. There are certainly many, many things we can appropriately call our fate: our race and color, our sex, our inherited qualities. But there is, in spite of all, a margin of freedom. Each living being is a center of partial indetermination. We are not only products of reality, but also producers of new realities, workers, even partial creators. We co-operate on the course of the Universe, certainly to a smaller degree than the tiny polyp on a coral island co-operates with the ocean that surges around it, but with conspicuous—and often distressing—results on this planet of ours. We are not only adapting ourselves to environment, but also adapting environment to ourselves, cultivating, or spoiling whole continents so that little of real nature is left on them. But all our human plans, devices and inventions, all buildings and machines, all organizations for good or bad ends have first been born in the realm of spiritual vision. What we mean, intend, invent, does not generally belong to what we call reality, namely, to the time-spatial, measurable world. In a way it is not of this world, yet it provides us with motives for actions which work them into this world. The supernatural, so thoroughly banned from the horizon of many of our contemporaries, is in fact a matter of everyday experience. Any scheme is supernatural as long as it remains a vision, before it is projected by our activity to set a goal for our action and to be embodied in the real, time-spatial world.

Willy-nilly, man is an inhabitant of those two worlds. It is a commonplace thing to repeat that he has become much more proficient in his mastery

of nature than in the finding and holding of principles which should guide his use of all those technical means. Yet, it must be repeated. This failure is the source of the stupor of our civilization; it accounts for the ruthless dynamism which has brought this warlike and revolutionary cataclysm upon us. It explains the betrayal and complete or partial suicides of European democracies. We continue speaking about institutions and procedures, but we are dodging the real economic and social issues. We forget that the essential issues of this cherished free civilization of ours must be seen through lest the revolutionary or predatory forces may succeed in their assault upon the "Haves." It should be clear that the humanitarian—and essentially Christian—ideals of democracy have to be as dynamic and progressive as any of the brutal forces now opposing them; that the eternal fight for the Rights of Man, for his life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the government of the people, by the people, and not to forget, *for* the people, must be projected into the economic and social order of the world. Instead, we have seen responsible statesmen compromise with those of the dictators who seemed to protect the vested interests of their class. Everybody was betraying everybody else. The new Napoleons have been smashing their way with armies of traitors through a world of deserters. Is it a wonder that old and decent institutions and traditions are bending under the weight of lost opportunities and neglected duties? We are living in the midst of an upheaval without precedent because we have been spiritually weak and for a long time in a crisis—long before the crises came.

Curiously enough, the minimization and amputation of the spiritual sphere of man has been hailed as a triumph of science. We were immensely proud of it. For a considerable time we have been intent on facts, more facts—and often facts alone. No time in history has been better informed about that which is; none has been more perplexed about that which ought to be. We are taking in more information through the press and over the radio in a day than people did in a month less than a century ago. We are being machine-gunned by facts and statistics: industrial, monetary, economic, social, hygienic, medical, political, and military. And yet, how little do we know what to think and to do about them! Mere facts are incapable of showing the direction. They all lie on the same plane of the real. We have become too exclusively citizens of one world. We have been standing on one leg only, hopping about now and then, but incapable of walking.

By all this, modern man is, of course, not stripped of his spiritual abili-

ties. Still, he is dangerously losing his grip on them, his faith in them, his spiritual pattern of life and personal self-control; all this at a time when the richness of his factual knowledge demands the very reverse. The impact of determining influences is such that not less, but more is needed of spiritual orientation, vision, and strength. We have become too matter-of-fact. Sailing on a rough sea, we have surrounded ourselves with charts, but have refused to consult the compass, to look up to the North Star, even to decide which way it is better to sail. As a result, humanity is adrift. The organizers of ruthlessness and sheer power policy hail this situation as their golden opportunity. They have become so realistic that bones and skulls are cracking. And the learned men are sitting over the havoc nodding like mandarins, yet unable to master the wild current which may carry us no one knows where.

IV

However, it was just the "dreamers" who have done most to direct the course of civilization. Not from the statistical offices, but from the fairy-land of Utopia came the inspiration. Facts must be studied—in this respect we are never thorough enough. Nothing is further from our mind than to advocate a seclusion of the spirit. Those people who are content to sit in their corner while the world is ablaze are hardly less dangerous than gangsters. "If the so-called good people were not lazy," said a wise man, "the world would be a much better place to live in." But this does not mean that we must try to diminish the distance between the two poles of which we have spoken. Prophets and philosophers of the Absolute actually have exerted a greater influence than the most careful descriptions of what was—and is no more. They cared little about the ways and means—means have to be found in each time anew—but their guiding influence was deeper than the influence of those whose facts died away with the times in which they happened to get them.

In the gospel of Jesus this vital dualism of the real and the ideal, this tension between what is and what ought to be is *made absolute*.

Unless we take it quite in earnest, we certainly miss one of the vital traits of the gospel, if not its very essence. It is meant as a source of untiring, unceasing, creative dynamism. Here is the force of the paradox. But it is not primarily the theoretical solution that interests us, it is the practical implications.

The first Christian generation undoubtedly interpreted such words in

personal rather than in social terms. They believed themselves to be reading the last page of human history; their risen Christ was expected at any time to descend from heaven to inaugurate the miraculous advent of the Kingdom of God. Political programs and social reforms, even family life and new marriages were not among the things that mattered. The abolishment of social differences among themselves was, where it succeeded, new life, but no program to be carried on beyond their ranks. All worldly conditions were already suffused with the light of the new aeon to come, and neither Jesus nor the first Christian generations were social revolutionaries, as was sometimes believed by Marxian writers. Yet new *life* it was.

With the conversion of broad pagan masses the Church was as much paganized as the masses were Christianized. The political victory of the Church since Constantine and its alliance with State and power politics completed the process. Since those times a split goes through the Christian world: only a small part of the believers aspired to perfection, living in asceticism, and praying for the others, while the majority did not essentially differ from the old heathen world. It was these latter ones who set the rule; they were industrious and crafty, humble or overbearing; unless they were being robbed or killed, they did the job of robbing and killing. Theoretically the Church did not tell them they had a title to cruelty and fornication, but by forgiving them it fastened the grip on the society, the pattern and stratification of which it accepted, as a God-willed order. There were ups and downs in the moral standards of the spiritual minority. We must freely acknowledge the relative good they did, especially in times when they added work to praying, or in the early Middle Ages when they were nursing the new barbarian nations. We need not emphasize the periods of decay of monastic orders. The point is that this split, this kind of dualism in itself meant dodging the issue. If we look at it from the sociological and social angle we cannot but acknowledge that, with few honorable exceptions, the Church, or Churches, did but little to soften and humanize the ruthless ways of life. Social revolutionaries sneer at the philanthropic bones thrown to the poor. The reality was not quite so bad. Social conscience has made some progress, with us, at least. But at practically no time in the Christian history did the Church take the lead to improve the pattern of society. We are still bent upon the palliative cure of symptoms, tending the sick, helping the refugees, giving away some money to the poor and hungry. However, seen in the due proportion, measured by the insistence of the

problems themselves, these are but puny efforts. We do not suffer enough. We are too complacent. It has been tradition to side with the rich and mighty, lest we lose their cherished financial support. History has heard accredited Christian speakers defend serfdom and slavery, bless the arms of aggressors, oppose school budgets, harangue against social legislation. It can hardly be denied that, in big and vital matters, it was the flocks that led the shepherds.

The old rift is ever present: in the predominance of pious talk over programmatic action, in the reluctance to take sides on issues which are shaking the world. It is not enough to say that we no longer admire the old-time recluse who was spiritual to the point of ignorance and dirt, or the old stylites from the Libyan desert who managed to sit on top of columns for years, half eaten up by insects. The rift is still there, among and within ourselves, in the watertight compartments in which we keep the bitter gist of the gospel from becoming dynamic. We refuse to see that it should have been the task of Christianity to lead the way, even if by trial and error; to be more effective in the criticism of existing conditions; more untiring in paving the way to greater equality of all men; more forward-looking, more progressive than the revolutionaries and aggressors who are now trying, in blood and terror, to break the neck of those classes, or nations, that have invited their envy and wrath.

V

Bracing ourselves for the great historic ordeal ahead we should now concentrate upon the real fundamentals. Many theologians are scrupulously trying to preserve all previous fundamental articles of faith, at least those lying in the ascendant line of their own Church or denomination. Seen from the historical angle, the varying emphasis appears like shifting sand. Once it was on the Nicene Creed; then on the problem of the double nature of Christ; on His single will; on the Holy Spirit's proceeding equally from the Father and the Son; on the inspiration of the Scriptures, on the number and interpretation of sacraments, on miracles. Long forgotten are circumcision and the expectation of the coming of Christ, while the baptism of unconscious children remains, illogically, an accepted custom even among those who have otherwise nothing to do with the magic force of a rite duly performed. The discussion about the fundamentals is going on amid growing indifference of those whom it should save from perdition. We do not intend to resume this kind of controversy. Many old issues which used to

incite even a most unchristian violence have died a natural death. Others will follow. Moreover, if we ask what function they were expected to have, we come to the conclusion that most of them were simply telling the people: "Take the gospel in earnest." Be serious about it—it is inspired Word of God, the new law of Love brought by a Saviour supernaturally born and taken up above the clouds to heaven. Obey the Church which is His foundation. This is certainly genuine, although the reasons given for it are sometimes far-fetched and doubtful.

The essence of Christianity lies in a creative dynamism. Even if the old tenets of the faith were real knowledge, even if we knew, as Dante's time knew, all about heaven and purgatory and hell, life could remain hellishly crude. As a rule, the churches, especially the big ones, tried to be on good terms with those who wielded the material power. While their first duty, ever since the hope of an imminent new aeon had faded away, should have been a critical examination of the pattern of society from the perspective of the underprivileged, they generally did the exact contrary. Their chief concern should have been tenaciously to hold the radical principles of the Christian ethics in order to make them stronger than the established "order" which has always been bad and cruel. Nowadays we are desperately in arrears in this regard, and must not be surprised if the masses of workers and many other disgruntled elements are turning away from us. We should not rejoice if we count the millions who are still obedient to priests or revel in the vision of heaven. The naïve, backward, and also the contented people only deepen the crisis. It is just the critical, often angry, but intelligent underprivileged who should be won over by the dynamic enthusiasm of the gospel, and consequently, of progressive democracy. If the Christians really carried on a relentless drive toward greater equality and human dignity of all men, regardless of race and present social standing, within the nation as well as among the nations, it would no doubt mean a severe initial crisis. The basic difference between mere baptized people and Christians by intention would at once become obvious. Our congregations would be deflated, stripped to the bone, for it is evident that it is their motley social composition which has rendered them indifferent to most burning issues and made them representative, as Bergson has put it, of a static rather than of a dynamic religion. But, if we can venture a prophecy, exactly this will be the dividing line of a future reformation. The great dilemma at present is whether we choose to create new facts or be dragged along by them; to recommend

a new, just world order with new political, economic, social and international implications, or survive ignominiously in the ruins of the old.

What we mean by all this, is not quite the same as the "gospel of social salvation." Social progress, yes, but as a road to spiritual salvation. This is, and remains, the ultimate goal. Our basic error lies in the fact that we are caring for the individual soul while classes, nations, states and races in their entirety evade us. We should never forget what Aristotle knew so well, namely: the perfection of man depends on the perfection of the community at large. They are interdependent; each of them receives life from the other, or, as often as not, the germs of death.

It is often maintained that we should allow for the development of two distinctive types of Christians again. The ones, unneutral, would take sides in the great issues of our times, though they must know they are relative and never quite clean. The others, the "redemptive" minority would attempt to live, so to say, on another plane. They would be neutral; they would offer their services to all warring camps. I am unable to see the point. There are obvious degrees of seriousness, but not different kinds. It looks like a new version of the ideal of the recluse and reminds of the old rift again. We are certainly always wrong, if we take sides without criticism and with the hatreds which cling to them. If the issues are not clean enough, let us purify them. But the real spiritual man should be a worker, in a way—as far as facts go—a worldly man, a man of affairs. The loss of love is certainly a danger, but no greater danger than that kind of indiscriminate loving which sometimes means naïve complicity. Some forms of Christian pacifism, for example, no longer mean any effective measures against wars, but would invite aggression. Do they not sometimes result in the willingness to see someone else thrown into the furnace? Can we afford to speak the same language now as we did a decade ago? Most of the decent people are pacifist—we do not question the principle or the ideal. But we must not live in the moon. I have been very active in this direction myself. But today I must speak as one who has gone through real tribulations of fate—and thought. I cannot but warn of superior minorities within Christendom whose very freedom and existence depends on the others, the less perfect, who carry on the unfortunate struggles.

In view of all this we must wonder if we do not often insist on secondary issues instead of the primary ones, if we do not worry too much when we must drop some ancient tenet, some allegedly fundamental article of faith.

It may well be that our simplification will help us to discover the real radioactive element. Some of us go on removing all but a ton of matter under apprehension of those who think the raw material is the real thing. But it is the tiny radiant remnant which contains the warmth and the energy, and the cure for the cancers of civilization.

Seen from this dynamic, creative side, Christianity becomes all but indefinable. We can easily define it as a historic religious current beginning with Jesus, but *its actual program is, and must be changing*. The impact of raw facts upon the lofty principles will ever produce a living synthesis which does not make sense, may be outdated or even reactionary in a different age and civilization. None of them is final. Inevitably there will be much trial and error in the process.

There is a certain danger in overconfident faith itself. Each of us has heard of inert people who have ruined their lives by believing that "the Lord will provide." Millions seem to be sure that the Christian religion cannot be beaten because of its godly origin and mission. They may be wrong. It is quite an accepted belief that God Himself is in charge of the course of human history. At the present time, with cities bombed and burning, with entire nations writhing on the cross of conquest, with the apocalyptic riders once more let loose in the world, such a belief is all but blasphemous. If this world war and world revolution were His work and not the work of human beings, He would be some kind of an evil demon and no other course would remain to us but to defy Him, and die. No, God interferes with history only through the vision and activities of those who have seen His light, but who do not resemble a passive, timid flock huddled together and begging for the privilege to be on good terms with the powers of light as well as with those of darkness. If we do share a more optimistic view of the future, it is because we believe in those human beings who do not think of desertion. It is they who may become real centers of strength, if they are shown the insistence of their paradoxical duties in this world. Though working against overwhelming odds, they will not give up the fight. Their feet firm on the ground, their eyes lifted up to the Absolute, they will be a living commentary to another enigmatic word of Jesus. It runs: "Be ye therefore wise as serpents and harmless as doves."

The Focus of Religious Education

PETER A. BERTOCCI

I

NOTHING, perhaps, has done more to vitiate our thinking about education, secular and religious, than the idea that education is "preparation." The schools, we say, are to *prepare* individuals for life, the implication being that the actual functioning of education is to affect not the present but the future! Thus we have provided the individual with educational medicine for tomorrow's malady, meanwhile overlooking today's ailment. It is high time we realized that the individual's present illness is so transforming him that the prescription for his future will not apply. It is today that determines what medicine will be effective tomorrow!

Furthermore, whether we like it or not, it is today that absorbs the main interest and attention of the large majority of people. The imagination for next month's and next year's task will be bounded by the vision and bias of today. If the present is too perplexing, the imaginative plan for tomorrow will be dictated not by realistic understanding and foresight, but by wish-beliefs and retreat.

It is no wonder, then, that we have forfeited, in large areas of secular and religious education, the moving interest of the individual. Many who are glad to sing the praise of education as a general tool, are still at a loss to see what good it does in the tasks which immediately confront them. Now, I am no advocate of "practical" education for today and next week only, or of those changes in a curriculum which enslave men to the present by closing the avenues to the past and the future. Indeed, I should insist that the present is misunderstood and misused unless we practice both hindsight and foresight. But I should urge with equal emphasis that education misses fire when it does not so clarify the present that the individual, child, adolescent, or adult, loses perspective on his immediate plan of action.

A misconception of the focus of education is even more deadly when it invades thinking on religious instruction. Whenever religious education, whether it be in the church school or in the sermon, stresses either the teaching or transmitting of a body of knowledge, and shies away from the bleeding concerns of the individual, it is inviting defeat. Nor are the reasons

far to seek. First, a man frustrated in his active interests will not for very long give more than lip service to a sanctified body of knowledge or doctrine that fails to illuminate the anxieties of the moment. The specter of religion has always been the inability to convince both the heart and the mind of practical men that belief in God really makes a constructive difference in the guidance of affairs in this everyday world.

II

Specifically, then, the focus of religion must be the individual and those basic conflicts which are forever present in man's life in different forms. What are these problems? They issue from the fundamental needs of man and the conflict of those needs; they spring from the elemental motives and desires which move men to some sort of adjustment to reality. I am very conscious of the knotty psychological controversy which arises when anyone tries to list the basic needs and wants of man as man; nevertheless, I venture to suggest these fundamental drives. (We need not be concerned here with whether these wants are innate, innate and modified by experience, or socially acquired, though I should accept a form of the second alternative.)

Four demands at least does the normal person make on the universe. He wants *security* for himself and those he loves. He wants *recognition* of his own abilities and needs. He wants to *feel necessary* to someone or to some project. He wants *adventure*, something for which to work or play that isn't too easy of attainment. Perhaps these goals will be seen as different aspects or moments of a single complex drive to find for himself and those he loves independence, co-operation, and novelty. Examine, if you will, even the temporary goals of man, and see if even the most unwise of aims are not particular ways in which men are working out their desires for security, recognition, significance, and adventure in a specific environment!

Indeed, a man's religion might well be defined in terms of the way in which he satisfies these urges. Religion exists because men do desire security, recognition, significance, and adventure. Note how these basic needs are expressed in the very common and persistent questions: What am I and what can and will happen to me? What is my place in nature and in relation to other human beings? What is the purpose of my existence? For what should I live? Is there any Power that cares for me, who is concerned in what may happen to me? If there is a God, what is demanded of me; how can I best fit into His purpose for myself and others?

Man would not ask these questions were it not his very nature to yearn for security, recognition, significance, and adventure. These are perplexities which persist not only in human history and make the religious quest eternal; they are tensions which recur in every stage of the individual's life, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, senescence. And in each stage they take a different form, defying the solution of the past and demanding new adjustment, challenging both the individual and his teacher.

Look into the life of the five-year old who finds he has a new brother. His world is shattered; his security is threatened, for he has a competitor in his claims to mother's affection; his personal status is weakened; he is not the "one and only." Worse still, what lies in the future? How can he maintain his status in the new family pattern, how can he feel wanted and necessary? On what new path must he strike out? Here is a predicament pregnant with religious impulses and possibilities. Take the same child, become adolescent. Once more his world has exploded. He wonders to what extent he can depend upon himself to achieve physical strength, mental depth, and emotional harmony. He is conscious, in a fresh way, of the demands made willy-nilly by the environment of things and people. All the time he is striving anxiously to formulate ideals and plans for living which will have lasting value and relevance to his life. But the problems of the adolescent are in essence those of the babe—again, but now in a different way, he is seeking security, recognition, significance, adventure. Urban Nagle, in a recent investigation of the religious development of adolescent boys, says that the boy of fifteen stands in the midst of problems "with childhood notions shattered, personal weakness magnified due to the powerful emotional resonance of a first offense—or perhaps to the disappointment in the hero who was built up through thirteen and fourteen—and a hitherto unknown feeling of insecurity."

Man, whether in thought or in action, ever seeks the dependable. His philosophy of life defines what he considers dependable; his religion, his faith, is his willingness to bet his life on his philosophy. As William James said: "Religion is the very inner citadel of human life." It concerns "the way an individual's life comes home to *him*, his intimate needs, ideals, devotions, consolations, failures, successes." The Church need never worry about the lack of interest in intelligent human beings if it will only intelligently guide the individual, beginning *from where he is*, by elucidating, not pontificating, by giving man a practicable map marking out vividly the issues of

life. The very conflict and struggle, the progress of life itself, the process of human action, will continue to issue in religious questions and adjustments. It is as absurd to talk about loss of religious interest as it is to worry about loss of scientific interest. For both are part of man's theoretical and practical adjustment to his always incompletely understood world.

III

I introduced this discussion of religious interest because, as is already evident, it has definite bearing on our problem: *the focus of religious education*. The importance of interest in religious education is next to that of intelligence. *Both* ability and interest are indispensable. Interest provides the emotional dynamic of education; intelligence provides direction and guidance of interest in the actual world. We have already suggested that the regnant interests of men vary in their manifestation and expression with the individual's intelligence and circumstances. Religious education, Christian or otherwise, must have as its focus the gaping needs in a man's life as felt by him in his personal and social conduct. In its approach to man it must use his language, even his slang, and its acts must be as timely as its speech. He will not recognize "the good news" in priestly robes, in well-blown and resonant phrases which leave him still confused and wounded by the side of the road. Unless religion can pour oil into his wounds and refresh him as it points out a new path, he will tip his hat regretfully and limp on.

Jesus claimed that His was the way, the truth, and the life, which would enable the individual to extricate the greatest value, the least evil from any human situation. Those who believe this must show by theory and action the relevance of Jesus' method of living and thinking to situation after situation with which human beings are confronted. How frequently we forget that men have found God in the very midst of anxiety and stress caused by the conflict of interests in their own lives and in relation to others! I do not mean to imply that religious promptings are present only in these situations. But if God is going to be more than an abstract theory in the lives of men, if He is ever to be a fire in their bones, it will be only as the meanings of His existence and purpose are revealed to them in their moments of glory and despair. The secret to the religious indifference of many intelligent people is to be found in the failure of organized religion to find a point of contact *with them*; they refuse to box themselves off religiously in a sterile purity far removed from that mixture of good and evil which con-

stitutes their everyday existence. I am aware that the blame is not to be shouldered entirely by the Church, but since I am concerned not with apportioning guilt, but in strengthening educational strategy in religion, I must at the cost of repetition bear out my contention by reference to three weaknesses in educational procedure.

First, we have been altogether too much concerned with the individual's soul, but not enough with his life. We have taken credit for expounding the Word of God even when we have failed to show in concrete terms what that Word means in the context of contemporary personal and social life. We have given the prescription but suggested no way of actual administration! We have assumed that the individual who, supposedly, could not discover the principle for himself (otherwise why teach and preach?) could apply its meaning in his particular circumstances! We may have preached a reasonable philosophy, but we have not helped others to reason it out for their lives. Heaven forbid that we should dictate arbitrarily the application of the principle, but let us not forget that the best weapon against dictation is freedom of reasoning by all, and not mere conformity. Little wonder is it that people are inclined to dismiss as platitudes doctrines whose relation to their own *status quo* is far from evident.

Paradoxically, we have been teaching the word of life in a dead way. The gospel stiffens and dies unless it is born anew, recreated in every conflict in every stage of life. Have we warned our listeners that the word of life appears in a changing garb, that it is present in a never-exactly-repeated way in every episode of life? Have we taught the Word for what it is, an instrument forged and beaten on the anvil of life in the first place, with its eternal stuff capable of reshaping for every particular individual and society? Have we realized that the gospel must be tested and developed further for every particular individual and society? We have forgotten, perhaps, that the Way of life has to be relived in every age, and perhaps reworded; that living is never, never a mere rehearsal of the past.

This general point, secondly, needs emphasis with specific reference to young people. For them especially, religion, if it is to be acceptable, must be not a mere creed but a vital, working hypothesis about the meaning and achievement of security, recognition, significance, and adventure in this day and age. The doctrine of the Trinity, of Biblical infallibility, of salvation and grace, may be interesting subjects for speculation (and young people, too, like to speculate), but the young man faced with the conflict between

private ideals and group wishes, between his parents' plans for him and his conception of himself and his abilities, may have a justifiably hard time seeing the relevance of such doctrines to his needs, or to the social catastrophes, such as war, which threaten his very existence. Important as these doctrines may be for a final formulation of the Christian view of life, we cannot hope to hold the interest of a young man faced with the major problem of marriage or of raising a family unless we can give the message or interpret the doctrines in a way relevant to these issues. In any case, let us not give crumbs instead of the bread of life; let the relevance of what we teach be clear both in our minds and in theirs. This is the hardest problem in teaching, for the relevance of any doctrine might seem to be better decided by the pupil than by the teacher. Nevertheless, it is ultimately the task of the teacher not so much to unfold doctrine as to unravel the conflicts of life, humbly, but steadily.

The second sin is one of commission rather than omission, and one sees its curse especially in the religious training of young people, though it has an analogous application to adult religious education. In our teaching of religion we have not distinguished between the essence of religion and its accidents, which are the formulations of religion. Even with regard to formulations, we have taught as if the various tenets were equally important. Some dogmas have been considered so important that different sects are still living witnesses to outworn differences. Like Pharisees, we have exacted the last jot and tittle, made no distinction between essentials of beliefs and over-beliefs. Did not Jesus Himself ask the rich young man which was the most important of the commandments? Instead of stressing central convictions about life which can be checked, rechecked, and developed by the person who accepts them, we have marked out particular one-way avenues to the kingdom of heaven, along which the faithful must tread. In the provincialism of our own emphases we have identified the lifeblood of religion with the particular body of doctrine through which it flowed. Hence men who found it necessary or desirable to disregard the body failed to see the spirit which, once at least, had really given life and movement to that body.

In this we have a partial explanation, at any rate, of the sad experience which adolescents have when (and if) they come to that intellectual and emotional reawakening which brings with it the overhauling of accepted beliefs and opinions. For, having accepted, from very sincere ministers,

parents, or teachers, certain religious doctrines *without* understanding their relative importance and purpose, they now find themselves unable to use their creeds as guides either to thinking or action. And eventually finding the doctrines useless, they put them away. It does not take long for young people to become indifferent to doctrines which, as presented, never touched them vitally. What is worse, if they have associated religion with these doctrines, they become indifferent to it also. For we have not helped them to realize that religion, which is spirit, can adjust indefinitely to new bodies that may convey it. Hence, they now fail to seek new bottles for new wine.

The college student is a special instance of this process. If he comes to college believing that the basis of religion is a book, if he thinks that the essence of religion is a particular view of creation, miracles, salvation, immortality, he may well find his faith tested, challenged, or denied by men who in their fields are as sincere as ministers and more informed than most. His consequent indifference even leads him away from those collegiate courses designed to help him build a more reasonable philosophy of life and view of religion; by a curious reaction he becomes unfriendly even to collegiate or community religious organizations. But the roots of this indifference are deep-sown. It is rooted not merely in the mistaken identity of religion. It originates in the misunderstanding of the doctrines themselves.

Indeed, if we reflect for a moment on the usual religious education of our children, we might almost marvel that things are only as bad as they are. Even if the child grows up in a sincerely religious family, he feels unconsciously influenced to conform with his parents' particular customs of belief and worship. Church attendance becomes a habit, and to profess certain beliefs is part of the price for social acceptance and respectability. Disturbing questions are seldom answered adequately so as to avoid unlearning in the future. One recalls the humorous story of the youngster who, one evening during a thunderstorm, ran from his room to mother for security. Mother (she must have been sleepy!) gave this lad a stone instead of a fish when she said, "Go back into bed, sonny, and remember, God is there watching over you." To which the child soon answered, "Please, Mother, you go sleep with God; and I'll sleep with Daddy." How many children at the age of ten (or shall I say twenty or thirty) still have religious ideas acquired at the age of seven? The trouble is that frequently their religious *emotions* are fixated at the same level!

One does not need to have much experience with the religious diffi-

culties of young people to know that most of them are due to unintelligent and unintelligible childish beliefs in intelligent heads. Their Sunday-school teachers are no doubt pious and self-sacrificing in the time and effort expended but are unable to clarify the issues of their pupils' lives. Frequently when youngsters ask why they should believe a certain view, they are told to take by faith what may be understood later. Hence, faith comes to mean a capacity to believe what one cannot understand. But because they do not understand the *why* of doctrines, because they never see what problems in their lives a certain doctrine is trying to meet, they are unprepared to resist contrary doctrines or understand better solutions. College or everyday life never robs them of anything vital, religion least of all; but it may take from them what they professed but never owned. Having never been taught to *think* about religious problems, they are now unable to continue thinking about them. Hence, the altogether too common phenomenon of men and women who know more about the techniques of life than they do about its goals.

Once more, I am not as anxious to assign the blame as I am to insist, as one of its critical supporters, that the Church must so educate her young that they may have a heightened and persistent consciousness of the religious approach to the problems of life. They must realize that the answer to religious problems is never given once and for all, especially in its application to their changing lives, that religious knowledge may normally be expected to change as insight grows into the nature of the world and man. Particularly in such matters does transfer of training depend on one's keeping the pervasive principle distinct from the particular formulation or expression which may later be substituted for something more adequate.

IV

Our whole discussion has led to the conclusion that religious education must not be indoctrination. Remembering the birthplace of religion in the search of man for emotional and intellectual satisfaction of urgent drives, education must forever be focused on the living problems of the individual as they manifest themselves in various personal, social, and cosmic forms. No doctrine is ever to be an end in itself; its justification lies in its relevance to some human problem of adjustment to the world as it is. Education is fertilized by problems; it is fossilized by mere doctrines. Religious education must be interested not so much in categorical, catechismal solutions as in

answers which it helps the individual work out through his own life and thought.

No, religious education must not be indoctrination. But neither must it wander at the mercy of a prevailing mood in ethics, economics, or politics! Religious education must be guided by principles evolved from the historic struggle and aspiration of earnest Christians. These principles, after all, are the formulations of men striving to weave the tangled threads of life into a meaningful pattern of doctrines.

The process is, in fact, twofold. On the one hand, we must draw our formulated doctrines down into the arena of contemporary human struggle. On the other hand, we must lift out from our particular conflicts the principles which in turn will help us to see the broader and deeper meaning of those very conflicts.

Doctrine there should be and must be; doctrine we must teach. But with all our teaching let us inspire understanding in terms of problems which at this very moment are begging again to be solved! Let our indoctrination be not formal but creative! This can happen only so long as the interplay between formulation and concrete issue is kept alive. Thus life will serve to redeem doctrines or force other formulations; doctrines in turn will lead to further experimentation or to further analysis of experience. But unless this creative indoctrination (which I have chosen to call religious education) drives out its counterfeit, we shall continue to encourage religious maladjustment.

For the religiously-educated man stands out in sharp contrast to the religiously-indoctrinated. First, the merely indoctrinated man can tell you facts, but the religiously-educated can tell you *what makes particular judgments facts*. He is inclined to be more flexible, and less dogmatic than the indoctrinated by virtue of his understanding of the complexity of the problems dealt with. For the indoctrinated this theoretical impetus to genuine tolerance and common action is out of the question; he is rendered the more suspicious of foreign-sounding creeds. As a matter of fact, when and if the indoctrinated man changes, he *supplants* one view for another, white for black, theism for atheism. He has no basis for the careful expansion and modification of earlier views; he has not established a hierarchy of beliefs supported by his consideration of their relative significance for his life. The religiously-educated man, on the other hand, realizes that the truth about life can never be completely imprisoned within one formulation, that formu-

lations change to meet changing needs, that yesterday's logic may not satisfy today's demands in the same way.

Nor am I trying to slay a straw man when I attack indoctrination. In *Rediscovering the Adolescent*, Dr. Hedley S. Dimock summarizes a recent investigation of the development of religious thinking in adolescent boys. One rather startling and disconcerting conclusion is relevant here. "At least from the years thirteen to sixteen, during which the majority of boys are passing through pubescence, no change whatever in religious thinking is registered in the scores from the tests, which were administered annually for three years." Though there is development in religious thinking from the years twelve to thirteen, this author continues: "The boy at sixteen is just as likely as the boy of thirteen to believe that God is a person sitting on a golden throne, who punishes everyone who is bad, and who answers prayers for material things." And Dimock suggests, as a "partial" interpretation, that "our agencies of religious instruction, the home and Church in particular, may do such a good job in indoctrinating children that their ideas at sixteen are about the same as they were at twelve."

But if this situation is to be remedied, if education is preferable to indoctrination, there must be teachers to whose devotion and personal example must be added the ability to understand sympathetically the situation in which their students find themselves and to indicate the relevance of the religious approach to their needs. For such a task of emotional and mental training, we need to give these teachers more than the time now available for teaching in the church school. By what logic can we go on supposing that the church-school teacher is not to be as prepared as the teacher in the secular schools, or that about an hour a week will suffice for proper teaching? It would not be difficult to prove that the vital teacher of religion needs a more thorough training both in theory and practice than does his secular colleague. Until we build a Church, then, which focuses its attention on the critical problems of man in his adjustment to the world, and which is willing, at whatever sacrifice, to provide able interpreters of the meaning of life in all its various stages, we will keep on merely indoctrinating men. But unless religion provides the best means for the satisfaction of man's basic drives, its days as a prophetic force inspiring men to nobler experiments are numbered.

The Problem of the Church

Some Obstacles to Spiritual Development Today

CHARLES EDWIN SCHOFIELD

THE business of the Church is the production of fully matured, Christlike character. This is an objective that can be realized only through the building of a society that is inspired by, and provides the institutional mechanisms for the expression of, the Spirit of Jesus. It is only in such a society that we can find the kind of environment in which a Christlike character can find nourishment and support. It is only through the dedication of purpose and sustained loyalty to the goal of such a society that growing personalities can discover the dynamic focus and the active self-expression indispensable to their maturity.

In this discussion we are focusing our attention upon the individual. It is through the channel of the growing experience of individuals, and through the media of the mutual relationships of individuals in the community, that personalities grow toward maturity. We can never forget these community relationships. It is in the atmosphere of fellowship, and through the facing and the faithful discharge of all the mutual responsibilities of the community, that individual character develops and matures.

I

In the recognition of the primary importance of the community, and of the whole intimate and complex texture of his relationships in the community, for the development of individual character, we come face to face with the first of the "Obstacles to Spiritual Development" to which we direct our attention. That is *the extent to which, in our contemporary society, those elemental community relationships, by means of which character is nurtured and brought to maturity, are breaking down.*

Probably the most significant single factor in our contemporary society is the transition that is on, all around the world, from a fundamentally agricultural and rural to an essentially industrial and urban society. All of our institutions and traditions have developed in essentially rural communities. A representative from the Department of Agriculture in Washington,

speaking before the Religious Education Association, in Chicago, recently declared that it is to the rural communities in American society the nation must look for creative leaders. This has been a commonplace all through our history. And the most ominous fact in the contemporary scene is the way in which the material resources and the spiritual morale of rural America are being sapped. For weal or for woe, unless through some unimaginable catastrophe the whole movement of civilization is thrust back into the chaos of a new barbarism, the life of the whole world is certain to be dominated, increasingly, by social patterns and ideals shaped by the conditions of urban industrial living.

It is out of *that* fact that our problem arises. The individual never stands alone. "Rugged individualism" has always been a myth. The individual is born into an intimate community that includes, in all normal situations, at least three—father, mother, and child. In the preponderant majority of instances in the past, this elemental family community includes four or more. Brother and sister relationships are included, in addition to those of parent and child. In the past, the family has represented a strongly united, tightly compact community. It formed the primary determining influence in shaping the ideals and fixing the character patterns for the growing individual well on into the years of maturity. In many instances the family community continued to hold individuals together, even after children had grown to manhood and womanhood and established families of their own. To a very significant degree the patriarchal pattern has dominated the whole life of society, up until the present generation.

Beyond the immediate community of the family extended the somewhat larger but still relatively compact community of the neighborhood. In the average rural community every family was intimately related to every other family. The community had a common trading center which constituted the economic ganglion for the community's life. There might be a single church. Or, in cases all too common, where the community religious life was divided, the Baptists and Methodists and Episcopalians and Presbyterians, and even the relatively smaller number of Roman Catholics, still recognized, across these denominational divisions, a common interest in their belonging to the same neighborhood. Their children attended the same schools. The lodges, the various forms of farm organizations, the Chamber of Commerce (when the village began to grow up and put on metropolitan airs), the women's clubs—all wove a fine network of mutual interests and

responsibilities that tended to knit the community together. For the most part, the whole community shared an essentially common outlook, a common sense of values, and common standards of estimating and giving recognition to human worth.

These simple elemental communities, in which character has found its primary nourishing environment, are tending to weaken and disintegrate to a disturbing degree. I am not thinking, primarily, of the sharp rise in the rate of the formal breakup of domestic ties through separation or divorce. This is by no means an unimportant matter. The divorce decree, however, marks only the most acute stage of the process. Even in families in which no one has ever thought of any legal separation, the older close-knit texture of the American family has been seriously raveled out. The difficulty which our generation has experienced in its attempt to keep alive the traditional patterns of family worship of our fathers, is only one illustration. Each individual in the family circle finds himself or herself involved in a bewildering cross-pulling of lines of interest and relationship which constantly tend to draw one away from the family circle. The modern family spends less and less time together, finds less and less of its diversions in activities that are shared as a family group. Inevitably, the various individuals in the family circle find themselves shaping their ideals, choosing their objectives, defining the standards for their behavior, in terms of influences quite apart from the traditions of the family. The individual, even before he is well initiated into the bewildering and disturbing experiences incident to adolescent development, is already virtually "on his own," so far as any adequate community guidance is concerned. Is there any wonder that we are faced with a baffling problem of juvenile delinquency?

In similar fashion the simple, elemental community of the neighborhood is breaking up. It is not necessary for the farm-reared individual to leave his ancestral homestead and seek the city with its distractions and its disintegrating influences. The all-devouring city has already invaded the remotest hamlet. Through the omnipresent metropolitan daily newspaper, brought to the door by rural free delivery service, or by direct news carrier; through the radio, whose strident, raucous voice can be heard in the farthest outpost of the last frontier; through the combination of low-priced automobile and the ever-widening network of hard surfaced highways; through the lure and glamor of the motion picture screen, augmented by the sinister excitement of "bank night" and other thinly disguised gambling devices—

not only the restless youth of the farm, but their parents and grandparents as well, are being drawn into the capacious maw of the all-devouring "megalopolitan monster."

Increasingly those intimate ties that formerly linked all of the individuals within a relatively small geographical area into one close-knit, compact community are loosening. As ever larger proportions of our total population migrate from familiar rural scenes, to seek greater economic opportunity and more entrancing possibilities of recreation in the larger centers of population, more and more the individual is cut adrift from those social moorings that formerly steadied his character against the wild eddies of the current that threaten to sweep men to disaster. Increasingly men and women tend to live their lives in relative indifference to their neighbors. They establish transient, and constantly changing fellowships with a bewildering variety of temporary communities, determined by the accidents of occupational association, the shifting whims of political enthusiasm, or the even more ephemeral appetite for varied and exciting forms of diversion. The total result is to leave individual men and women hopelessly adrift, without any sustaining support in enduring community relationships. We ought not to be surprised that, as an inevitable outcome of this breakdown of elemental community living, all of the creative institutions of society—the home, the school, the Church, government, and the whole structure of economic and social relationships—are seriously shaken. We can recognize as the inevitable consequence an increase in criminal activities and an alarming rise in the number of men and women suffering from various forms of nervous breakdown and psychopathic disorder.

II

In the second place we need to reckon with *the confusion in fundamental patterns of thinking that characterizes the mind of the masses of men and women today*. We find this evident in every direction. We find it in the almost hysterical debate that is on, all over the world, over the question of the pattern and structure of our economic institutions. We are catching up and flinging around with reckless disregard of consequences such heavily-loaded slogans as "capitalism" and "Communism," "profit-motive," "rugged individualism," "Red" and "reactionary," and not one man in a hundred who joins in the shouting has any clear understanding of the real meaning of the terms he uses.

We find it in the arena of political controversy. What unmeasured oceans of ink, and what volumes of envenomed spleen were spilled over the question of the integrity and sincerity of the political judgments of "nine old men"! Into what a debauch of sentimental romancing have we not plunged in our panegyrics over the new paradise regained in Russia! And scarcely one in a thousand of those who have joined in the antiphonal chorus has ever set foot on the coasts of Muscovy. What crimes have been condoned in the name of supporting the American Constitution! And those who have been loudest in their protestations of loyalty remain, for the most part, blissfully innocent of detailed knowledge, either of the history of the making of that document, or even of its contents. Every four years a presidential election precipitates a characteristically American orgy of political oratory, out of which, before the smoke and confusion blow away, we hope to arrive at a major decision over national policy. How many average citizens in any average community have any clearly thought-out convictions to guide them?

We find it, most of all, in the area of religious thinking. For many the old familiar traditional formulae of faith have been undermined. We may still profess to cherish them, but when we are pressed for an answer few men and women have any clear notion of what they really mean by the words they use. The "acids of modernity" have eaten deep into the framework of our inherited religious thinking. Increasingly we find ourselves following the guidance of the newer habits of reasoning, and the methods of procedure that are somewhat hazily associated in our understanding with the mysterious and potent name of "science." Less and less do even average men and women think of resorting to the forms and practices which they have been accustomed to label "religion," to deal with the critical problems of everyday living. More and more the claims of religion have grown tenuous and relatively irrelevant. The most ominous fact on the religious horizon is not the number of men and women who have never had any vital relationship with the Church, but the number of individuals and families that once sought such a vital relationship and later have grown indifferent. The "nonresident" and "inactive" lists on the membership roster constitute a disturbing total of spiritual casualties—men and women who once knew the meaning of faith, for whom religion has lost its constraining power.

What is the meaning of religion, anyway? What do we mean by God? Is He a Reality or is He, as one troubled soul once put it, little more than a

kind of "oblong blur"? How shall we value the Bible? And, even more pointedly, how shall we make any practical use of it? As one thoughtful teacher of Bible in a Methodist college put it some years ago, "The Bible has become the most sold and the least read of books." Even those who most emphatically protest their love for and implicit belief in the Bible, seem quite at a loss to know what to do with it, in order to make it serve as a resource for daily living. Perhaps one of the reasons why so many have been led off into all manner of fantastic efforts to read the riddles of prophecy and discover a forecast of immediately impending events, is just the fact that so many people know of no other use to which the Scriptures can be put. How shall we interpret the function of the Church? Why need we bother about the Church at all? Is there anything vital or essential to the success of our human venture of living which the Church contributes? How many regard the Church as a needless excrescence, an additional item of expense that we can just as well eliminate? What is it that makes up a religious experience? How does one "get religion" anyway and what happens when we have a religious experience? These are only a few of the questions about which men and women generally confess themselves hopelessly bewildered.

We need not be surprised that the program of the Church moves heavily along amid such cross-currents of confused thinking as we find prevalent in the average community today.

III

The third of the "Obstacles to Spiritual Development" that I would like to single out grows directly out of the two that we have already considered. That is *the tendency to the disintegration of ethical controls*. It is inevitable that, when those elemental communities in which most of our ethical ideas have developed and our moral standards have taken form begin to weaken, the authority of the older moralities should begin to lose its power to control our lives. Along with the weakening of the older community bonds we are finding ourselves, today, thrust out into situations involving forms of tension and conflicts of interest for which the older ethical maxims, that were adequate for a simple rural community, offer little concrete guidance.

Take the matter of Sunday observance, for illustration. It was a relatively simple matter to hold up the ideal and enforce the practice of a

practically complete cessation of all forms of remunerative labor, in a neighborhood of farmers. But when we face the problem of a society linked together by the telephone and by communication systems involving a process of uninterrupted service; when we face some of the more complex industrial processes, the interruption of which at regular seven-day intervals would mean a formidable economic loss—the problem is not nearly so simple of solution. Or take the issue which was raised by the “sit-down” strikes a few years ago. In a community organized upon the relatively simple pattern of rural agriculture it was not difficult to define the rights of property nor to adjudicate acts of trespass. But when you begin to reckon with a situation in which, for thousands of men and women, the only basis of economic security they know is the right of access to opportunity for employment and to industrial machinery, which itself has been produced, to a very significant degree, by their own toil—it is not nearly so clear in that kind of situation that property right is vested solely in the interests of management or of the absentee investor.

The older classical ethical disciplines still hold their authority, buttressed by the impressive prestige of long-established tradition. But this authority exerts a steadily waning influence. On the other hand, increasing numbers of men and women in most of the communities where we live and work find themselves yielding to the drift, surrendering to the imperious demand of impulse and appetite, and the lure of transient satisfactions and ephemeral excitement. And, again, great masses of men and women have found themselves confronted by the insistent clamor of a new type of intolerant authoritarian system, adorned with all manner of emotion-stimulating devices. The Fascist has attempted to cut the Gordian knot of ethical confusion by the imposition of the simple absolute command to obey the Leader.

Beset by these confusing and contradictory cross-currents of ethical thinking, our generation is generally drifting with no very clearly defined conceptions of the values that men ought to seek and cherish, and with no specific guidance for everyday living. When we recall to what an extent the issues of Christian living have been identified with particular patterns of conduct, it helps us to understand how serious an obstacle this ethical confusion may prove to be to spiritual development. Most of the tensions to which men and women are subject today, out of which an increasing number of psychopathic disorders are arising, and in consequence of which life

becomes more and more disorganized and confused, are directly related to problems of conduct for which men find no guidance either in the traditions they have inherited, or in the thinking of their own generation.

IV

The final point of difficulty to which I would like to direct attention is *the confusion and uncertainty within the Church itself concerning the nature of the Church, the function it should perform in society, and the character of its claims upon the individuals who are numbered in its fellowship.*

There are two lines along which this confusion tends, most commonly, to be disturbing. For one thing, the Church is caught in the eddies marked by the shifting of the current from the older, narrowly aggressive sectarianism, which has characterized the American Church from the beginnings of American society until within the last fifty years, and the more recent tendencies to a vapid and diluted syncretism. The American Commonwealth was founded in a period when the lines separating the various sects and denominations into which the Protestant movement divided, were sharply drawn. An intense sectarian loyalty characterized most of these divisions of the Church. Much of the educational curriculum, and most of the evangelistic propaganda, were characterized by an emphasis upon the all-important distinctions between the "true apostolic Church" and the "Babylon" of heresies from which the faithful were called to "come out and be a separate people." However we may criticize the preaching and teaching of those years, this much must be said. The issue presented to the prospective convert was weighted with the import of eternal destiny. The claims of the Church were of primary importance. Churchmanship meant something tremendously significant.

By the close of the last century the power of this intensely sectarian appeal had begun to lose its force. During the last fifty years we have been ringing the changes upon the idea of broad-minded, generous tolerance. All too often tolerance has been defined in ways which carry the implication that the issue of active fellowship in the Church is a matter of relatively minor importance. In consequence evangelism has lost its persuasive appeal to those outside the Church, and represents no very vital concern for those within her fellowship. Even among those who are covenanted members of the Church the program of organized Christianity has come increasingly to stand in the category of more or less interesting and pleasant diversions

—one of the electives, among which one may choose, when seeking occupation for hours not already commandeered by more important interests.

The second line of confusion probes to the heart of the question of the place and function of the Church in society. On the one hand the older traditional sacramentarian and authoritarian view of the Church represents the dominant attitude of the official hierarchy of the Church. It still determines most of the teaching and preaching interpretative of the meaning and value of the Church. But it carries a steadily diminishing influence over the mind and life of most of her communicants. On the other hand, while thoughtful younger leaders in the Church have been developing an approach to her program in terms of vital functional analysis, this newer approach has as yet failed to capture the imagination of the rank and file of her laity. It has not been equipped with the imaginative glamor and emotional drive which the older interpretation once carried. And so, laymen, generally, are quite hopelessly drifting, without any very clearly defined notions of what the Church represents, what her legitimate claims upon them are, or what their attitude and relationship to her program should be.

Another factor which contributes to this confusion is the emphasis upon an extreme form of premillennialism that has come to claim the interest of considerable groups, both of ministers and laity. The general political and economic confusion and the consequent widespread insecurity and fearful foreboding concerning what the future may hold, have stimulated this interest. Among those who yield to it, it tends, as always, to paralyze the nerve of vital concern for any phase of the church program except that of a means of escape from the impending catastrophe. On the other hand, placing this note in the place of central importance still further alienates thoughtful minds who are unwilling to compromise their intelligence with a view of religion that does not gear in to their customary habits of thinking about the world.

V

The purpose of this discussion has been to attempt to diagnose a malady rather than to prescribe a method of treatment. That should be a major objective for every thoughtful Christian today. One or two conclusions, however, ought to stand out clearly in our thinking. If we are to attempt to insure the development and maturing of Christian personality today, we must come to grips with the problem of the breakdown of elementary com-

munity relationships. We shall not find the solution by attempting, as Gandhi has done in India, to turn back the hands of the clock and reverse the process of industrial development. The older neighborhood-community is passing. No wit or wisdom or shrewd devices that we can conjure up can bring it back. For weal or for woe, unless our whole civilization is thrust back into a chaos of barbarism, to await a new cultural beginning, by a major catastrophe of destructive revolutionary violence, we shall have to readjust our attitudes, our habits of living, and our forms of institutional organization, to patterns that fit into an urban industrial society. We shall need to guide men and women into the building of stronger bonds of fellowship in new types of community relationships. Surely we are not going far afield when we cherish the belief that the Church offers the most constructive and practicable means within our reach, for providing a vital and dynamic core for these new types of community relationships.

We do not anticipate that the family, as the elemental institution of society, is likely to disappear. It is far too deeply rooted in the elemental drives constituent to human personality. But the character of that family life is bound to be profoundly affected by the transition from an agricultural rural to an industrial urban society. And here, again, it ought to be the high privilege and the holy task of the Church to pioneer in developing new means for strengthening the family bond, and guiding troubled and confused men and women into ways of living by which the family fellowship may again be made the strong, sustaining kind of simple elemental community in which the basic patterns of character may be fashioned.

The responsibility of the Church, facing the confused currents of thinking in our time, is clear and unmistakable. This is no novel responsibility. Every generation has had to rethink its religious convictions and remake the institutional patterns through which vital religion finds corporate expression in creative social living. We need to awaken to a fresh appreciation of our responsibility to carry forward this interpretive function of religion. Through the teaching and preaching ministry of the Church we must undertake to give intelligible meaning to those deeply-moving experiences which we associate with religion. We must guide men and women in the building up of an adequate philosophy of worthwhile living for our time.

The Church in a Time of War

HUGH VERNON WHITE

I

PRESENT-DAY Christians are likely to be morally shocked by the extent to which the Church in the past has acquiesced in the waging of war by dukedoms, nations and empires. War has been accepted by the Church not, to be sure, as a normal state of human society but as a "natural" evil. This attitude has been soundly grounded in a true knowledge of human nature and in a realistic view of the sequence of cause and effect in the motivation of human conduct. The Church has not held that "man is a fighting animal" and that "human nature cannot be changed." The essence of Christian doctrine is that man, though a selfish and contentious creature, *can* be changed and that no Christian society can be achieved unless he is changed so as to be able to live in peace and co-operation with his fellow men. The Christian gospel itself is the power to bring about the spiritual regeneration which both brings man into voluntary submission to the will of God and into a new relation of love with other men. All this is classic Christian doctrine. The Church has no grounds, nor ever has had, to hope for the abolition of war apart from the essential conquest of selfish desire by grace of the new idea and motive of the Christian gospel.

But historically the dominance of natural egoism, especially as a law of group and national action, has been so complete that the Church has accepted it in the main as the way of the world and has projected its hopes of peace to the future life or to the millennium. This has meant, in effect, that war has been accepted as inevitable and all sorts of legitimate and illegitimate accommodations have been made to it. The warrior has been idealized, the cause of the warring State has been blessed and the Church has been absorbed into the war system without protest. Individuals have withdrawn in protest from participation in it and small groups like the Friends and Mennonites have on Christian principle repudiated war. But war has continued and the Church, on the whole, has cherished only vague and remote hopes of freedom from its recurrence.

Today the Protestant Church generally has begun to feel a new sense of moral responsibility in the whole matter of war. Some church leaders

practically identify the Christian gospel with the position of absolute pacifism. But even those who do not take such an extreme position realize that war presents to the Church its most urgent moral task and constitutes the chief ethical issue of the time. But this is not an isolated issue. The new moral sensitiveness about war is a part of the general change from an other-worldly or millennialistic outlook to the attempt to make Christianity a working basis for the common life. It is this that creates the paradoxes and tensions of Christianity in a warring world.

There are two questions which are intimately related but not identical: (1) What shall the Christian do? (2) What shall the Church do? A great deal more thought and discussion have been given to the former, but the latter is at least of equal importance. Indeed, the individual Christian has not seen the whole picture that is relevant to his personal decision until he has given due consideration to the nature of the Church and of the State and their proper relation to each other. It is, therefore, with the question, What shall or can the Church do in a time of war? that this article will deal.

II

There is considerable superficial similarity between the Church as an organized body and the political State. But they differ fundamentally both in origin and in function.

The State is the seat of political authority. It exists to order the life of society, to determine the general rules that shall limit and control the actions of individuals and groups. The State is a government and it is the business of a government to govern. Whether government is autocratic or democratic, it exercises ultimate control over the common life. Even a free and democratic nation must submit to the authority of the State. In a democracy the individual citizen is no more free from political authority than is the subject of an absolute monarch. The difference lies in the fact that in a democracy the citizen has a voice in determining what kind of laws shall be made and who shall administer them. Having done that, he is just as much bound by the authority of the State as is the subject of a king. He may have the assurance that a democratic form of government will be more considerate of the rights and real interests of its citizens, and normally it does. In principle, democracy is government "of the people, by the people and for the people." Its failures to live up to this principle are usually due

to political ignorance, inertia and corruption and to the hidden control of government by powerful private groups and individuals.

But in all government, including that which is democratic, the State manifests its true character by making laws and enforcing them. That is, it uses coercion. The courts and the police force are as essential to a functioning state as are its president and legislature. All but anarchists accept coercion as legitimate and necessary to the existence of the State.

The responsibility of the State to maintain and enforce order within has a parallel in its obligation to preserve and defend, so far as it can, the interests of the nation and its people in dealing with other political units. In the exercise of this function a state maintains a foreign secretary (we call him the Secretary of State) and a diplomatic corps. It also maintains an armed force of which, in the United States, the commander-in-chief is the President. The main purpose of the military is to defend and preserve by force what are considered to be the vital interests of the nation. This is all so evident as to be platitudinous, but it must be briefly rehearsed in order to point out some things inherent in the character of a political state, as follows:

(1) The State in both internal and external operation exists for the sake of the *interests* of its people; (2) in the fulfilling of this duty, the State makes laws and enforces them internally; (3) in dealing with other political units and peoples it makes decisions as to what constitutes the vital interests of the nations and, when necessary, uses all the force at its command to defend those interests. Such actions do not represent the perversion of the State but its true character and obligation and its proper administration. No one should expect any political state to renounce voluntarily and in principle any of these functions. They constitute it a state; in them its sovereignty consists. We may say that an essential part of the *raison d'être* of the State is to seek the well-being of its citizens and to defend their interests. This involves the use of force both internally and externally.

III

The Church is by nature different in its duties and responsibilities. The two key terms in our account of the State were "interests" and "coercion." Neither one of these terms fits in a description of the Church. The Church does not exist to maintain or defend the interests of its members. Its impulse to human service is a quite different thing from the support of the personal or group interests of its own members. That impulse sends its

members out to render service, even sometimes at the sacrifice of their own interest. In fact, the Church teaches men to be less concerned about selfish interests and more devoted to the welfare of others.

In this the Church differs radically from the State. The State accepts as legitimate the law of self-interest, especially in the people as a whole; the Church seeks to conquer self-interest by the impulse of love and so to create a new society based upon the new law of self-giving. While the idea of an orderly society which is a goal of civil government and the Church's conception of a Christian community coincide in large areas of practical morality, this difference in principle is of great importance. It is the ethical aspect of the traditional distinction between the State as a temporal or secular institution and the Church as a spiritual fellowship.

The other radical difference between Church and State is that, while the use of coercion is fundamental to the full existence of the State, the Church exerts its power over men by persuasion and education. The authority of the Church is moral, its techniques of control spiritual, its hold upon the hearts and consciences of men based on their free religious response to the will of God. Morality springs out of worship, obedience to God from love of God. In religious living man is ultimately free; even the most arduous performance of duty is prompted by the free response of the will to the intrinsic goodness of God. However, the Church may have sought to compel obedience to its will, and the Church of Rome still claims the right of such compulsion, the true functioning of the Church has no place for coercion. The realm of human conduct in which coercion has a legitimate place is the civil order and not the religious fellowship.

In these important ways then, the Church differs from the State: (1) It does not support the self-interest of its members; and (2) it does not use coercion.

IV

The distinctions here drawn between Church and State do not imply that the Church can be indifferent to what the State does. Specifically, it does not mean that the Church has no concern about the matter of war. To a large degree the human personnel of Church and State are at any given time identical. In our own country roughly half of the people are members of some branch of the Church. When the State sends its citizens to war it is sending the members of the Church to war. It is unnecessary here even to

mention the points at which this creates tension and conflict in the life of the citizen-Christian. Our question is, What can the Church do about it?

And the answer at first must be disappointing. In many situations the Church cannot do anything—directly. It cannot stop a war. It cannot prevent an impending war. This might be different if the whole Church were agreed upon the principles of its action and the methods of its procedure. Even if this were so, however, it would not be sufficient merely to range its whole membership against war. If the Church is going to take a positive and decisive hand in the control of temporal affairs at this point it must be by adequately coping with the causes of war. That involves influence upon the State in the whole realm of international policy as well as in the specific matter of making war.

But the Church is likely to be tragically inept in its attempts at direct influence upon the State. To begin with, when it tries to exert such influence it is trying to get the secular political power to do something that it cannot do itself. And that is a dangerous business. The sequence of cause and effect set up by the action of the State in the political sphere will likely lead far afield from the objectives of the Church. For example, many church leaders have been seeking to persuade the government of the United States to impose an embargo of scrap iron and aviation gasoline upon Japan. Their motive is worthy of Christians, a horror at the suffering inflicted upon the Chinese by the Japanese invasion and indignation because Americans share in moral responsibility for that suffering.

Now the Church itself cannot impose the embargo. Accordingly church leaders and groups of Christian people unite in urging the government to do it. But the United States cannot make such a move without assuming responsibility for the consequences. It must be prepared to carry through with the course of action which such a move initiates. That may mean war. Many think it will not; others think it will. It at least brings the United States and Japan nearer a break which, if Japan feels strong enough, may be followed by war. We have the embargo now and it is clearly bound up with a policy of pressure that at least threatens open conflict.

If war comes between Japan and the United States it will not be because the Church asked for an embargo. So far as that is concerned, the embargo was not imposed because the Church wanted it or for the reasons that prompted Christian leaders to ask for it. But it will remain true that from

the Church came pressure upon the State to adopt a policy which helped to bring on a war. This illustrates the danger the Church must always confront when it tries to persuade the state to follow some specific course of action in a complex international situation.

V

To point out the dangers involved does not mean that Christian individuals and groups should never attempt to influence the State in international affairs. To do so is not only a right, it is a duty of the Christian citizen. Inevitably, mistakes in judgment will be made as to what course of action most nearly conforms in all its implications to the Christian objective. But unless the Christian is to leave statecraft to wholly secular control the hazards must be accepted. However, it ought to be kept clear that these efforts are acts of Christian citizens, not of the Christian Church, and that they spring from moral judgments of individuals who seek to translate the absolute ideal of Christian faith into the relative good of a secular order. Their mistakes are not failures of the faith; the limitations on their knowledge and judgment do not invalidate the eternal rightness of the Christian ethic. But what they do introduces a redeeming element in the political life of mankind.

This conception of the medium by which the moral influence of the Christian Church may be exerted upon the political State stands midway between the position of the Lutheran churches and that of the Church of Rome. Lutheranism generally leaves the State free from moral criticism in its own sphere of action. The Church of Rome goes to the opposite extreme. It maintains a Secretary of State and a diplomatic corps and uses the techniques of the political state itself in agreements, concordats, et cetera, to secure its ends. This throws the Church bodily into the intrigues, the compromises and some of the duplicity of diplomatic procedure. Only in 1929 did the Vatican, in the Lateran Accord, agree to give up its claim to actual political authority in international affairs. But its method is still political and that inevitably destroys the integrity of the Church as the bearer and interpreter of the Christian ethic.

Protestantism generally is becoming committed to the position which I have outlined above. This kind of relation of the Church to the political State keeps the Church free from the degradation of its own ideal and opens a way of effective influence upon practical politics. It is clear, however, that

while the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic methods both get along comfortably in an authoritarian system, the Protestant technique requires a democratic and liberal political order for its effective operation.

VI

The main work of the Church, however, is not done through exerting direct influence upon the State. It is not what the Church persuades the State to do in a realm where it does not itself operate that is of greatest significance, but what it does directly by its own methods, in its own proper sphere of activity. It is here that the Church must make its main endeavor. This is in the realm of the moral education and the spiritual service and guidance of men, that is, in the realm of ethical and evangelical religion. For such service the Church has or can develop its own techniques, and in it express freely and truly its own law of love. The work of the Church in the local parish and in the world mission can be controlled by that essentially Christian ethic just so far as its leaders and members are faithful to it.

It is the task of the Church to create a new moral basis for human life. The Oxford Conference said (Official Report, p. 158): "To the creation of such a common foundation in moral conviction the Church, as a supranational society with a profound sense of the historical realities and of the worth of human personality, has a great contribution to make." This ethic of respect for personality and the law of good will is already widely disseminated. The future is with it. Secular parties and states are today trying to claim it and detach it from its Christian origins. But such efforts must always involve the degradation of the human person they claim to serve. For that reason, if for no other, they are doomed to failure. But aside from that, they are opportunist programs and lack the support of religious faith and a true idea of man.

Even in the non-Christian world the Christian ethic has become a criterion of judgment by which the so-called Christian nations themselves are being judged. This is conspicuously true in India. To be sure, it is far easier for Hindus to convict Western Christians of sin by this ethic than it is to create a society in India that embodies it. But India is stirring herself to the constructive undertaking. One may well doubt that the Christian ethic can be fully realized apart from the Christian faith. Indeed, one may be certain that it cannot. But for that matter the Christian faith itself now has its home in India. In some measure and with different forms of its mani-

festations, the Christian moral ideal has entered into the life of China, of Japan and of other nations. The increasing clarity with which today that ideal is seen in terms of the worth of human personality and the law of love gives it a direct and powerful appeal to all sorts of men. It is the root doctrine of Christianity, as a moral force in human society.

This ethic the Church is teaching throughout the world; in many forms of service and in the personal lives of its missionaries it becomes a living reality. The deeper and the further that process goes the more intolerable war will become.

VII

The faith and the ethic of Christianity are most truly embodied in the Christian community. That community is not an idea, it is a social reality. As it is strengthened and made conscious of its mission and as it is more widely extended, it becomes the substantial basis for hopes of a new world order. This is the true business of the Church; it is a religious task with creative power in the social and political life of man. Recently a refugee German Jew who had been visiting Christian youth conferences remarked that what impressed him most in Christianity was the clear consciousness its leaders have of the task of the Christian community. "I have strong convictions regarding my own Jewish faith," he said, "but if I should ask a Jewish rabbi what is the task of the Jewish community, I do not know what answer he could give." Whether the Jewish rabbi could give a good answer to the question or not, the Christian community is certainly becoming aware that it has a work of radical importance for the social and political unification of mankind. Its true function is to become the leaven of faith and good will, the salt of a new social bond among men and nations. The Christian fellowship itself is the bearer of the redemptive power of God's purpose. Its extension is not the mere dissemination of an abstract doctrine but the creation of a new society of living persons. Its own growth and purification is the chief contribution the Church can make to the regeneration of world society.

VIII

Finally, and in addition to the teaching of a new ethic and the extension of the Christian community, the Church has a platform for international politics. That platform constitutes the only basis upon which the ending of war is conceivable. It is succinctly stated in the Oxford Report (p. 157):

"So far as the present evil (of war) is political, the heart of it is to be found in the claim of each national State to be the judge in its own cause. The abandonment of that claim, and the abrogation of national sovereignty at least to that extent, is a duty that the Church should urge upon the nations."

This is as important an utterance by the Church as has been made since the beginning of the Protestant Reformation. It summons the nations of the world to renounce the chief political obstacle to peace and to achieve the indispensable political structure by which peace can be maintained. The Church hereby enters the realm of world politics in its own proper way by defining the political objective demanded by its own doctrine. World Community is a spiritual goal to be achieved by the Church itself; but a necessary condition for its effective existence is a political organization that in principle does not deny it. The "world political authority," as John Foster Dulles calls it, is the correlate of the Christian doctrine of the supreme sovereignty of God and the spiritual brotherhood of man.

The Oxford Conference thus has committed the Church to the task of influencing the nations of the world toward world political unity. It does not presume to prescribe how that unity shall be attained, nor what its form shall be. Those are the problems of practical statesmanship. But as a purpose, as an end to be sought, the Church holds this world political order before the nations and gives it the full sanction of the Christian faith.

We should not be under the illusion that political unity can be realized and maintained apart from the moral basis of a Christian ethic or the social force of a widespread and vital Christian community. They are the salt and the leaven. It is not necessary for its success that the whole population of the world shall profess the Christian faith, or be enrolled in the membership of the Christian Church. But the world must be sufficiently pervaded by both the ethic and the fellowship of Christ to sustain its political unity in essential justice.

Nor should we vainly hope that such a world order would automatically eliminate war. It would, however, make peace possible. And even if war were banished, that would not mean that injustice, social wrong and human suffering would cease. But within the structure of a world political order the Christian fellowship would have a freedom to develop and work for the fruits of righteousness and peace that is denied it under the present system of absolute and irresponsible national sovereignty. In such a world the sovereignty of God could really be made manifest.

Eschatology and Reunion

FREDERICK C. GRANT

ESCHATOLOGY" and "Reunion"—have they anything in common? Much every way! But not by way of the simple formula, "When the Church is united, or reunited, the Kingdom of God will come." Instead, the bearing of the eschatological outlook of the primitive Church, and of the New Testament, upon the problem of reunion lies in the direction of a more adequate conception of the nature of the Church, of its relation to the Kingdom of God, to the whole of history, and to the ultimate purpose of God. That there is a fundamental *philosophy* underlying the strange and even weird conceptions of Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic is too often overlooked, even by some of its expositors. This philosophy affects the conception of the Church as we find it in the New Testament—in fact it determines the form and emphasis which it received at the beginning: the Church was the New or the True Israel of "the latter days." But "eschatology" affected more than the emerging doctrine of the Church; the whole primitive Christian outlook was involved.

If this paper were a sermon, we should begin with a text; and none would be better than Revelation 21. 5—"And he that sitteth on the throne said, Behold, I make all things new." As Ernst Lohmeyer remarks in his commentary (in Lietzmann's *Handbuch*, 1926, p. 163), this verse "places in the mouth of God Himself the norm of all eschatological hopes." The text is, accordingly, a good one with which to begin the consideration of the problem before us. It comes, of course, from the next to last chapter of the Bible, from the last vision of the Apocalypse, as almost the last message of the sacred written record of divine revelation: "Behold, I make all things new!" One might expect the Bible to close upon some other note, a summary of the past, perhaps, a finale into which would be woven the earlier themes, or some statement that the revelation of God in Christ was now complete—like that mystical Last Word from the Cross, in the Gospel of John: "It is finished." (Indeed, some interpreters find such a meaning in verse 6a, "They are come to pass"—which Charles however views as a gloss.) Instead, it ends upon a note that reminds us the Bible is really an

unfinished symphony. It looks forward to a consummation not yet realized. It places in its readers' hands a task to be done, a goal to be realized, a hope still awaiting fulfilment, a divine promise still to be kept. True to its nature as an apocalypse, the Revelation of John stresses the future coming of the Messiah in glory. Though He is Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, Christ nevertheless says, "I come;" and the writer responds, "Amen: come, Lord Jesus!" And so the book closes, and with it the Bible.

Over and over again in this book the note of newness is sounded: the new name, the new Jerusalem, the new name of Christ and even of God Himself, the new song, the new heaven and earth; finally, climax of all, "He that sitteth on the throne" says, "Behold, I make all things new." That is extraordinary! For "the throne" surely connotes stability, permanence, changelessness, God "the same yesterday and today and forever." And yet it is the eternal unchanging God who makes all things new.

I

There is a profound truth here, indeed there are two profound truths, which deserve to be carefully studied by anyone who is trying to work out a philosophy of life, especially in times of great change like our own. (1) The first is that *in religion the changeless and the changing, the changeable and the unchangeable, are brought into close relation*. If we think of religion as something that does not change, as God changes not, or as something which we do not wish to change, we must remember that change is the law of all life: as the Stoic Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, put it in his famous *Meditations*, "The Universe *is* change"—an observation substantiated by modern science. Hence in order to remain the same, in a changing world, there is a true sense in which religion also must change—or grow outmoded, decadent, and eventually antiquated and meaningless.

"Religion is an evolution, like everything else in the world; and Christianity is developing, like everything else. Without change and adaptation it could never have survived; but without a genuine religious life, a genuine faith, a genuine continuity with its own past, and with the religious past of the race, there would have been nothing to change, and Christianity would have disappeared long ago. Its continuity is not that of an institution, like a mountain or a temple or a city; its real continuity is that of the spirit, the religious life which animates and inspires it."

In brief, "its continuity is the continuity of religious life rather than the static immobility of an institution"—though even institutions are never

entirely static.¹ Hence the paradox of the spiritual life: To live is to change, to remain the same is to have changed constantly in order to meet new conditions and solve fresh problems; and this holds as good of the Church as it does of the individual religious man or woman.

(2) The other truth is that *only the future really exists*. The past is dead and gone; and can never be restored. The present is only the breaking crest of the wave as it moves onward forever into the future, a mere geometrical line without breadth or depth, dividing the past which has been and now has ceased to be from the future that is now coming into being. In a word, life moves forward not because it is pushed from behind but because, like the tides following the moon or the waves the wind, it is drawn from before. By the time we see or experience any event, it has already taken place, is already ceasing to be. What we observe are only the after-effects of combinations or collisions of forces which are taking place throughout the universe—taking place, always, just before we observe the results.

Plato saw this when he described things in this world as faint copies of their unseen originals. Aristotle saw it even more clearly when he said that all things are drawn by an "appetite" for the ideal. The tree is not pushed up from the soil; it aspires, instead, toward the sun and the air and the rain. And a man is what he wants to be, and tries to be, drawn upward by what he admires and adores. As the greatest philosopher of mysticism, Plotinus, once put it in simple words: "You are what you love." Or, stated in more modern psychological terms, You *become* what you love. And so the world is no finished work of art or mechanism; it is a living thing, a "system of animate nature," as Sir Arthur Thomson calls it, and all things, all species and individuals, are drawn forward in the great sweeping movement of life itself toward whatever goal the universe is set to realize. You might equally well call it a spiritual system; for the principles that govern its growth and development are really the mysterious, invisible principles that only the mind or spirit of man—not his five senses—can grasp. As the philosopher Whitehead insists, the Ultimate Reality is closer akin to a mathematical equation, a poem, or a symphony, than to solid matter, as men used to conceive it. Perhaps Dante was not wrong, then, when he referred to

"The love that moves the sun in heaven
And all the stars."

¹ *The Beginnings of Our Religion*, ed. by F. C. Grant, 1934, p. 159.

It is for this reason that the future sways the present, even more than does the past. If only the past is real, you have a false and impossible determinism; if only the present is real, you have moral and intellectual anarchy; but if the real is the future, what is now coming into being, or what is presently to come into being, then you have a spiritual system, and a world of reality which is at once recognizably scientific, philosophical and religious. And because this is the true picture of reality, it follows that love and compassion and patience and friendliness and sympathy are far greater forces in the moral and social life of men than war and hatred and rivalry and suspicion and pride and fear and self-seeking. For hatred and suspicion rest upon the past: their future is only a repeated or further projected past; while patience and compassion rely upon something new and better which is yet to be. As the recent works of Professors Dodd and Wilder remind us, it is no accident that the *ethics* of eschatology, Jewish and early Christian, centered in this highest reality which was now in process of becoming.²

It is often assumed that force, or compulsion, is a much stronger power in society, and in the private moral behavior of the individual, than love and compassion and generosity and confidence and all those softer, more effeminate, more Christian virtues. But it is not so. About two thousand years ago the Roman Empire was founded, upon a basis of compulsion, coercion, and far-flung commercial expansion. It was a great human achievement, and it served an important purpose in the world's history. But within three centuries it had begun to totter, and the succeeding era saw its steady decline and final fall. Today it no longer exists, save either as an ornamental legend or as an uncomfortable and impossible dream in southern and southeastern Europe. About two thousand years ago a man was crucified in Judea—a harmless teacher, one might have said, who was the victim of professional religionists, a man whose whole reliance was placed upon the methods of love and patience rather than force. And though the world is still far from accepting His way as the true one, nevertheless His influence has steadily grown through the centuries. The great world-empire of the Caesars is no more; but the name of Christ is known and revered everywhere. Why? The answer is clear, in the words of the poet:

² C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom*, 1935; *The Apostolic Preaching*, 1936; *History and the Gospel*, 1938. A. N. Wilder, *Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus*, 1939.

"Though the cause of evil prosper, yet 'tis truth alone is strong;
 Though her portion be the scaffold, and upon the throne be wrong,
 Yet that scaffold sways the future, and, behind the dim unknown,
 Standeth God within the shadow keeping watch above his own."

As Clement said, "Force, or compulsion, is not an attribute of God."

II

This is one of the greatest messages of the New Testament, and the very heart of that strange view of things which we call Apocalypticism, or Messianism—the view, namely, that the whole world is coming to an end, or is about to undergo a universal change, and the Last Judgment to be held, the dead raised, and the Kingdom of God established outwardly and visibly everywhere. There is a real philosophy here—bizarre and fantastic as its imagery appears today. The Kingdom of God is the Reign of God: The divine Rule over the universe, over human society, over the individual man and woman—whether they be willful and headstrong and disobedient, or humble and righteous and loyal to their God. The center of things is not here but yonder; as if the action of the drama were taking place off-stage, as in the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus, and we saw and heard only the results, not the action itself. But before long, now, the walls and scenery of this narrow stage will collapse, and we shall see what is really going on. The action will then take place before our very eyes—it will all be clear, for "the day shall reveal it." That is New Testament Apocalypticism, and you cannot read twenty pages of our Christian sacred book without taking it into account. The reality, it assumes, is just ahead of us—we are like Blücher's troops at Waterloo, trying to catch up with the battle, but not succeeding just yet. But presently we shall catch up, and find ourselves in the thick of the action. That is Apocalypticism, the hope of the Kingdom of God, as the New Testament sets it forth. The battle is on, and victory is in sight; but it is not yet won. That this is a perfectly respectable philosophy, even today, is clear from modern French writers like Bergson, and Meyerson, and Monod—thinkers who have paid considerable attention to the problem of Time.³

Now it is in the light of this ancient Christian conception of the world that the doctrine of the Church—and indeed all Christian doctrines—should be examined. If you think of the Church as merely an institution,

³ Cf. Victor Monod, "Christianity and the Value of Time," in the *Anglican Theological Review*, xvi. 4, October, 1934.

like the Roman Empire, or the Papacy, or the Library of Congress, obviously you will think of it in terms of its past. It was a great institution, say in the Middle Ages, particularly in the thirteenth century. It was founded originally by the Apostles, and it was organized more or less along the lines of the Jewish Synagogue; but before long it took on the forms of the imperial organization as well; and so on. Upon this basis, men will argue indefinitely about the propriety of this or that form of organization or ministry, the "validity" of sacraments administered by one order of ministry and another; and so on. But all the while the very first premise of all their arguments is one that the New Testament scarcely recognizes, namely, the static, unchangeable, purely institutional conception of the Church. The New Testament idea of the Church is not static but dynamic. The true Church really exists in the future; what we see now is the growing Church, not the finished product; it is not an heirloom but a task, not an inherited institution but one we are even now engaged in creating, as the Church continues steadily to "edify itself in love." That is our task: "edification," housebuilding. The real Church, the true Church, is the *ideal* Church: "the pillar and ground of the truth," "the bride of Christ," "the New Jerusalem which comes down from heaven," "the Jerusalem which is above and is free and is the mother of us all," "the glorious Church without blemish. . . ."

It is true, there always have been some Christians who thought of the Church as merely an institution which has come down from the past, rather than as a dynamic, creative force flowing out of the future into the present. For them, it has necessarily had to possess a concrete form and organization, a legitimate ministry, valid sacraments, specific rules governing its members, and authorized prayers and scriptures. The closest approach to such a view, in the New Testament, is in the Gospel of Matthew, an "ecclesiastical" Gospel, written rather late—some of us think it was compiled in the early second century rather than in the first. But this view is not the one held by Saint Paul and most of the other New Testament writers. For them the Church is not an institution enshrining an inheritance from the past; instead, it is a fresh, creative, spiritual power flowing into the world and producing, or creating, an institution as its aftermath. It is not the Church that enshrines and safeguards and maintains the Spirit; it is the Spirit who creates and recreates, fashions and refashions, upholds and vitalizes the Church. And the Spirit comes from Him that sitteth on the throne, and says, "Behold, I make all things new."

III

Now if this is still the true view of the Church, it has certain consequences of very great moment at the present time.

1. First of all, we do not make the Church; the Spirit does that, and we are to trust and obey the Spirit—who is still as truly present in the Church as He has ever been, molding the lives and thoughts of men, sweeping through the world, bringing the future, where the real forces of the universe are at work, into view in the present, where we see only the results of their deeply involved interaction.

2. If the Spirit is the Lord and the Giver of Life, then who are we to oppose or question His clear and obvious guidance of our brethren? What right have we to judge our brethren, and call their services of worship “mere ceremonies,” or their theology “mere superstition”; or, on the other hand—if we happen to be rigid churchmen—to call their sacraments invalid and their doctrines false, and their ministers merely man-made? You simply cannot be a New Testament Christian and speak language like that!

I am happy to say that the attitude of my own Church is changing, and in evidence I wish to read into the record the statement made by the Anglican representatives at a conference held at Lambeth not long ago:

“Ministries which imply a sincere intention to preach Christ’s word and administer the Sacrament as Christ has ordained, and to which authority so to do has been solemnly given by the Church concerned, are real ministries of Christ’s Word and Sacraments in the Universal Church.”⁴

3. In the third place, Christian reunion is not going to be accomplished by whittling down our doctrines and practices to a minimum, so that we shall have nothing left to which anyone might object, for example, the doctrine of Providence; or the probable reality of something we may call grace; or the divinity of Christ, understood in the sense that He was the greatest of all religious geniuses; and the like. No! the work of the Spirit is always rich and varied, and rarely uniform. God loves variety, for He is an Artist. We cannot reduce our religion to a flat, drab level of perfect uniformity, and then call this the work of God! For God has room for all sorts and conditions of men, and the diversities of operations and of gifts are His work. And He uses them all. Every instrument, every note is needed in the great symphony. Unless we can recognize the rightfulness of this scheme

⁴ Quoted in L. Hodgson, *Convictions*, 1934, p. 187.

of things, and hear the divine harmony God is producing, we shall not get far with the New Testament. For it recognizes a revelation made "in many parts, and after divers manners"; it insists that "those that are not against us are for us;" it describes a vast variety of spiritual gifts poured out upon the Church by its one Lord; and it recognizes but one Faith—though this Faith already existed in many various forms;⁵ and one Baptism—though there were various forms of baptism too—even in the first century.

4. Finally, and after all, it is not we who are going to bring about Christian reunion at all: it is the Spirit. For it is God on His throne who says, "Behold, I make all things new." What we are called upon to do is to follow the guidance of the Spirit, respond to His promptings, remove obstructions and obstacles (particularly in ourselves) which impede His action, and get ready for the outpouring which is sure to come when human hearts are truly prepared to receive Him. We can work for church unity, yes, and many of us there are who have pledged ourselves not to cease from mental strife until that dream is accomplished; but even more important, and coming first, is the Church's *will* to unity. Without that, we shall get nowhere. And this too is the Spirit's work: since it is "God that worketh in you to do his will."

One day the Tsar of Russia found a guard standing in the corner of his garden. Upon asking why he was there and what he was guarding, the man replied, "I do not know." So the Tsar inquired of the officer, but he did not know either. Then he asked the Commandant, and the General, and finally the War Office. But no one knew why every day a solitary muzhik stood sentry at one corner of the garden, guarding no one knew what. At last research was made in the War Office files, and the record was traced. Decades ago, generations ago, Catherine the Great had planted a lovely rosebush in her garden, and had commanded a soldier to guard it and see that no one trampled it down, that no one robbed it of its blossoms. Catherine died, and the rosebush died, yet day after day, year in and year out, a sentry was placed on guard at the spot.

I have heard this story told as a parable of the Church, particularly the Russian Church. But is it a true parable? There are many persons today who would say that it is true! And I think we can recall sayings in the gospel that criticized the scribes and Pharisees for their empty institu-

⁵ See the article, "The Significance of Divergence and Growth in the New Testament," in *Christendom*, iv. 4, Autumn, 1939.

tionalism, their idolatry of the machine from which the spirit of life was absent, their watch set to guard the spot where once the rose had bloomed, but had now long since faded and disappeared. And I think we can realize what is in store for the Church, and for the Christian religion, and for the spiritual inheritance and outlook of our race, and all its achievements, artistic and intellectual, moral and religious, if the present world-wide revolt against tradition continues and eventually succeeds. I am no reactionary, I hope; but I think only a man totally ignorant of history will deny that the present world-wide propaganda of secularism and irreligion is a threat leveled at the very heart of Christianity and of Christian civilization. The signs of the times read clearly, Reform, or perish! That is the alternative facing our muddled, divided, competitive ecclesiastical systems of today. And the opposition is not going to wait indefinitely for an answer. Unless we Christians can speak the same language, and teach the new generation the Christian way of life, twenty-five years may be too late. "Cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground any longer?"—that will be the verdict of society generally, and of all future history. I for one do not wish to hear that verdict! But I think it is the inevitable one, unless we put first things first, and unite to accomplish our common task—which simply cannot be accomplished in disunion. Not even the first task of all, Christian education, can be accomplished effectively in disunion. Whatever we say, the implication always is this: "Some other group of Christians do not say the same thing; and when there is so much disagreement in religion, how can it really matter?" And so the Church will go the way of the Empress Catherine, and her rosebush, and the Tsars, and the Russian Empire—as went the empires of old, the Persian, and the Roman, and all the rest—and the City of Jerusalem, and all great institutions of the past from which the spark of life had gone out, never to return. "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish!"

And the strange part of it is that all later history will say, "*It had to be.*" For we cannot oppose the Spirit of God! If the Church will not obey His guidance, the kingdom will be "taken away and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof." For it is no fanatical revolutionist, but the eternal God Himself, sitting upon the throne of the universe, who says, "Behold, I make all things new."

And so Eschatology and Reunion have something in common: and the eschatological outlook is as vital today as ever it was; not in some crude, literalizing interpretation, but in its essential and underlying philosophy.

The Religious Evaluation of History

THEOPHIL MENZEL

ONE of the most important points of difference between the religions of the world may be found in the evaluation which they give to the historical process. As a matter of fact it may be said that some of the major religions hardly recognize that there is such a thing as history. To the Western mind this is scarcely conceivable. We have been taught to think in terms of a time process in which the unfolding of the events of history has much to say about the meaning of our existence. To attempt to think of life without history is not only like painting a picture without taking perspective into account, for to us history is much more like the very canvas upon which the portrayal of life takes place. We have utilized history as a chart upon which to delineate the ways of God with man.

But it is an unwarranted assumption to suppose that every religious tradition has taught men to do this. In reality only one religion, outside of Judaism and Christianity, has seen any great significance in the historical process. The other religions are either unconscious of any religious meaning that history might have, or they deliberately deny that the events of this world have any eternal reference at all. It is important that these distinctions be seen more clearly. Our generation is one which has taken a great deal of interest in the philosophy of history. This interest is especially noticeable in recent theology. Discussions of the importance of the historical in religious thinking have been given by men such as Berdyaev, Söderblom, Tillich, Piper, H. G. Wood, C. C. J. Webb, Dawson, Dodd, Bevan, Macmurray and many others. Most of these authors refer in passing to the fact that Judaism and Christianity are unique in the significance assigned to history and that, on the other hand, no such importance is attributed to it by any other religion, with the possible exception of Zoroastrianism. This assumption is, I think, correct, but it means little to us until we determine in more detail what these religions have done or have failed to do with history. For this reason we shall attempt to show what history means in the various religions, hoping that this survey may serve to illuminate the peculiar use which Christianity has made of the concept of history.

(It should be said in passing that our use of the word "history" is not

that of the pure historian, who is primarily concerned with establishing, by critical methods, what did actually happen. This is a comparatively recent approach. We shall use the term in the sense of the total concept which men accept when they speak of the historical process. Whether or not every detail which goes into this concept can be critically verified by modern historical methods does not concern us here.)

Let us begin with Egypt, one of the oldest high cultures known to the historian. Certainly the Egyptian has bequeathed to us a rich body of materials for historical research. But he compiled no histories, neither did he think in a pattern which unites past, present and future into an historical interpretation of life. He was concerned about the fate of his soul in the world to come and his rulers left some records of actions done, but this does not comprise a historical perspective upon life. Egyptian culture is like the proverbial old maid who saves up everything in her attic, but she will not tell you the story of her life. You can make your own deductions. There is no pattern or order in her arrangement of the materials. Excellent material is furnished for the archaeologist but in itself it is not a history because there is no uniting historical pattern in the mind of the owner.

In Japan we find a rich mythology which tells us in very anthropomorphic style how the primeval divine couple gave birth to the various phenomena of nature. Other myths tell of the creation of the first divine ruler of Japan, Jimmu Tenno, who was said by later interpreters to have begun his rule in 660 B. C. A collection of chronicles or records of ancient happenings was written down in the eighth century A. D., but these can with less justice be called a "history" than would the term "History of Israel" be justified if we had no more than the first portion of the book of Genesis. The tone and style of these Japanese writings are emphatically mythological rather than historical, and fit more naturally into the company of primitive mythologies than into the category of interpretations of history. The apparent purpose of the material is to show that the Imperial Family was placed in control of the world at the beginning of things.

China gives us quite a different picture. There is little of myth that has survived, nor is there much speculation concerning the origins of things. In contrast to Indian thought, Chinese scholarship has taken the phenomenal world for granted and is little concerned about that which lies beyond or before or after. The interpretation of the universe seems quite naturalistic and sober. The powers of nature work together eternally in a state of har-

monious equilibrium. Do not expect any powers outside of nature to interfere in the affairs of men. This is not atheistic. There is a highest power but he (or it) can only be discerned in nature. "Heaven does not speak" is a frequent saying. Man himself is a part of nature, a microcosm partaking of the nature of the macrocosm. He is good in the sense that nature is good, showing no serious inner conflict. Such phenomena as revelation, a sense of sin, creation and a final consummation of things are foreign to typical Chinese thought. It is so harmonious that there is no clashing of wills. There is only the destruction which comes from ignoring the established order.

It is evident that such a people will not find a plot or story in the events of the world. There is a deep sense of moral order and a doctrine of retribution, but the relation between heaven and earth is too impersonal to produce a dynamic sense of history. There is only history in the sense that one would speak of the record of a mechanical process as history. To be sure, the Chinese compiled records of ancient happenings. Some of the Confucian classics are of this nature. They had an aptitude for precise recording which is rather unique in the ancient Orient. But the record is static, more like a collection of photographs than like the dynamic of an unfolding story. As to man's future, the great teachers of China had nothing to say.

Turn westward to Babylonia. The foundation of much of Babylonian thinking is astronomical and astrological. Here for the first time we meet the cyclical conception of the ages of the world. This is probably suggested by the cyclical movements of the planets, for just as the planets travel in circular paths, so the world ages revolve in cycles of time. At the beginning of the cycle there is a golden age. Then follow the silver, the bronze and finally (in later interpretation) the iron age. We have almost forgotten what such a pattern involves. The world begins in a golden state, then degenerates into silver, bronze and iron. The age of perfection is always back of us. The times are becoming worse.

In itself this Babylonian scheme would not seem significant except that it was shared by other more influential ancient cultures of East and West. The cyclical pattern of the world ages became normative for the ancient world in most of the cultures reaching from Greece in the West to India in the East, and in some of the northern countries. Wherever it was adopted it spread a spirit of gloom and irresistible fate. No religion which thought in these terms held out a clear note of hope to mankind. There is no use feeling encouraged because another golden age will be at hand in some distant

age. That too will degenerate. And so the world is caught in an inescapable treadmill in which the music goes round and round and it is always like the music of a phonograph that is running down.

The Greeks worked out this pattern of the world "process" in greater detail. Hesiod's formulation in *Works and Days* is not only the idea of an isolated poet, but is a pattern which was presupposed in most Greek conceptions of the course of the universe. In the golden age there was no old age. Death came, but it was like the approach of peaceful slumber. The universe is under the rule of Kronos, who keeps it as a perfect Utopia until it fades away. Then the gods made a second race, the men of the silver age, placed under the domination of Zeus. Then men remained children for one hundred years, but they began to slay each other so Zeus put them away. Now follows the bronze or brazen age in which men perished by violence and war. The last stage is the iron age, characterized by labor, sorrow, injustice and brutality. It is the age to which we belong. Zeus will destroy it.

The metals which characterize these eras symbolize a theory of descent and progressive decay. Epicurus tried to counteract this by a theory of ascent, but it never becomes normative for Greek life. Heraclitus is steeped in the spirit of the cyclical pattern. Plato also makes much use of it. The Stoics often gave a mechanical rigidity to it. Every age is the exact counterpart of every corresponding age in previous cycles down to the last detail. In every cycle (or *magnus annus*, as the Romans called the cycles) Socrates will marry Xanthippe, will drink the hemlock and die.

What does history mean from such a perspective? Nothing will or can be done by man that has permanent worth. The good is defined as that which does not change. The world is infected with unreality and evil because it is in process of change. The Greek and Indian outlook is like that of a man on a train who thinks the world is always disappearing behind him and is horrified by the impermanence of his situation. There is not enough assurance that he is going somewhere to overcome the feeling that the telegraph poles are always moving backward. To be sure, a man may become interested in the telegraph poles and may count them and philosophize about them. Greek historians like Herodotus gave interesting accounts of the ancient past, but this came mostly out of intellectual curiosity or national pride, "to prevent the great and marvelous actions of the Greeks and barbarians losing their due meed of glory, as well as to state the causes of their hostility," as Herodotus says. The Greeks made a contribution to the art of

writing history, yet they see no eloquent meaning in history. They furnished no clue to the destination of humanity save that the course of time takes us round and round. Not only men but even the gods are caught in this cycle.

Indian culture is even more remarkable for its lack of historical consciousness. Indian literature, rich as it is, has produced nothing which can even be called a reasonably accurate chronicle. Some literary products like the Great Epic (the Mahabharata) are no more histories than are works like Homer's Odyssey or the Nibelungenlied. In fact Indian writers have been so little interested in accounting for events that it has been most difficult to set up a chronology for Indian history, even though the culture is now recognized as having reached a high level of development in the fourth millennium, B. C. The first dates which can be set with any degree of certainty are linked with the reign of King Asoka in the third century B. C., and that is only possible because they can be linked with the Greek rulers of western India. The nearest approach to accurate recording has been furnished by Chinese pilgrims who came to study the history of Buddhism later on. So the modern historian finds his best information about early Indian history in Chinese records.

There is a reason for this indifference to the events of time. The dominant philosophy of India has been a monism which has almost dissolved man's sense of the reality of the world itself, not to speak of the reality of the time process. Some of the leading schools declared the phenomenal world to be *maya*, usually interpreted as "illusion." Some modern Hindus dispute this translation, but their explanations add about as much reality to it as would the wrapping of an illusion in a coating of cellophane. Frequently the world of events is called *lila*, a play or puppet show. Not all Hindu thinkers would go to this extreme, but the general tendency is expressed by such terms. Whether or not Hinduism should be called acosmic in a strict sense, it does attribute so little reality and importance to the world and the events of time that Hinduism has not been interested enough to formulate an account of its own story.

In India we also meet the familiar pattern of the cycle of the ages. There are four *yugas* or ages. As the ages succeed one another they show progressive decay. The highest age, the *krita*, stands on four feet of the *dharma* (religious and social law or doctrine). Each successive age stands on one foot less of the *dharma*, until the fourth or *kali yuga* has only one foot of the law to stand upon. It is the present evil age. In the first age

men lived 4,000 years. There were 1,000 pairs of twins in each of the four castes. There were no sexes. Each pair was replaced by another at death. In the later and lower ages men were no longer constituted as twins but became male and female. Each cycle lasts 12,000 years, but these divine years are each equal to 360 human years. A thousand cycles form a *kalpa*, a cycle of cycles. Sometimes other measurements are given which are so astronomical in their proportions that they burst the capacities of mathematics to express them. This is not due to a tremendous sense of time, but rather to a failure to take any measurements realistically.

The cyclical feeling was no doubt accentuated by the presence of the doctrine of transmigration. Not only the universe goes around in cycles but each soul travels the ceaseless round of rebirth. At almost every other point of Hindu teaching one finds the same lack of rootage in time or tangible circumstances. Salvation is interpreted as involving the removal from time and circumstance. It is never interpreted as a process of doing something with or for the world. When the religions of grace appear in India, in which the gods appear to save men, these *avatars* are not concrete incarnations but are theophanies of a type which the Christian would call decidedly docetic. In Hinduism it is ridiculous to suppose that the divine can really take on the form of time or flesh. The divine word which becomes flesh would no longer be divine. God and the world are opposites.

In the interest of economy of space it may suffice to point out that Buddhism on the whole adopted the older mythology of India. All Buddhists agree that there is no beginning or end of transfiguration. Speculation concerning the beginnings of things is forbidden as questions which "tend not to edification." But Buddhism has a great event to proclaim. The Buddha appears to help men escape from the round of rebirths. Yet it is interesting to note what the antihistorical element in Buddhism does with the life of its founder. Gautama Buddha is a definite and datable personality. But he is that in spite of what the Buddhists have done to his story. Few Buddhists are interested in him as an historical personage. When Western scholars have sought to discuss problems of the history of this founder with Buddhist teachers they are usually met with astonishment. Why should anyone be interested in that? Many learned Buddhists, if asked to give the dates of Gautama Buddha's life, will not get within several thousand years of the established date. Perhaps the date is not so important, but the indifference of the Buddhists to history is nevertheless significant.

In Islam we have an interesting contrast. Here we have a strict monotheism which will seem to be utterly different from Indian thought. But as far as the evaluation of history is concerned the result is almost the same. Allah is the creator and he is the great consummator, but in the fierce blaze of Allah's will the world and history shrivel into insignificance. "Rotten rags and dirt—that is your life," said the Prophet. Allah is not the kind of God to relate himself to anything. The world is like a coal which is in a twinkling to be discarded like the burned out cinder which it will become. History is but a recess between creation and the final judgment. There is of course the tradition of the succession of prophets in history of which Mohammed is *the* Prophet. But this succession is a borrowed thing, consisting almost entirely of Biblical material. We might say that without the Hebrew-Christian tradition Mohammed's conception of history would be as empty as that of the most acosmic religions. Man is not endowed with a will of his own, either for good or evil. It is difficult to make sense of history if the course of events allows for no freedom in humanity's actions.

In Zoroastrianism we meet a religion which neither adopted the cyclical scheme of the ages nor did it portray God as one whose will dissolves the significance of history. According to Nathan Söderblom, Zoroastrian doctrine contains "the idea implied in the word history, that is to say, 'something happens in what happens,' so that the intricate mass of events has a meaning and a goal beyond the actual combinations and situations. The real kernel of history is a 'forward,' not a see-saw, and not a backward, although it may seem so to the human eyes." "To have originated faith in the significance and purpose of history may fittingly be called Zarathustra's greatest gift to mankind." Whether Zoroaster's work is to be regarded as prior to the Hebrew evaluation of history is a debatable question, yet it is certain that he rejected every cyclical or static conception of the world.

The Zoroastrian conception of the world includes three elements essential to any religious world view which would attribute significance to history. (1) It attempts to account for the existence of the world by a doctrine of creation. (2) It has an account of man's existence upon the earth which shows action and movement toward a goal. Man is not a puppet, he is an actor in the drama of history. He is not a victim of inexorable fate, such as to induce merely the sympathy we feel toward the victim in a Greek tragedy or toward the souls in process of transmigration. He is a responsible actor, and his action reaps judgment. So the conception of history in which respon-

sible men play a part always includes, (3) The idea of judgment and a new order. In such a religious world view history always has a transcendental reference. It issues in a divine solution of the historical dilemma. Because the episodes of creation and judgment (or eschatology) are super-historical conceptions, they must necessarily be expressed in terms of mythology or symbolism, but the historical episode of the scheme takes the events of history much more seriously than is the case in those religions which do not see history as the story of an ongoing process of redemption. Zoroastrianism shows only the rudiments of such a conception, but it has grasped enough to give a forward sweep to its whole picture of the universe.

Unless we keep in mind the cyclical and static conceptions which most of the religions have espoused we shall not appreciate the uniqueness which is revealed in the Hebrew, Christian and Zoroastrian views of the world. Consider the Hebrew version. When we speak of the high evaluation which the Hebrews had of history, we do not, of course, mean that they wrote history according to the scientific canons of the twentieth century. As accurate reporters they probably did no better than Herodotus or the Chinese chroniclers. They did not pretend to give a complete version of events according to the standards of modern research. Yet as one passes from the Gentile world into the Hebrew scene one feels a new orientation toward history as such, regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of the records. The episodes of history are not mere points in a circle which is followed round and round, nor are they lost in the desert of static boundlessness. Each event is a milestone in the story of a relationship, the relationship between God and mankind. This relationship to God is expressed, not in spiritual states, as in the mysticisms, but in unrepeatable actions and events. That is just what makes it so dramatic and graphic. The materials do not aim primarily to depict an institution, a doctrine or even a nation. They include valuable material with reference to such things. But their larger subject is a concrete story of God's deeds.

The writers of the Old Testament do not move in a timeless world of psychology and intellectual conception. The nature of God is to be discerned in the rise and collapse of nations. The visible arena of the affairs of men and of nations is thus invested with an importance which is unique among the religions. The world is seen with different eyes because the visible world stands in a different relation to the ultimate reality. The world is not invested with divinity, nor is it merely an ephemeral bubble.

It is molded by God, yet God is above it. God is closely enough related to the world to make His continued action upon it possible, yet He is separate enough from it to allow for action between God and the world. This apparent paradox of the dependence upon and separation of the world from God is what makes history possible. If God were not related to the world, time would be robbed of all its larger significance. If the world were not separated from God the action of history would be impossible. Everything would be swallowed up in the bosom of changeless being. Here the difference between the Greek and Oriental conceptions of pure being and the Hebrew sense of the divine will is tremendous. Where the Greek speaks of ontology the Hebrew speaks of history. The Greek asked, "What is the time'sss being?" The Hebrew asked, "What does God do?" This difference of approach is, of course, rooted in a different concept of God. The Hebrew emphasis upon a righteous and holy God, rather than a God of ontological perfection, shifts the interest to action and history. Ontological interest usually serves to discount the importance of history.

But it is not only God who acts. In the Old Testament we see as nowhere else in ancient Scriptures that man acts. Man is always making decisions. "Choose ye this day," happens every day in the Old Testament. Man is no flotsam and jetsam floating on the tide of some cycle or fate or round of rebirth. He is constantly choosing and striving or wilfully refusing to do so. Thus it is no accident that personalities are seen with a dynamic and a clarity which is unique among the ancient records. But not only that. There is a sense of community which is also astonishing. Mankind is seen as essentially one. One man's existence is closely interwoven with that of others. There is a community of destiny as well as a community of decision, a community in time as well as in space. There is a sense of the solidarity of mankind without which history would not be possible. At times this sense of solidarity was perverted into nationalism, but the true voice of Israel can never be equated with nationalism. And even if judged by the canons of modern historical research there is much in the Old Testament that deserves more appreciation than it has received. Where else in the history of nations do we find such a frank and unvarnished account of national leaders and policies? The writers of Samuel and Kings often show a freedom from national ties which would be remarkable in a modern textbook of history. Not even the greatest leaders are whitewashed. It is true that they write from a certain point of view, a religious "philosophy of history." But

that philosophy of history is so frequently and so clearly stated that there is no mistaking the criteria upon which they based their judgments. There can be no legitimate objection to such a criterion as long as it is honestly stated and is not inserted as an unacknowledged bias. The most misleading and unobjective interpretations of history are those which proceed from a certain philosophy of history which is never admitted.

Finally, a few closing observations concerning Christianity. The early Christian community fell heir to the Hebrew evaluation of history. In fact, it might be said that Christianity gave history an even greater significance. Some religions can be described without any particular historical rootage, but Christianity is unthinkable unless certain events occurred in history. Brunner reminds us that some of the events are so concrete that they could very well be the subject of a police report, such as, "Jesus of Nazareth, crucified under Pontius Pilate." The gospel is news, good news concerning things seen and heard. To be sure, the gospel is more than a mere report of occurrences. The events are important because they have reference to something more than a mere "now," but unless they enter the realm of time they cannot be windows to eternity for us.

This does not mean that Christianity is enslaved by history. Brunner is right when he says, "the historical Jesus is a corpse." Merely to establish the events of His life is barren history, not in itself religiously significant. But Macnicol rightly counters Brunner's judgment with the supplementary observation, "the Christ of idea is a phantom." Historicism leaves us with a corpse, but theology which is not rooted in historical fact leaves us with a phantom. Many of the important struggles in the history of Christian thought have to do with the relation between the historical and the super-historical. Celsus complained about the Christians that they believe in a kind of myth, that of Christ, which "will not permit an allegorical explanation." Why not? In a world flooded with allegorical myths, Christianity comes with the story of an event. You cannot allegorize it. Either God has done these things or Christianity is not even a myth. The difference between the historical orientation of Christianity and the nonhistorical spirit of the mystery religions is apparent.

Samuel Angus in his recent volume, *Essential Christianity*, shows great concern lest Christianity try to base the truth of its message upon the literal historical accuracy of unprovable details. That way leads to barren obscurantism, he maintains. That is, of course, correct. The fundamental-

ists of any religion cannot prove the truth of religion by archaeology. On the other hand, a Christianity without a serious concern for the historical is disloyal to its essential genius. When the Gnostics and Docetists tried to dissolve the historical rootage of Christianity the Church correctly countered by describing Christ as one whose work and meaning rooted in events. His life was not mere myth. He was born, was crucified, He died and was buried. Unless the word became flesh, they maintained, the gospel is a lie.

The Gospel of John is often considered the least factual of the accepted accounts of Christ's ministry. It takes liberties with chronology and with the setting of occurrences. But even this very free interpretation is a good example of Christianity's indissoluble relation to history. The theme of the book can be stated in these words, "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." God has been made known in a man, not in the illusion of a man. He has entered the process of history. Far from representing a denial of history, the fourth Gospel attempts to show the unhistorically-minded world that time has become the camping ground of the eternal.

One wonders also whether the doctrine of the Trinity, which has seemed such a paradox to the non-Christian world, does not have some relation to Christianity's insistence that history cannot be ignored. Among other things, the trinitarian conception tries to keep alive the recognition that God is not a solitary abstraction, devoid of relation within and utterly divorced from the world and time. Perhaps the formula, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, expresses among other things something of the Christian philosophy of history. It suggests that which exists before the curtain of history is raised, it insists that God has entered time in the person of His Son, and it reminds us of that which abides with us and brings all things to a divine consummation. To be sure, the persons of the Trinity are not interpreted in Christian theology as existing in a relation of temporal succession to each other, but the formula does suggest that God is no mere state of being. It suggests activity, relation and a goal.

Almost every important Christian teaching has a relation to history and presupposes an evaluation of history. Even that which takes us beyond history, as all religion must, takes us beyond it by transforming and fulfilling it, not by destroying it or ignoring it. The kingdoms of this world become the kingdom of our Lord. The teaching of the Kingdom, while more than a philosophy of history, is concerned with history. History is not everything to the Christian, but in it we find that story which is framed in eternity.

A Modern Protestant View of Nature and Grace

VIRGINIA CORWIN

THE central beliefs of Christianity have long since been expressed in formulae which can no more be deleted from history than the strata of rocks can be erased from the world. But every generation must examine the experience which may be so stratified, and emphasize for itself what is of central importance. Even individuals may do it for the purpose of gaining perspective, in the knowledge that the emphasis will not be the same for any two generations. In an area so well traversed as this there can be no originality, only the attempt to deal honestly and fairly with the problems.

The doctrines of nature and grace deal with nothing less than the relation between man and God, conceived of as a dynamic, continuing one. This relationship is surely at the very heart of religion. Unfortunately it is so central that it cannot ignore any of the important matters raised in a consideration of the question, What is Man?, nor most of the questions relating to the purpose and activity of God. It is obvious that in limited space only the most important aspects can be discussed, and much else must be omitted; nevertheless, there is gain in exploring the territory.

The subject is one of extraordinary importance today, for the mood that is creeping over the world is one of despair and pessimism in the face of the increasing impotence of the individual before forces which he can neither understand nor control. The mood of confidence which has marked the Western world since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is waning. The temptation is to swing to the opposite extreme: that of a collapse of any respect for the intellect and value of the individual, and the growth of blind dependence on leaders who are revered as supermen, without criticism of either the ends toward which they move, or the means which they employ. A new understanding of the relation between man and God, which has always been expressed in doctrines of nature and grace, may well help to bring about a more realistic understanding of man's failure than has marked the last two or three centuries, and at the same time give ground for hope in

the future, if man can open himself to the invigorating action of the grace of God.

I

We turn to an examination of the nature of man. The chief points to be made are grouped under four general theses, dealing with four determining factors in man's life: (1) Man is born, not isolated, but in community—in relation with others of his kind, and with God. (2) He is born limited, so that his relationships to his community are abortive. (3) He is a sinner; he rejects the relationships of love, and clings to himself. (4) His destiny, the end of his creation, is fullness of communion with God and with man.

(1) Man is born, not a monad, but a being already involved in a social environment. The number of his relationships at the beginning of his life is very small, but they are all-engrossing. Anything that could be called an individual will is limited to very slight expression in newborn infants, but it is only a short time before the individual ego comes into play. As the child grows older the number and complexity of the circles which make up his experience increase—family, school, club, church, class, nation, et cetera—and his freedom to choose or to refuse membership in one or another circle increases. Man never grows out of this web of communal relationships, however, because even though he may cut himself off from other persons physically, he is bound with them intellectually and emotionally. They have in large measure made him what he is. He inherits with them culture in its widest sense: ideals and aspirations, skills and habits that belong to a particular technological period, a commonly understood world of needs and meanings within which creativity with tools and imagination can operate, and human institutions. And the community is not only human, but trans-human as well. Man can neither be understood nor estimated without recognition of his potential relation to God.

The fact that each individual is woven into the social fabric is the most important circumstance that can be stated about him. It underlies and affects interests and activities of all sorts, whether they be those that are primarily dependent on the flesh or on the spirit, if we use for a moment the old dualistic division.

(2) But social contact does not mean fullness of community. Man is limited, and it is in part this very limitation that makes his communal relationships abortive. He is strongly marked by the circumstance that he lives

in time. He is conditioned in every aspect of his life by the problems and presuppositions of the century into which he is born. He may in rare instances partially transcend it in the quality of meanings which he chooses so that he becomes kin to the few great of the ages, but his interests are almost inevitably influenced by the categories which make up the intellectual climate of his generation. He is further conditioned by the nationality and class which are his by birth. The subtle psychological channels of language and his estimate of his place in the group have directed his thought at a period before critical judgment has developed, and he has a pattern laid out for life. Certain classes and nationalities are marked by relatively greater freedom in one century, and others in another—even to the point of having a limited possibility of transcending century and nationality and class—but in all cases habits of thought, prejudices, and predilections arise from the facts of cultural heritage. In all ages the less fortunate classes, economically and educationally, are also less free. Each person is still further marked by strongly individual circumstance: by physical inheritance and temperament, by the weight of the particular past experience which has been his, and by chance turns of fortune. To say that man is limited is certainly not the whole story, but it is a vitally important fact.

Emphasis on the fact of man's limitation may lead to a premature despair about the possibilities open to him. It is true that he approaches life from his own angle. But it is within these community circles, even if they are only partially realized, that man lives, and it is there that good as well as evil comes into existence. It is when the circles are small enough to bring him into personal contact with his fellows that his limitations are least hampering. He is likely to be most successful in creating good within the family, where the closest ties of love and interdependence exist, and where at the same time opportunities for observation are best. That situation provides the best opening for a person to sacrifice his own interests for the sake of another individual or to make a decision in the interest of the group itself. Imagination is a prerequisite for success here as everywhere, but it is a less difficult exercise than in relationships where personal contact is perfunctory, or where it is entirely lacking as it is in purely economic interdependence. It is by no means certain that even in intimate circles will be found fullness of understanding and readiness to transcend the universal limitations of being one individual rather than another. Because the bond is so close, the possibilities of pain are as great as those of love. Emotional

protests and blocks may arise to prevent any real contact. But good is created only when an individual recognizes the needs and rights of others. Good arises when the perspective is widened—when by an effort of the imagination heightened by love man transcends his own ego.

When we face squarely the degree of the limitations, it is not surprising that rarely outside of an intimate group are genuine understanding and true community called into existence. A man understands another nationality or class only partially under the best of circumstances, and not at all when any sort of tension makes his own lines of defense rigid. The very fact that there is inescapable interdependence and at the same time little genuine experience of community provokes difficulty. Conflict of interests exists between individuals, classes, nationalities; indeed, between social organisms of all sorts. The evils arising from ignorance and lack of imagination are complicated by the perpetual antagonisms of groups.

Search for a relationship with God is one part of this aspect of man's life—though the need for so profound an extension of his relationships is only partially and fitfully recognized. Man is apt to believe that communion with God lies within his control—that his search for God is a rational and voluntary concern, as he is also apt to think that in the realm of human relationships he can do whatever he wills to do. His success in rational matters has encouraged him to hope that all experience can be controlled in the same way. He is averse to recognizing limitation, which is most obvious in the areas of life in which strictly rational categories are least useful.

However much a man may be aware of the unsatisfactory nature of his communal relationships, he cannot escape from them. An individual, however sensitive his conscience, is so bound into society that he is forced to live within it. His salary coming directly from the comptroller of a reputable institution may be indirectly drawn from wages withheld from workers who have had an inadequate share in the fruits of their labor. Faced with the complicated demands of modern industrial society, a man cannot examine and control the implications of all of his actions. Even a thoroughgoing protester against industrialized society like Gandhi succeeds in extricating only certain parts of his life from involvements. It is important to clarify issues in as many parts of life as possible, but a man must compromise, whether or not he knows that he does it. He cannot control all his relationships, if he would.

(3) But the truth goes beyond this, for he does *not* will the full clari-

fication of his communal life. He not only fails to live out the possibilities of community because he is limited, but he rejects them. He loves himself—not his fellows, not God. Self-love is expressed in terms of the centrality of self in all his thoughts and acts. It is his point of view that must be maintained, his right to have comfort and security, his power and position that subtly determine his course. At a somewhat higher point of development his concern may seem to be unselfish because it is for the circle with which he is most closely identified—his family, his friends, his country—but the egocentricity, though masked, is invariably present. He will not accept the implications of mutual sacrifice and adjustment and love which are the necessary means of living in community. One of the last things that a man can yield is the right, as he sees it, to determine his own destiny, which usually means to determine it in line with his desires.

Sin is the conscious rejection by an individual of whatever ways of living are not conducive to his own pleasure and power. There are two roots of sin, one which involves man in continual evil and hence, eventually, sin; the other a matter of orientation which Christianity has always declared to be susceptible of change. A perspective shaped by century, class, nationality, concentrates a man's attention on that which is *his*. His sense of values is partial. As he becomes aware of the conflict between his success and that of one of his fellows, his conscience may be stirred—which is to say that in imagination he recognizes the validity of the claims of others upon him, although imagination may fail to move him to a modification of his course of action. At this point the general evil in which he participates may be said to become describable as sin, because he is made aware of his share of responsibility in it. Thus from one point of view sin appears to be the inescapable lot of man, because it must forever arise from the limitations into which he is born. The second root of sin is to be found not in the inevitable limitations, which only gradually rise to consciousness and become partly deliberate, but from a constant characteristic of man's inner make-up. He is self-dependent; he wants security and control. In other words, he loves himself. This is expressed in a negative answer to the promptings of conscience, a positive defiance of God.

Sin is thus always a conscious and deliberate ignoring of what is felt to be right. The view of the right may be only very partial, but such as it is man repudiates it. And by ignoring it he knows himself torn by tragic disunity. "The good that I would I do not, the evil that I would not that I

practice." His aspirations and intuitions may be true, but they are in complete conflict with his egocentricity. His desire to achieve his aspirations is not sufficiently strong to drive him to mitigate his own power.

To say that sin is the deliberate doing of evil is not to say that man is ever conscious of all his evil. Man can never know all the implications of his sinful choices, any more than he can know the full extent of all evil in which he participates by reason of his limitations. He may even successfully ignore one phase or another of his sinfulness by repressing it, as a purely incidental experience—that is to say, one devoid of moral content—may be misinterpreted and repressed. But it may be doubted whether any person can wholly strangle his feeling of responsibility, and it is certain that a serious recognition of responsibility in one realm is likely to lead to its extension into another. In spite of these qualifications of the definition of sin as conscious and deliberate self-love, it would seem that the basic truth has not been altered. Only that aspect of evil which a man consciously accepts is sin.

The problem then arises as to whether man is sinful by nature and whether he has any freedom in the matter. It seems clear that man always has a high degree of negative freedom: he can base his life on a denial of the value of community, whether with his fellows or with God. He always has the freedom which is that of *posse peccare*. In the smallest circles of his relationships—the family or close friendship—when he is stimulated by natural love, he has a partial positive freedom: he may succeed in transcending his egocentricity and self-love within those areas. But as the circles of interdependent relationships become more numerous, more complex, and less immediate, the positive freedom decreases, and his self-love is so strong as to seem practically unshakable. In the last analysis man cannot break the bond of preoccupation with the narrowly egotistical concerns in which he finds his security. In other words, man's sinfulness is as constant as is his humanity. It is his nature to love himself, but to say that is not to suggest that the explanations offered by most forms of the doctrine of original sin are satisfactory. A statement of the fact, rather than any attempt to explain it historically or psychologically, is as far as one can go, except that the suggestion may be advanced that there has been biological and perhaps psychological survival-value in the self-dependence which is at the heart of sin. For our generation there is more meaning in saying that what is necessary is a

reorientation of man's desires, a re-evaluation of man's values, than in saying that a metaphysical change in man's nature must be achieved.

(4) Man's destiny is not to remain cabined within himself, for the end of his creation is fullness of communion with man and with God. The doctrine that man was created in the image of God is one of the ways in which Christians have affirmed their faith in the glory of man's destiny. Sometimes the doctrine has been connected with creation and in that case it has been linked with the idea of the origin of man, either racially or theologically. This connection is dangerous today, because it almost always connotes a *point* of creation, rather than a *process*. Sometimes the doctrine has given rise to the question, In what sense is man made in God's image? In that case it has been used to emphasize the idea that by means of the rational faculty man has freedom and may create good. But it would seem to belong more truly to the conviction that man's destiny is to partake of the *imago dei*, by means of the process of redemption which is only the continuation of creation. Man's greatest leap of faith is that in the end he may be made in the image of God, and therefore be able to respond to what God offers him—communion with Himself.

II

Grace is the activity of God, working in the world to create good. Just as it has seemed impossible to restrict man's sinfulness to one area of his being or experience, so the operation of grace cannot be restricted to one aspect of God's work in the world. As the grace of God appears in the natural world it is most clearly manifest as power, but it is power useful for the creation of good. Grace appears also in history, in the human relationships within which man lives, but there the activity of God can be restricted by man. Insofar as he succeeds in achieving a limited amount of good, man co-operates with God.

Redemptive grace is the love of God reaching out to redeem men from absorption in self. It does not seem to be essentially different from the expression of God's love and power in other aspects of creation, but the word redemption has been used to indicate the delivering of man from sin to new life, which is primarily a life of fullness of communion. Redemptive grace is offered freely to all men as the rain falls on the just and the unjust, and the sun shines on the evil and on the good. The insights of Jesus seem more penetrating at this point than those of Augustine. All men may have

the abundant life of a new relationship if they cease to shut out God. For redemptive grace, which is the highest point at which the process of creation can touch man, seems to make central the response of person to person. Only so are the barriers to community which are inherent in the human situation broken, and man's destiny fulfilled.

It is only God's grace, in other words, that can bring man into communion with God and man. It floods in when man's barriers go down, and lifts man to a point which he could never reach by his own endeavor, but only when he is borne on the tide of the love of God. Man turns to God when his self-confidence is broken by frustration, and despair of achieving righteousness. Man catches a glimpse of himself as he *is*, and his self-dependence and self-absorption are seen to be barriers against men and God alike. This turning toward God may be a single and dramatic *volte face*, or it may be a recurrent expression of man's deepening awareness of the implications of community.

When man has turned toward God, sin is forgiven. As sin brings its own judgment, that of living shut within self-erected barriers, away from God and other men, dealing with them only by ill-directed means which bring as much pain as joy, so grace sweeps away sin, and man's perspective, his orientation, is profoundly altered. And that change has been brought about not by his own effort, but by God's free gift. The flood stages of a river may be shut out by dikes, but when they are allowed in the boats of men float high above their earlier level. Man may have let in the waters, but he cannot say that the changes wrought are his own doing. A new level of relationship is reached.

To say that man's sins are forgiven, that the grace of God has changed his orientation, and that a new possibility of communion with God is opened to him is not to say that man reaches perfection. On the contrary he never ceases to be a sinner as long as he lives. His human limitations continue as one ever-present root of sin. But because the center of his life is no longer himself, but in faith he is turned toward God and man, sinfulness has a less strong hold on him. He seeks to live in communion with man and God, to live out the implications of his birth into community, even though he never achieves it. He continues to live by the creative grace of God. He knows his dependence on God, but in that very dependence he has found freedom which carries him beyond himself.

III

A developed doctrine of the Church and the sacraments is essential to any consideration of the working of grace. This paper cannot pretend to discuss those fields, but it must point out how important both are in the experience of the man who is learning to turn toward God and his fellows. Certainly it is not only within the Church visible that redemption is possible, but nevertheless the Church has a vital rôle to play. It provides a universal community which swallows up the narrower ones, although it negates them only if any one of them lays absolute demands upon its members. The Church itself is beyond all narrower circles, although there may be frequent occasions when it is used to serve the purposes of factions or nations. When that happens it is corrupted in itself, and it becomes a demonic force more devastating than any less potentially universal community can ever be. At its best, however, it can wean a man from preoccupation with himself because membership within it forces upon him the implications of a wider fellowship. The grace of God works in it to enable man to lower his barriers. Within the Church man is likewise confronted with the word of God, and with the testimony of lives which have outrun his own, before which he must inevitably know his own self-absorption and superficiality. At the very least he has pointed out to him the experience of those who felt themselves acutely to be human, dependent—sinners—that is to say, those whose consciences are more sensitive than his own. He cannot fail to get glimpses of his destiny. "Now are we sons of God, and it is not yet manifest what we shall be."

The relation of the sacraments to the grace of God needs to be re-examined and reaffirmed in our time. In the evangelical churches teaching about grace seems to have suffered of late years, partly as a direct result of the suspicion of sacramental doctrine in modern Protestantism. The sacraments, not uniquely, but certainly significantly, bring man into the presence of God. Through participation in them he receives schooling so that he may *begin*, at least, to turn toward God. In them discipline of man's desires and redirection of his love proceeds, as the grace of God meets him at whatever stage of religious development he may be.

Christian Ethics and Social Obligation

VERNON H. HOLLOWAY

THE PROBLEM

A CONSIDERABLE portion of the utterances of church leaders and the actions of church members in society betray some confusion with respect to Christian faith and "social action." This is one of the basic and perennial problems of Christian ethics. It is the problem of the relation of the absolute demands of God, as revealed through Jesus Christ and his gospel of love, to the relativities of institutional life and group relationships. Christian faith, if genuine, involves a religious ideal so pure and so binding upon persons that it is difficult to relate it to the more impersonal, structural aspects of social life and change. The loyal Christian is under obligation to love God and to love his neighbor, but in the realm of group relationships and responsibilities he is never, at any time, able to find social programs and political strategies that measure up to the demands of the gospel. Yet the gospel has social implications and the Christian lives in a world where group and institutional responsibilities must be affirmed, at least by most of us.

THE PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL-RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE

Placing its stress upon purity of motivation, the religious-ethic of Jesus Himself is primarily personal and only indirectly social. It is essentially a counsel of perfection. "Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect! Judge not lest ye be judged! Let him who is without sin cast the first stone! Turn the other cheek!" Responsibilities for justice to third parties, for the restraint of aggression and the righting of social wrongs, are not dealt with here. The necessity of restraining evil and enforcing justice by police and military measures is not dealt with by Jesus. A probable factor in this was the influence of popular apocalyptic views that encouraged Him to think less in terms of society's institutions and more of God's demands in the present and immediate future, expecting the imminent and complete ushering in of the Kingdom by divine act.

If by "Christianity" we mean the central experience of the Christian movement in history since Christ, centered in Him but having to adjust divine

commands to a *continuing society*, then we must make some degree of distinction between the religion of Jesus and the Christian religion. The latter is essentially a religion of *and about* Jesus, for it has had to base itself upon the total sequence of events that culminated in Jesus' death and in the resurrection of His spirit in the Christian community. It has had to address itself from time to time to the problems of the followers of Christ in a continuing world and especially in the civil orders of that world.

The Christian "movement"—the "Church within the churches"—with its affirmations summed up in certain focal points of religious-social doctrine, as in Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and others—has neither a purely individual nor a purely social message. It is concerned above all with the *community* of all *persons in relation to one another and to God*, as made *uniquely possible* through the disclosure of God in Jesus Christ. The Christian ethic, or human life as *response* to this "Divine Initiative," should be bi-polar (personal and social) in its moral manifestations. The will of God challenges and affects persons *and* groups, the outmoded habits of individuals *and* outworn and unjust institutions of society.

THE "BI-POLARITY" OF CHRISTIAN MORAL OBLIGATION

Neither good will toward persons nor support of programs of institutional reform is adequate by itself when one encounters acute social problems. Neither the "personal redemption" of the Oxford Groups nor the proposed "institutional deliverance" of gospels such as Marxism is adequate to the task that confronts us in the sphere of community with its "orders." The total demand that life in society places upon us is not an "either-or" with respect to institutional reforms and attitudes toward individuals. *Both* are constantly being required, because persons are always persons-in-society.

I may love a particular Negro as my brother-man, and my overt action should thereby express this attitude by friendship, charity, and other appropriate means. But this does not justify any forgetfulness of the fact that social sin (group egotism as expressed in the mores and institutions) still characterizes the relationships between the white race, of which I am a *member*, and the race to which my Negro friend and his kin belong. The Christian ethic applies to races, nations, and classes *as such*, as well as to every person.¹ Every individual plays a collective as well as a personal rôle, and the two can never be completely separated.

¹ H. Richard Niebuhr, "The Christian Evangel and Social Culture," *Religion in Life*, Winter, 1939.

"ABSOLUTE" AND "RELATIVE" IN CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LIFE

The Christian knows what his motives must be: "Love God and neighbor!" But he never knows with equal certainty just what actions or strategies will fulfill or best approximate the norm of love, especially in the collective sphere. The Christian ethic is a conviction rather than a social program. But this conviction has serious implications for the selection of available instruments of social change.

Christian faith and action have only one final norm, only one constant element: wholehearted response to the loving, just, and merciful will of God. There should be no disagreement among Christians as to the centrality of this "absolute" and of the demand that follows from it: "Love your neighbor!" This is the "Law of Life," although "Law" is not the right term to designate this reality, since it is not impersonal but the very presence of the Divine Being, whose will is the binding, unifying Power that underlies and yet transcends nature and history.

There have been, and probably always will be, disagreements among Christians as to the meaning of love in the collective sphere where political and economic problems are not reducible simply to moral issues. It is one part of the Christian task to attain religious insight and to pursue moral ideals of high caliber. It is equally important, although usually very difficult, to implement such motives in social action that can establish a more nearly just society.

Christian motivation with its social sympathy and passion should always remember the phrasing of the commandment: "Love God with all your *mind!*" This might suggest not only the need for careful thinking in theology but that religious-social passion "to do God's will" must involve a concern and respect for social facts and analyses. Religious perspective and social intelligence should complement one another. Motives, however sincere and devout, if not linked with facts, lead to sentimentalism. Facts, without motives rooted in religious resources, easily lead to cynicism and to contentment with expediency.

There is considerable truth in the theme of Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*: that the "goodness" of the individual in his personal relationships tends to disappear when he acts as member of a group. At least, his effectiveness for harmony in face-to-face relations is not always relevant to the consequences of the institutional rôles he must play. His

membership in, and hence support of, social groups and social habit systems helps to reinforce their strength when they often are very unjust. It is easier to carry out one's good will within the family than within political activities. In the latter sphere it is impossible to act according to love *as this norm applies* to more intimate relations.

Actions that follow from a "love of society," from a love of those persons most of whom we can never see or know intimately, must be measured by a more impersonal standard—"social justice." But this should *not* be regarded as a matter of "justice *rather than* love," of "compromise *rather than* perfection," but of *what love means in the collective sphere* where our relationships, and therefore our obligations, can never be limited to personal ones. The norm of love is impersonal here in so far as one must act toward many persons chiefly by reference to the collective whole of which they are parts. And such action must be with due regard for the "bony structure" of this socially organic whole—its "social framework" or institutional structure, the mores, laws, social agencies and other relatively impersonal instruments of society's adjustment to its environment. Here it is necessary to act toward many persons with respect to their embodiment of a system.

Concern for society and for masses of its workers may demand of many Christians that they work for a National Labor Relations Act. Regard for the rights of Negroes will lead some to support a Federal Anti-Lynching Bill. Love of international society may have to express itself imperfectly as Christian motives combined with political insight lead to collective action to restrain Nazi aggression, even though this means "fighting fire with fire." Love of the "neighbor," when "neighbor" is determined by God's will and not by the boundaries of race or class or nation, does not stop with concrete activities benefiting persons whom one can directly contact. It includes efforts to improve collective measures for the regulation of human affairs.

THE MEANING OF CHRISTIAN "COMPROMISE"

Social problems are always more than moral. The relative stability of the social order rests upon the use—albeit the moral, discriminate use—of power. In a period of instability and conflict, one cannot participate in the struggle for social justice simply by having pure motives. Action that is relevant to institutional problems will have to combine religious insights

and ideals as best it can with programs that are politically effective. Political movements cannot be sublimated into activities of pure moral suasion. Political struggles are power-political struggles. In this sphere one must join a pressure-group that uses political, economic or other weapons that are deemed necessary for social health. (Many "moralists" would profit greatly by reading Lincoln Steffens' *Autobiography*.)

In modern industrial relations it is important as to whether there is a high degree of patience and impartial, relatively unselfish, desire for the "welfare of the whole" in bargaining activities. But in such an area it is very important that moral appeals be reinforced by organized social power. One need not subscribe to all the tenets of Marxism if he concedes that until labor organizations can wield as much power as employers' groups they will not fare so well in their demands. Individual good wills are not as effective in such group relations as is equality of power. Hence "compromise" is inevitable for the Christian who acts responsibly *in* this area, *if* by "compromise" we mean that he finds it necessary to act with or to support groups whose collective aims and methods are "coercive" in a fashion that the Christian might reject in more personal relationships.

Is such action *only* "compromise," as some Christians would have it, who refuse to depart from the Sermon on the Mount? Or is it not what *must* follow in an attempt to accept the dictates of love and responsibility amid the complexities of group relations, where love as a personal, intimate manifestation, is not a real possibility, or where if it is it will not fulfill one's total obligation to the social situation? It is important to note that "compromise" applies, after all, to those who refuse to participate in the social struggle because they dislike coercive action, or because "the unions have selfish interests of their own," or "the Allies are not disinterested in their restraint of Nazi aggression." In so far as anyone benefits from and is a part of the total situation, his inaction does not clear him of moral "compromise."

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

The Christian ethic proclaims itself as the theory and action of those who sincerely seek to respond to the will of God as disclosed in the historical event and significance of Jesus Christ. As long as there is a common reference to Christ as the unique symbol of God's will, various Christian expressions of religious loyalty and moral obligation will be seen to have

a common denominator, regardless of the otherwise differing patterns of behavior. Christian life does not give up its claim to universal validity because it needs always to be formulated in relative terms and applied to changing conditions. The continued loyalty to God as revealed in Christ is the "absolute" in Christianity that the many and different Christian groups, doctrines, and social theories have sought to express.

Since modes of thought conflict within a particular period and differ between one age and another, Christian affirmations of God and His relation to the world will vary, and theological disagreement will be inevitable. Christians, like all men, in their social judgments tend to reflect social backgrounds and relationships, so that social applications of their religious ideals will be conceived from within the standpoint of their family, class, racial, national and other perspectives. Hence there will be ethical disagreements. Religious decision qualifies all other decisions, but along with these others it is made by finite individuals who are conditioned by the needs and interests of various groups.

This accentuates the need for recognition of a "bi-polar" standard in Christian ethics. Luther was right at least in claiming that not only were there too few Christians, but that they themselves were not (in the social sphere could not be) "Christlike" enough. Hence in the civil sphere he allowed for compromise with the Sermon on the Mount. Soldier and magistrate, for him, had a religious calling. Their rôles were necessary for the relative stability of the kingdom of the world. The Christian should not defend himself, but as citizen he should defend his neighbor, even though by use of the sword. It is to be regretted that Luther went too far toward leaving the social sphere to the will of "the powers that be," so that "compromise" was left in too little tension with the demands of the Kingdom—the possibilities of love and constructive reform. For this reason Lutheranism has tended toward quietism, attempting no direct critical influence upon the political structure.

There is a great measure of truth in the "duality" of Luther's position (probably even more in Augustine's), providing we do not *separate* the two "poles" of personal and collective life. From time to time at least many of us confront the inescapable demand that we participate in the strategies and overt conflicts that aim at approximate social justice. And we inevitably run the risk of so divorcing social ethics from the Sermon on the Mount that there cease to be ideal checks upon political action.

RESULT: THE CENTRAL TYPES OF CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC

Because of this risk, and of the desire to witness to the Gospel of Love, some earnest Christians usually refuse to accept the responsibilities of coercive action and therefore take such positions as pacifism, monasticism, and asceticism. Generally these are flights from the political quest for social justice, but it should never be forgotten that their influence provides moral contributions to the ongoing social order. The monastics and the Quakers, for example, made undeniable contributions to society. Those of us who feel that we could not have been pacifists in Spain or Czechoslovakia, or that we could not now be pacifists in China or the "Battle of Britain," need to know of the absolute protest against this evil, as demonstrated by the lives of Christian pacifists. Our concern for the relative justice at stake, driving us into action on one side, is always in danger of becoming an "absolute," devoid of checks upon its natural tendencies toward limitless hatred and pretense. The errors of Christianity in the first World War were not so much its inability to make all Christians pacifists as its weakness in any establishment of religious reservations with respect to the righteousness and universal claims of either of the two sides. This remains as one of our greatest Protestant weaknesses with respect to issues of modern social conflict.

There have been, and there exist today, two general types of Christian social ethic: *participation* in the political and military realms with the attendant "compromise," and *flight* from direct action in these realms—or to use a better term—the *disavowal* of responsibilities in the conflict over justice, in order to contribute the persuasive influence of witnessing to the meaning of love in individual life, where perfection can be most fully embodied. It is deeply to be regretted that some who today are trying seriously to achieve a "Christian" standpoint with respect to the war, and who have found it necessary to take a pacifist position, lack religious and historical perspective upon the ambiguity of all human efforts, and as a result are unable to see the relativity of their own "absolute protest" and therefore are unwilling to agree that others are equally within a Christian standpoint when the latter accept responsibilities for the use of coercion.

THE NEED FOR A DEGREE OF "LIBERALISM"

As mature Christians we should be able to "agree to disagree" as to

just where we are called to take our own particular stands. Loyalty to God will qualify but will not, by itself, complete our social judgments. Christian convictions will drive some of us into political action, as we seek to relate these convictions to the particular problems of the political and economic realm. This usually demands co-operation with decidedly secular groups. If such be our decision we must not lose sight of the social need and moral right for other Christians to take a pacifist position which removes them from the direct struggle of politics. And we need to recognize that many Christians have responsible positions that may keep them among those social groups which will be opposed to the particular movements which we may support in our hopes for a more nearly just society. Is there not a place for Christian faith and effort within the ranks of labor unions *and* the National Association of Manufacturers, within Republican *and* Democratic *and* Socialist parties? Even within German *and* Allied general staffs and trenches?

Should we not, as Christians, be able to accept the following principles? (1) That we are united in a common loyalty to God, and therefore acknowledge responsibility for our neighbor; (2) That there is no justification for indifference to social evils; (3) That since *everyone* is our neighbor and man continues to be a sinful creature, *both* absolute protest *and* the restraint of evil by coercive action are possible Christian rôles, depending upon one's position in society and the possibilities he sees for constructive effort.

Decision for the Kingdom of God is the decision which qualifies all other judgments. The Christian has to be more than just "patriotic" in his patriotism, for he sees the limitations as well as the good points in such legitimate but limited loyalties. Like Edith Cavell, he must affirm that "Patriotism is not enough!" He is not just "father" in his attitude toward his family and its relations to the world, since he realizes that while he may never quite be able to "love his neighbor" exactly as he does his own family and himself, nevertheless his neighbors are of equal value in the sight of God, and where their rights are trespassed upon there are the roots of collective evil and injustice, so destructive of community well-being. He knows that it is not, ultimately, the "white race" nor can it be the proletariat, that fixes the boundaries of his obligation. He knows that it is not *his wishes* but God's universal will that determines who is his neighbor and therefore the scope of his responsibility.

THE CHURCH AND THE CHRISTIAN CITIZEN

The primary task of the Christian Church is to bear religious witness to the reality of God as revealed through Christ. The Church cannot give evidence of absolute loyalty to God if it permits itself to become confused with the State or one of the parties contending for supremacy in civil affairs. Social action which demands programs about which there are always disagreements can and should be an adventure in the application of Christian obligation in the collective sphere, but since this is subject to errors of various kinds it should not be made in the name of the Church. But this does not mean that the Church is silent on public affairs. As a general rule, it cannot lead society in specific items of structural change, but by means of its religious functions it can and should establish ways of ethical self-criticism within the community. Whether an exclusive sect or an inclusive institution, it should address itself to the community as "children of God." It must seek always to provide that social vision without which men perish, with which men see what ought to be, beyond the claims of competing interest groups. The many "churches" should therefore embrace and protect both pacifist and "participant," in so far as these are grounded in Christian convictions, and should appreciate the testimony of each.

Through their participation in the Church, Christian citizens should be led constantly to realize that our Christian faith is absolutely vital to our lives upon earth! Without Christ we lack a competent guide among the relative goods of human life. But the history of our faith indicates that while we apprehend a divine standard that is relevant to our life, we live in a world where we must use it among values and possibilities that do not fully comply with that standard. As Emil Brunner suggests in the *Divine Imperative*, "It is necessary to stand *between* the official order and the Sermon on the Mount." Because of our faith we must affirm social responsibilities. But both the New Testament and the subsequent history of our faith bid us to recognize the importance *and* the relativity of diverse attempts to fulfill the moral obligations imposed by our loyalty. This is the great paradox of the Christian life. We are "justified by faith and not by works," but it is the saving perspective of faith that makes the works possible. This is what it means for the Christian to be "*in* the world but not *of* the world."

The Importance of Jesus for the Twentieth Century

DONALD T. ROWLINGSON

AMONG the current half-truths making their bid for popular approval is one which relates to the importance of Jesus for modern life. It was expressed some time ago in provocative form by Harry Elmer Barnes in his premature obituary of the demise of Christianity, *The Twilight of Christianity*, and has continued to make itself manifest in the writings of others of a like cast of mind. It is the claim that despite the ethical genius of Jesus in His day, and the heroic and dynamic quality of His life, He is essentially irrelevant to our search for the best life in the twentieth century. This conclusion is based upon two main grounds, His obvious ignorance of the phenomena of a scientific-industrial age like our own, and the limitations of His methods and teachings.

I

It can be understood why this misconception appeals to apparently earnest seekers after truth. On the one hand, it represents the tendency of men in every age to react in extremes to the failure of religion to make a rapid adjustment to the advance of truth in the so-called secular realm, in this case that of science. Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Morals* is a good illustration in so far as traditional conceptions of Jesus are discarded in favor of a more "scientific" view. On the other hand, it reflects the habit of men to allow half-truths to do service for more profound thinking, since there is contained in the conception enough that is valid to make it seem plausible to many who are content to rest their judgment with conclusions which do not reach the end of the matter.

To explain the phenomenon, however, is not to justify it, and before we pass to a positive statement of Jesus' contribution we should examine critically the assumptions upon which the attack rests. The first assumption is that His ignorance of the twentieth century disqualifies Him to aid us. It is obvious that there is an element of truth here which it is important to grasp. Jesus has made no contributions to scientific discovery which have enriched our lives and broadened our horizons as have those of Copernicus,

Darwin, Pasteur and countless others. Nor can we discover in His teachings any specific suggestions to apply to modern economic and political dilemmas. Even in ecclesiastical government He offers no advice as to specific procedures. It is fair to assume that everything Jesus uttered was directed to some localized situation in the first century and that His thought was bounded by the age in which He lived. On the basis of His recorded words there is no reason to think that He was even aware of all the currents in the wider life of His own day, let alone that He was consciously addressing the inhabitants of the earth in our day. The Gospels do not lead us to believe that Jesus had any more exact and detailed prevision of the future than have we about the days ahead of us. His "philosophy of history" was rather the fruit of a profound faith.

Granting all this, however, it is absurd to conclude that as a consequence Jesus is thereby outmoded. But this is the conclusion we are asked to accept. We are asked to give credence to an assumption unbelievably naïve and superficial, namely, that Jesus or anyone, therefore, in the past who has made no specific suggestions regarding the policy America ought to follow in the present world crisis, or who was unfamiliar with modern medical and psychiatric methods, is thereby irrelevant to modern life. It implies that Plato and Aristotle are likewise out of date, that all discussions of the fundamentals of democracy in the past are antiquated because written ballots have been replaced by voting machines, that all ideas regarding the basic elements of the religious life coming from Palestine of ancient days are outmoded because in America we speak in English rather than in Aramaic or Greek. Thoughtful men will not be so easily misled.

More serious than this ephemeral supposition, however, is the other leg upon which the argument stands, namely, the alleged inadequacy of the methods and teachings of Jesus. Serious though it be, it simply reveals the inability of some minds to rise above the temptation to interpret Jesus according to their own presuppositions untempered by adequate critical and historical perspective. In this case we see the exponents of a philosophical dogma distorting or discarding from the Gospels data which cannot be fitted into their neat scheme, and at the same time revealing their ignorance of recent gospel criticism. It is claimed, for instance, that in dealing with the perplexities of men Jesus neglected what we now know to be the most dependable human faculty for this purpose of analysis and guidance, namely, intelligence. Instead, Jesus is supposed to have depended fundamentally upon an

all too simple and naïvely childlike trust in the Father to whom He gave His complete obedience. Suppose we grant that trust in the Father was the core of Jesus' life, who is to say that such trust was not based upon a wisdom much more profound than what all too commonly passes for "intelligence"? And judging by the results, who among all the human race did more for perplexed and harassed individuals than He? The Gospel records make that clear beyond any doubt. And do not the findings of many modern psychologists testify to the importance of religious faith in leading tangled and handicapped minds to peace with themselves? The value of this testimony is enhanced because paradoxically it often comes from men like Jung who profess no personal belief in God.

It is also claimed that Jesus cannot help us in the economic and political sphere because He took the existing order of His day for granted, thereby precluding any obligation on man's part to interfere with the processes which affected his well-being. But this is to interpret the life of Jesus with eyes closed and with no historical perspective whatsoever. If the alternatives faced by Jesus in the "Temptation Experience" are to be interpreted with any historical realism they must be viewed in the light of first-century Jewish Messianic hopes, with all that was implied in terms of economic and political freedom from the Roman yoke. It must also be remembered that "Love your enemies" was voiced in the face of an almost united hatred on the part of the Jews for Rome, and that the Parable of the Good Samaritan was set forth against the background of the mutual suspicion and antipathy existing between Jew and Samaritan. Nor can any analysis of the causes of Jesus' crucifixion be realistic and neglect His driving the money changers from the Temple, with its implied protest against the exploitation of the poor by the vested interests of Israel's official class. And certainly Jesus' statements regarding nonresistance must be related to the circumstances of His own day as they reflect an alternative procedure to that championed by the jingoistic and violent Zealots. Jesus did not live in a vacuum, but His efforts were directed to helping men make an adequate adjustment to the specific circumstances of their immediate environment.

Other claims, equally questionable, are made against Jesus. His self-glorification is even dragged in to prove that He lacked the humility and modesty of true greatness. But how can this claim be intelligently made when Biblical scholars cannot agree upon the self-consciousness of Jesus, partly because the records themselves are not clear about it, and partly

because it is impossible to determine to what extent the interpretations of the disciples have colored the portraits of Jesus which are set forth? And even if Jesus did hold Himself in high regard, what has this to do with any final evaluation of His importance for the twentieth century?

From the standpoint of a purely negative criticism there is little in this attack upon Jesus' relevance to our day which can stand. This is not enough, however, to bring us confidence that He can help us. Let us seek therefore to set this in a more positive vein.

II

The heart of this whole matter is whether Jesus can help us in meeting our fundamental needs, and in the last analysis the case stands or falls upon this ground and no other. By fundamental needs we do not refer to the crying urgency for discoveries through scientific research which will bring an end to the scourges of cancer and tuberculosis, important as they are, nor to the demand for techniques to bring about the proper distribution of economic advantages. Our fundamental needs go deeper than that, and they are the same for every age. These needs express themselves whether men live at a time when galley slaves propel frail vessels across dangerous waters or when Deisel engines force great ocean greyhounds through the waves. They go down into that area of experience where men, regardless of the civilization they have inherited or are helping to create, ask about the basic meaning of life in a mysterious and perplexing universe, and seek for light upon the unchanging problems of how to relate themselves to their fellowmen and of how to bring to complete expression the latent powers which psychology demonstrates they possess but do not use to the full. In this realm Jesus makes His supreme contribution, for His unerring insight into the basic values of life has not only been undimmed by all our modern discoveries, but has also been adequately vindicated by the testimony of experience.

Here, for instance, is our desperate need for a standard of values which has enduring significance, upon the basis of which our complex phenomena may be organized for the common good. We may learn much from Jesus here. Growing out of His deep conviction regarding the nature of God, and underlying everything He said and did, is His assumption of the existence of a basic moral law, as integral to the universe as the laws of nature according to which the tides ebb and flow and season follows season. It was the convic-

tion that the supreme attribute of God's character was self-giving love, and that the universe was so constructed that human relations must be organized upon that fact. It placed a sanctity upon human persons because the aim of God's creation was the achievement of moral personalities, and it fostered the demand that every institution and every product of man's creative genius must be organized and used so as to bring to full development the latent qualities of personality in each human being. This found expression not only in the direct command of Jesus to love one's neighbor, including one's enemies; it was implied also in the conception of the Sabbath as "made for man," and underlay His sympathetic companionship with sinner and outcast, His severe criticism of an undue emphasis upon wealth and material considerations, His pathetic brooding over Jerusalem, and countless other expressions and deeds. This implied that self-interest must be tempered for the sake of others, and that man could bring his life to full flower only as he identified his own welfare with that of others. It demanded an attitude of intelligent and constructive love which could rise above every impulse to hatred and revenge in the interests of redeeming the "enemy." Since these truths were in the nature of basic laws of life, man's corporate life could be conducted in harmonious fashion only when these laws were respected. The more somber aspects of judgment, equally evident in Jesus' thought of God's rule, find their coherent place here. Man must co-operate with God's laws or perish, although in Jesus' conception of God judgment was not vindictive nor impersonal, but the discipline of a loving Father, a mysterious means of bringing recalcitrant children to Himself.

Does this have any meaning for us today? In the light of human history and experience we can see the ultimate truth involved. Various contemporary writings have pointed out the all too evident testimony of history to our failure to achieve a good life upon the basis of principles which deny the insight of Jesus. In our economic life, perhaps blindly, we have allowed the principle of gain for self through loss to others to assume a place of dominating importance. And as a result, what have we reaped? Not only misrepresentation in advertising and high-pressure salesmen forcing upon a gullible public things which they neither need nor want; crime in high places and low, as well as politicians who are at the beck and call of "special interests"; much ill-gotten and undeserved gain along with a deepened chasm between rich and poor; the mutually disadvantageous oppression of worker and employer, of farmer and industrialist; and special-interest groups in all

areas of our national life seeking advantages for a small minority without perspective upon the welfare of the State as a whole. We have also produced a cataclysmic economic disturbance, the worst in a series extending over the years, the startling paradox of poverty and unemployment in the midst of "abundance," and the increase of materialism through forcing those at the bottom of the scale to be unduly concerned for bread in order to keep alive. No one could sensibly declare that this is a complete picture, but as far as it goes it is all too evidently true. It would be foolish for one unversed in the intricacies of economics to be dogmatic in such an analysis, but history teaches us that moral causes are at the root of human disaster, and there seems to be no valid reason to alter that judgment in this case. The wisdom of Jesus is justified by the fruits of our failure to follow His way.

Likewise it follows that Jesus points to what is basically necessary to the achievement of the good life in this area. Although He gives us no blueprint which may be transplanted bodily from His day to ours, He does take us to the root of the matter where our troubles begin, and reminds us of the basic laws of life upon which our economic life must be organized, if ever chaos is to be permanently avoided.

In world affairs we are met with a similar situation. Despite the evident yearning of men everywhere for peace, their nations have been plunged again into armed conflict. Whatever justice there may be in the cause of "democracy" against "dictatorship"—and a distinction must be made—it is recognized by intelligent men that war as a means is no more than the lesser of two evils and that it is a tragic perversion of the instruments of science to the ends of barbaric slaughter. And what has led to this pathetic situation? Although the causes of the war are extremely complex, involving immediate and underlying factors, fundamentally war arises from the failure of the nations as a whole to deal with each other upon the basis of the Law of Love set forth by Jesus. The root cause is a narrow self-interest on the part of the nations and their policies of self-protection at the expense of others. There may be degrees of guilt, but no nation can be entirely exonerated in a world in which each one looks to its own prestige and national advantage before it considers the welfare of the nations as a whole. We have no more learned in our international life than in internal economic relationships the wisdom of losing life to find it, and as a result we are reaping the winds of desolation. Nations can no more violate the moral laws of God and live than can individuals.

Furthermore, if lasting peace is ever to come, Jesus makes it clear what is involved. He takes us again to the point where the trouble first festers. Without asking us to neglect the immediate problems of aggression He bids us give our attention as well to cultivating the soil out of which peace may grow. He shows us the need of making some radical readjustments in the psychology upon the basis of which men now allow their nations to operate. He directs us to inculcate in our national life the conception of a nation's greatness not in terms of how much power it can wield over others, but rather of how great a contribution it makes to the development of the latent capacities of other national groups. He calls us to redefine patriotism by lifting the thought of love of country out of the realm of jingoistic pride and narrow self-interest into the clear air where national sins are recognized and repented of and where magnanimity has a chance to accomplish its mysterious work. He turns our minds to the kind of readjustments which go deep enough to bear some lasting fruit and of which history as yet offers few precedents.

Does anything more need to be said in justification for looking to Jesus for guidance in this age? Do we need in addition to recall the impulse to humanitarian service which has sprung from the influence of His life? Or is it necessary to remind ourselves of our faith in democracy, which takes its rise not from the slave-ridden republics of Greece and Rome, but from the Hebrew heritage which culminated in Jesus' emphasis upon the worth of the individual? Surely it is a shallow mind that fails to see that the real saviours of our day must come from the ranks of those who take their lead from Jesus' basic convictions regarding God and the universe.

But let us consider another of our fundamental needs—how to unearth a means of releasing the latent power for creative and heroic moral living which we all possess. It has been adequately demonstrated that most men live below the level which they are capable of attaining, because they do not draw upon the resources with which they have been endowed. It has been demonstrated also that many things may bring the "integration" of personality necessary to this achievement, but none more than religious faith. If we list all the examples of this we shall find it no more clearly demonstrated than in the life of Jesus. He lived life to its full capacity. His moral grandeur was such that men did not hesitate to call Him "sinless" and the unique revelation of God's character, and His personal courage in facing the Cross is evident. The source of this strength lay in His religious faith,

in His unwavering certainty that the Creative Power of the universe was a Personal Power, working through all experience toward the creation and attainment of moral values, and that man was therefore not alone but could at least partially understand and co-operate with that purpose and communicate with the Purposer. The result was the release in His life of every latent power for goodness and heroic moral stature.

This fundamental faith in a friendly universe, as a minimum, is still the greatest source of energy today. Man instinctively yearns for security, not only in the form of material goods, work and friends, but also in relation to the universe. The faith of Jesus reproduced in others is the only answer to that longing for something to which to cling. The results of such a faith, which are in turn a testimony to its validity, can be illustrated in the lives of millions who humbly add to the sum total of goodness in the world and who face the exigencies of existence with magnificent courage. The results are perhaps most conspicuous in the lives of the outstanding benefactors of the human race. Name whom you will of those who have contributed to the advancement of humanity. Call the roll of the great heroes of the human race from Moses to Lincoln. Include within it the Walter Reeds, the Michael Pupins, the George Washingtons, as well as the leaders of the Christian Church. It will contain names from every land and race. With few exceptions, it will be seen that either by direct profession or by implication they lived and worked in the confidence that the universe responded to their efforts, and that most of them were even content to forego lesser forms of security in the conviction that persecution and suffering for the sake of their ideal were in line with the basic moral purpose of life. Whatever other factors contributed to their influence, their morale found its inspiration in an underlying faith at one with the mood of Jesus when he called God "Father." And in the present day it is no mistake that human servants like Helen Keller, Toyohika Kagawa, Albert Schweitzer, and countless others, rest their lives on the same foundation. Even Harry Elmer Barnes can think of no more useful Americans than a group of religious leaders whose lives are rooted in loyalty to Jesus and His conviction about God.

III

The significance of Jesus becomes even more impressive as we look back with perspective over the long course of life through the countless centuries of its growth and development. We have witnessed the marvelous inception

of reasoning power at that momentous moment in the past when an advance over the subhuman forms of life was accomplished. As a result we have seen man subdue not only the animal kingdom, but through his discovery and use of natural law rise to dominate the physical universe as well. We have seen the steady conquest of disease, the defiance of the restless oceans and the once impassable heavens. It is a marvelous tale, this story of invention and mechanical discovery, all of it based upon man's intellectual capacity to adjust himself to the laws which control the physical universe in its activity. But of much greater significance has been the discovery by a few rare individuals, aware that partial mastery of the natural universe cannot alone bring freedom, that law also governs the relations of men in their dealings with each other, that men defy this law to their mutual peril and co-operate with it to the advantage of all. The Buddha and Confucius glimpsed it in their stress upon the importance of "harmony" as fundamental to human relationships. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were aware of it, and the Hebrew prophets struggled toward it. In its full-blown potentiality, however, as judged by the best in human experience through the centuries, it was set forth in the character and teaching of Jesus as in no other. In Him we see in its fullness that conception of human existence which corresponds best with the very nature of the universe itself, a conception which the human race is all too slowly coming to recognize as the only hope of salvation.

If we learn any one thing from the story of life's development, it is that some mysterious but evident purpose is guiding us toward the development of ever higher forms and an ever nobler life together. This is not to affirm that progress is "inevitable." The present condition of our world is adequate refutation of that. It is to affirm, however, that man is made for something better than that which he has thus far achieved, and that this nobler achievement lies along the path of adapting himself to the basic moral laws of life as he has made his peace with physical law. It is to affirm that far from being outmoded, Jesus rather points us toward that higher level which few have yet attained, but toward which it is our common destiny to move and into which we are destined to emerge. Jesus thus holds in His example not only the answer to the deep, instinctive yearnings of the human race for something finer than has yet been known in human relationships, but in Him is also found the source of inspiration and morale necessary to the accomplishment of that dream.

“Like People, Like Priest”

HAROLD PATTISON

WE often hear the popular proverb—“Like priest, like people,” but in reality that proverb has been twisted. The shoe is really on the other foot. The ancient prophet said “Like people, like priest” (Hosea 4. 9). It is the congregation that makes the minister. It is the *pew* that makes the pulpit.

There are three types of ministers, which alas! sometimes represent three stages in one man's life.

First: There is the priest who is ahead of the people. In this statement there is of course no thought of superiority. We know that a physician must be ahead of his patients in some respects, however much he may be behind them in others, or he could not cure them. We know that the lawyer must be ahead of his clients or he could not advise them. So the minister must be above his people in order to lift them; only as he is ahead of them can he lead them, even though the march be sometimes through the wilderness.

The priest must be ahead of his people as a teacher of scriptural truth. We believe that the ministers are fifty years ahead of their people in this respect. As a teacher of scripture the minister is not to preach higher criticism; neither is he to ignore it. The doctor does not tell his patients of the dissecting-room, nor does the lawyer speak in technical terms before an audience of laymen. The minister is off the track who thinks that creeds or even the Prayer Book are his ultimate authority. The Prayer Book and all creeds must be interpreted by the Scripture and not the other way round.

We need today a restatement of the gospel truths in terms that men can accept. The terms in which they were taught twenty-five years ago no longer reach them. These truths may dwell in men's minds as a memory, but they need to be restated so that they will dwell in men's lives as a power. To quote Saint Paul: “Let us commend ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.” The minister needs to remember the famous saying of John Robinson: “The Lord hath yet more light to break forth from His word.” To become a follower of Jesus, as laid down in the New Testament, does not depend on the acceptance of a creed. It seems a very simple matter. He called to all who desired His presence and wanted to follow Him.

More than this, a minister should be ahead of his people in the stand he takes on moral issues. Now we are on dangerous ground. Nevertheless, he must stand for the highest even when that ideal may hurt the feelings, because it may wound the consciences of some. However tactfully he may uphold these ideals he is certain to make enemies. But what of that? Both Jesus and John the Baptist came not to be ministered unto but to minister to their fellows, and one was crucified and the other was beheaded. Many a minister may hesitate to take this stand for fear that he will lose his job. What of it? As a matter of fact, and I speak after forty-six years of fairly active ministerial experience, he is in more danger of losing his job if he does not stand for the highest issues, than if he does. I have yet to find a people who will not loyally stand behind the minister who fearlessly and conscientiously preaches the gospel of modern and moral duty. In taking such a stand he will often be left open to the shafts of envy or ignorance or malignity, but the people will always uphold him.

It is true that every church pays its minister a salary, but no real church ever wants its minister to be a hired man. They respect him only as in the words of Saint Paul: "He is their servant for Christ's sake." A real priest is bound to apply the high ideals of the Scripture to the everyday life that is about him. Of course, he has no business to single any individual before him as a target, but on the other hand, if some man puts on the cap, the minister has no business to take it off. There may be a weather vane on the church steeple but no Christian congregation wants one in the pulpit.

Inevitable reaction to such preaching will be heard from certain individuals who will cry, "Do not bring politics or business into the pulpit. Let us have the old doctrines of Christianity; the minister's job is to preach the gospel." To all such we reply in the words of W. S. Rainsford: "All this sort of talking I hold to be little short of hypocrisy, if it falls short of it at all." The man who says that politics and business have no place in the pulpit will generally be found a man whose politics need purifying and whose business needs straightening.

Now let us turn to another type of minister who has fallen down a peg or two and come abreast of his people. Of course, he must be abreast of his people, and of his times, if he would be in touch and sympathy with his people and his times. In that sense he must be alongside of them, but he approaches the dead line when the people catch up with him in scriptural teaching and moral ideals. The minister, as well as the doctor and the law-

yer, goes out of business when no one has need of his help. F. W. Robertson of Brighton once said that no man was in greater danger of losing his own soul than the minister. Why?

For one reason, because unlike the doctor he must handle his parishioner with bare hands whereas the doctor can handle his patient with gloves. Like his Master before him, he must touch lepers if he would cure them. His business is to help make the crooked straight; the wounded well; the fallen lifted up.

The very fact that he handles such matters so often, and the further fact that he must deal so commonly with the most sacred things, both in the Bible and in the world about him, present a danger lest the sacred become common, and the fires which he seeks to kindle in other men's hearts grow dead in his own.

The minister must breathe the atmosphere in which he lives. If his people be of low faith and purpose, then sooner or later the reaction of that environment on his own character and ideals will be felt. Even a canary, however beautiful it may be, and however sweet its song, will topple off its perch if gas creeps into the coal mine. The minister must constantly struggle against this danger of being acclimatized. How many of the ministers of New England are anemic! How many of those of the South are traditionalists! How many of those of the East are conventional! "Like people, like priest."

The minister is in danger of becoming involved in types of work which consume his time and destroy his energy. We all remember the beautiful picture that Oliver Goldsmith drew of the village pastor of his day. He was their guide, philosopher and friend among the simple surroundings of his rural parish. Today all this is changed. The city congregation makes a thousand claims. The work of a minister grows harder every year. Not only must he do the work of his own church but he must listen to the multitude of demands that come. He must be a member of boards and committees, he must speak at anniversaries and conventions, he must be here, there, and everywhere!

In all this the minister is tempted to put second things first and to spend his time and strength on things which may be important but which add burdens under which he is in danger of breaking. It is very easy for a minister to lower his ideals. A wise congregation will discriminate between the second-rate and the first-rate product of his brain, but the minister who has

a fatal gift for making cheap and quick sermons, popular and showy, but clever only in their shallowness, is faced with a terrible temptation.

Bright men are often tempted to preach such sermons, because they are easily thrown off and do not strain the soul, and a congregation is apt to welcome such productions because they demand little attention. The really wise congregation will neither harass the minister and so make him liable at times to lose control or become petty, nor will they so praise him as to make him infallible in his own estimation. The truly wise congregation will surround the minister with an atmosphere so genial and bracing that every good in him will be fostered and everything petty will be killed.

We have mentioned the minister ahead of his people, which is his rightful place, and the minister abreast of his people, which is a positive misfortune, and now a few words about the minister who finds himself behind his people. Because of the very pressure and dangers to which we have referred, the minister may not lose his job, but he may be the victim of a greater tragedy. For the greatest tragedies in the pulpit today are not those men who have lost their places but men who have kept them and have descended in spirit. In a New England parish I once looked up the records of the pastors who had served there. I was thoroughly frightened when I discovered what had happened in the past twenty-five years. One had become a Tammany lawyer, another a public lecturer, another a journalist, another an insurance man and another a grocer. Of them all we rather like best the man who became the grocer. All these men had been true men, but they had lost their enthusiasm in their message and their mission. Their vision had dimmed because "Like people, like priest." What can the people do to keep the minister true to his task?

They can be prompt and regular in their attendance at the service of public worship. A man is often a great help to the minister just by filling a seat. Promptness means a lot. Excuses for tardiness need not be too easily accepted. Most of us do not miss trains when we plan to catch them. We should have as much respect for the Church of God as we have for an express train. A good deal depends on one's behavior in the church. The atmosphere of the service is not made more helpful to the preacher by a score of men taking out their watches the moment he begins to preach, and the click of closing watch covers is not exactly inspiring music to his ears. The atmosphere of the church is created by the way people behave after they get there. In the early days when the settlers were afraid of Indians, it was the custom

for the man of the family to sit at the end of the pew in order that he might get out of the church without delay in case of attack. He sat at the end of the pew in order to protect the women and children. The Indians are gone but the habit survives. There is no harm in that unless the man at the end of the pew looks as though he were expecting Indians. Let him smile, not scowl, if a stranger is shown to his pew. It is a good thing to have a stranger on the seat beside us even if we do have to tuck coats and hats under the seat. It is well never to leave a service without shaking hands with at least one person. Shaking hands is a means of grace. I remember coming years ago as a stranger to New York and on Sunday afternoon going to hear Maltbie Babcock preach. I was shown to a good pew. The lady who occupied it saw that I had a hymnbook. After the service she shook hands with me and hoped they might have the pleasure of seeing me there again. With a smile she left me and I left the church, but I never afterward went by that church without a warm feeling stealing into my heart. By their prompt and regular attendance, and by their behavior, the people can create an atmosphere of cordiality and good will which perhaps they little realize, but the minister who breathes this atmosphere, as well as the stranger, thrives on it.

The people can surround the minister with a buoyant atmosphere of friendliness toward himself. When he does anything or says anything that helps, tell him so. Silence chills and many a congregation has petrified its minister. Friendship and sympathy go together. If anyone thinks that the minister has an easy job, let him try it for a week and see. That job will be made less difficult only if we tell the minister when he has thrown light on some difficult passage in Scripture, or when he has stimulated our conscience and enabled us to do a duty that we had neglected, or when in times of trial or sorrow he has sustained our hearts with the rod and staff that comfort us.

The people can help the minister by their generosity. The amount of giving in support of the church is largely a matter of imagination, and imagination is not a good mathematician. Laymen are sometimes as extravagant in estimating their benevolences as ministers are in estimating the size of their congregations. The average layman is not nearly as generous as he thinks he is. In the grace of giving many American Christians are still in the copper age. Many men who fare sumptuously think themselves generous when they allow the Church of God simply the crumbs that fall from the rich man's table. It would be well for some of us to count the money

spent on dinners and theaters and travel and lodges and clubs—then figure up how much we actually give to the support of the Church. Yet the use which a Christian man makes of his money is the finest and truest test of his Christianity.

If every parishioner would give five minutes every Saturday night to definite prayer for the services of the Sabbath—that the word of the minister might be with power, that souls might be helped, that the church might be quickened—*then* something wonderful would be seen. The people might think it a change in their minister. But it would not be that. It would be a change in themselves. It would be "Like people, like priest."

The minister and his people should be co-workers together with God but they are not. God has always used leaders. We have had no great heroic leader in the Christian Church for several centuries. Not principle but expediency has been the powerful weapon that has closed mouths and stopped initiative. Some years ago I arrived on a Monday morning at the Grand Central Station after an out-of-town Sunday appointment. I checked my bag and went to the Ministers' Meeting that was being held a few blocks away. The paper did not interest me so I spent my time in looking over that Monday crowd of ministers. Worry or weariness was depicted on many faces. Suddenly the chairman called on me to say something. I had nothing to say except to utter the thought that had been in my mind. I told those ministers that if I said what I was thinking they would not like it, but as it was the only thing I had to say I would say it. I then told them frankly that I felt sad in what they had revealed to me. I knew that on the whole most of them had entered the Christian ministry with high aims of service to their fellows and unselfish visions of spending their lives in the advancement of the Kingdom of Christ. But in a few years all that had been weakened. Some church officer or large subscriber had thrown cold blankets over their enthusiasms and heroic ideals. Gradually they had found themselves traveling along the line of least resistance. When the meeting adjourned, I expected to find myself ostracized. To my surprise, the ministers, many of them with tears in their eyes, came to me and said no one had ever spoken to them like that before, and that what I had said was true.

We need ministers who will stand. We need people who will support.

"LIKE PEOPLE, LIKE PRIEST"

Parsons' Pleasure

A Chat About Novels

JOHN C. SCHROEDER

THE parson in our time has had to become a man of many interests and in recent days one more seems to have been added to the roster—a familiarity with contemporary fiction. The preacher is human. The same temptations come to him which come to everyone else. Like them he occasionally succumbs to the lure of the world. Not the least of its seductions is that wanton, the novel. But, fortunately for the parson, he can find easy rationalization for his capitulation to its allure. He feels he must be familiar with his time and understand the *Zeitgeist*. The novelist is the portraitist of an age and his painting reveals the somber shadows and the high-lighted vividness of its moods. Yet even when he does not rationalize, the parson is discovering that he can find his pleasures in fiction. He is surprised at the incredible revelation that he can enjoy a book even though it does not deliver a homiletical illustration. He is learning how to read a novel for its own sake and he does not have to condemn himself that he is wasting his time. Occasionally a Ruskin rises up to challenge him with "If you read this book, you will not have time for that," but such moralizings may readily be dismissed at a time when self-righteousness has become the unpardonable sin and balanced diets seem to be as necessary in literature as they are in dietetics. Nor need such pleasures be limited to the parson. The layman is just as sensitive to the moods of his time and just as interested in its pardonable pleasures.

Good stories are pouring out in a flood and it is becoming an almost impossible task to appraise each one. This particular selection is made according to no canon of judgment except that of variety. Others might well be substituted. The busy man may choose according to his own taste and mood.

The international turmoil is represented in two books, the first of which, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, is such superb writing that one is almost tempted to call it a great book. It is a story of the Civil War in Spain. Robert Jordan is a young American fighting on the Loyalist side, who is ordered

by the General Staff to blow up a bridge. The assignment takes him into the hill country where he must himself raise his own supporting company. He succeeds finally, knowing always that he will have to pay for the bridge with his life.

Against so simple a plot as background, Hemingway paints in the personalities who typify the struggle on both sides of the campaign. There is Jordan himself, a romantic idealist who never thinks much about the ideology of the struggle but who knows only because he feels as he faces death that "I have fought for what I believed in for a year now. If we win here we will win everywhere. The world is a fine place and worth the fighting for and I hate very much to leave it." Jordan in the short few days of the operation meets and loves Maria. In the episodes where these two people are together Hemingway succeeds in describing the transport and ecstasy of romantic love with poetic feeling and emotional power. The most remarkable of the Spanish characters is Pilar—earthy, vulgar, wise, a strong woman who is manlier than the men and yet even in her ugliness, truly feminine. Then there is the wide variety of Spanish types—the unstable and cruel Pablo, the brave, kind Anselmo, the peasants, the thugs, the gentry. The simple people are all invested with one element common to the peasant in all ages—utter dignity.

Hemingway must have a true feeling for Spain, since even his brilliant English style *feels* Spanish. But truer than this is his grasp of the mood of this cruel country, wracked by civil war where religious and economic and social forces all converge in terrible conflict. Pilar's description of the killing of the Falangists in Pablo's town as they are forced to run the gauntlet from the room in the City Hall where they had been praying with the priest, through a lane of men armed with flails to the edge of a cliff of destruction, is a shocking description of human brutality and the horror of civil war. The book is remarkably objective, as the types of men who support each side are clearly and justly portrayed. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Hemingway deeply believes in the Loyalist side as the human side. But the book is emotional rather than intellectual and while the reader feels he knows what produces revolution, it seems to erupt out of human struggle as unpredictably as a volcano. Here is a part of Pilar's description of its beginning in a small town:

"If you have not seen the day of revolution in a small town where all know all in the town and always have known all, you have seen nothing. And on this day

most of the men in the double line across the plaza wore the clothes in which they worked in the fields, having come into town hurriedly; but some, not knowing how men should dress for the first day of a movement, wore their clothes for Sundays or holidays and these, seeing that the others, including those who had attacked the barracks, wore their oldest clothes, were ashamed of being wrongly dressed. But they did not like to take off their jackets for fear of losing them, or that they might be stolen by the worthless ones, and so they stood, sweating in the sun and waiting for it to commence."

Civil War is man's cruellest enterprise. Once it starts he is caught within it and then cannot help but stand and deliver. It is impossible for him to be neutral. Such conflict reveals, as nothing else can, his inevitable complicity in society's brutality. Hemingway feels this deeply, even though he may not understand it spiritually. The selection from John Donne from which he gets the title of his book says it majestically. "No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a clod bee washed away by the sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Manor of thy friends or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee."

Another novel about the international situation is Feuchtwanger's *Paris Gazette*. He has demonstrated his power as a novelist time and again and this book, with its intricate plot, its comprehension of human motive and action, its subtle appreciation of invincible social forces is another earnest of his virtuosity. This is the story of a newspaper run by German *émigrés* in Paris and its struggle with the Nazi propaganda machine. Sepp Trautwein, an Austrian composer who cannot make a living by his music, is roused by the abduction of a Jewish journalist by the Nazis. He determines to expose the infamy in the columns of the *Paris Gazette* and so starts a train of events which tragically involve not only his own family and the other refugees but also the fortunes of his Nazi opponents. Feuchtwanger's portrait of the clever unprincipled Wiesener, the German journalist; of the heavy, unimaginative Heydebrege, a sincere Nazi; of the Germans in the embassy, are accurate delineations of types. The plight of the refugees in Paris and their desperate attempts to earn a living are movingly and sympathetically portrayed. The book is a penetrating revelation of one aspect of totalitarian war—the use of propaganda and the economic and social resources which give it power. The machine is subtle and merciless. Its victims are the

homeless who have been driven across the face of the earth and have to learn anew how to earn a living in an alien environment.

Then there are two books about urban life in this country, each of which presents an angle of concern to the parson. James T. Farrell's *Father and Son* is in the Studs Lonergan tradition, but it is a softer, less brutal book. He knows life among the Shanty Irish of Chicago and writes about it with true insight and great power. One is bound to compare it and contrast it with Gosse's classic of the same title, since both books present the love and conflict inherent in this intimate relationship. Gosse intellectually scorns his father while he reveals himself to be less the man. Danny socially scorns his father, but can never match him for dignity or worth. Farrell knows his Chicago, the poor Irish, and the Roman Catholic Church. Jim O'Neill is a hardworking, devout man. His wife Lizz is forever at church, her frequent worship of the saints seeming to issue in nothing except an increased proficiency at profanity. Danny, who lives with his mother's relations, goes to parochial school and there as a football hero, indifferent student and fraternity man lets life run through his fingers from his early dream of becoming a priest to his first job as a clerk in a trucking company. His membership in the fraternity makes him a snob; his background of poverty and his angularity make adolescence difficult and his relationship with the girls awkward; the education provided in the school fails to awaken any intellectual interests whatever. The book is a severe indictment of the education which at least some of the parochial schools in a large city offer. The emphasis on athletics, the defensive attitude of the Church, the bullying of the teachers and their dependence upon sarcasm, produce in all the students a sullen defeatism. Then there are many other characters all of whom are urban types living on the edge of insecurity, struggling to find their place in the sun, victimized by the pressures of the city's chaos. The center of all their life is the Church and its power is discerned in Jim's thoughts as he attends with his wife.

"Jim kind of wished that Lizz would get finished. But it wasn't so bad sitting here in church. In fact, it was sort of pleasant. Although he sometimes did crab about priests and money, he was proud to be a Catholic. Like he had often heard said, if you had the chance to cross the ocean in a steamship or a rowboat which would you choose? Well, the Church was a steamship, and other religions were just rowboats by comparison. He was proud to think that ever since the days of Christ the Church had gone on teaching the same truths. Yes, even if he did like to gripe about Father Gilhooley, he was proud to be a Catholic. Sitting there, a

sense of mystery stirred in him. He thought of Christ dying on the Cross. And people still went on doing all sorts of lousy things even after Christ had died for them. He liked to think that Christ was born in a poor man's home, and never in His life was He rich. That was one of the lessons in Christ. It was a lesson for all men who wanted to get rich by stepping on other people's backs. Christ was the poor man's God too. A lot of people ought never to forget that."

Another novel about urban life is Marian Sims' *The City on the Hill*. Medbury is a small North Carolina city with all the corruptions and evils of any mill town. The hero of the story is Steve Chandler, a reforming attorney and judge who comes to discover the viciousness of cause and effect in poverty and crime. His father is a successful business man and ardent churchman whose bigotry and self-righteousness drive Steve from home. The author sets this conflict in extreme terms. The father is righteous and loveless, honest and hard; the son is kind and pagan, wise and immoral. It is the Pharisee and publican contrast set in a contemporary setting. For this reason if for none other, it ought to be read by church people. The story is well told but its analysis of the problem is too pretty to be entirely true and too obvious to be profound.

There is one novel in the religious field which will probably find its way to every preacher's desk. Many church people will be reading Lloyd Douglas' *Invitation to Live*. They will sigh in satisfaction over Dean Harcourt's wisdom in handling people and glow happily in the development of the sweet romance. The Dean is presumably the perfect pastor, as he sends Barbara Breckenridge out into life to learn about the "poor" and as he arranges it that Lee Richardson shall meet her. He manipulates their lives as he does those of many others. Lloyd Douglas writes easily and well. His humor is gentle and his sense of adventure deft. But the story is so sentimental and the situation so unreal and all the denouements so happy that it never touches a real situation. It's too good to be true.

Space is limited and it's too bad there isn't room for more than the mention of several of the historical romances, all of which are excellent. *Preacher on Horseback*, while more a story of frontier life than of the circuit rider, is well told and is good reading. Janos Sandor rejects a comfortable pulpit in New York to start out with his charming and cultured wife for the Mohawk Valley. He is impetuous, lovable and human; she is noble and steadfast. But the bare income which he gets from the circuit and his wife's luxurious upbringing make it difficult for them to keep their marriage balanced. They

leave their failure there to go to the lumber frontier of Michigan and the hard brutal life of the camps. This is a sympathetic story of the early home missionary and of the excitements of his adventurous life. *Mighty Mountain* and *Bright Journey*, one about early Washington State and the other about early Wisconsin and the fur trade, are both fine tales. They picture the conflict of the white man's greed and the Indian's helplessness to handle it. *The Road to Endor* is sound historical fiction about the witchcraft persecutions in Salem and the life of the colony as it centered in the church. It is a superb delineation of the character of a Puritan divine and an analysis of the forces which resulted in the witchcraft madness. And finally, if there ever is a spare evening in your life and you want a charming romance, read Komroff's *The Magic Bow*, which is the life of Paganini, written with delightful and easy grace.

For Whom the Bell Tolls. By Ernest Hemingway. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.75.

Paris Gazette. By Lion Feuchtwanger. New York: The Viking Press. \$3.00.

Father and Son. By James T. Farrell. New York: The Vanguard Press. \$2.75.

The City on the Hill. By Marian Sims. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. \$2.50.

Invitation to Live. By Lloyd C. Douglas. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. \$2.50.

Preacher on Horseback. By Cecile Hulse Matschat. New York: Farrar & Rinehart. \$2.75.

Mighty Mountain. By Archie Binns. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.75.

Bright Journey. By August Derleth. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

Road to Endor. By Esther Barstow Hammonds. New York: Farrar & Rinehart. \$2.75.

The Magic Bow. By Manuel Komroff. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.50.

Book Reviews

Master Sermons of the Nineteenth Century. Edited by GAIUS GLENN ATKINS. Chicago: Willett Clark and Company. \$2.00.

In his preface to the volume Doctor Atkins says: "This book is likely to be more read by preachers than by their parishioners—though we could wish it otherwise." One may well share his wish. Laymen as well as preachers would be enriched in mind and in spirit by reading this book; but whether the laymen read it or not, men who are already in the ministry and students of homiletics in our seminaries had better seize it and absorb it, both for their pleasure and their good.

What Doctor Atkins has done is exactly what is most useful. He has brought together one sermon each of thirteen of the great preachers of the nineteenth century. His own rich knowledge and sensitive discrimination have enabled him to select the sermons which are both most representative and most enduring, and to each sermon he has prefixed a brief but most illuminating summary of the life and personality of the preacher.

To read these sermons is to realize how much they differ in some ways from the twentieth-century manner of preaching, yet how much they reveal of that which every century must reflect. As a rule they are much longer than modern sermons. This was due, as Doctor Atkins suggests, to the less hurried temper of their time, a time "which read three-volume novels and filled long shelves with Scott, Dickens, Thackeray and the poets," but it was also due to the "massive amplitude of the preachers'

minds." Moreover, "These men did not need to quote, being themselves, like Milton's sun, sources to which

"as to their fountain, other stars
Repairing in their golden urns draw
light."

The modern preacher will not try to imitate in all respects these great predecessors of a former century, any more than a man of today would wear nineteenth-century fashions in clothes; but he may well try to understand, and, if possible, to attain something of the dignity and grandeur of spirit which these men represented.

W. R. BOWIE.

Union Theological Seminary,
New York City.

The Evening Altar. By CARL WALLACE PETTY. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. \$1.00.

What Men Need Most. By HOBART D. MCKEEHAN. New York: Fortune's. \$1.00.

THE posthumous publication of sixteen radio sermons by Dr. Carl Wallace Petty brings to the reading as well as to the listening public the dynamic message of the late minister of the First Baptist Church of Pittsburgh. In a moving Foreword, which is itself an eloquent tribute by one preacher to another, Dr. Albert E. Day says: "This book is his legacy. It is not comparable to the wealth of manhood which was his, but it is a precious fragment." These addresses were not written to be read by other ministers in their studies (although min-

isters will profit by reading them). They come straight from the heart of an earnest and human Christian who is speaking to ordinary people sitting by their firesides about the elemental concerns of the good life. There is no attempt to catch the crowd with clever titles. He talks about such simple and mysterious things as "Courage," "Hope," "Faith," "Success," "Loyalty" and "Happiness." To each subject he brings a deep understanding of people, and a deep understanding of God. Each address leads up to a prayer which is the simple, direct outpouring of a sincere spirit in the presence of God. People who feel that a printed prayer gets between them and God will find these petitions not barriers but ladders by which they may rise in spirit toward the Eternal Throne.

Doctor McKeehan's sermons were preached in the Abbey Church of Huntingdon, Pa., where he ministers, and before ecclesiastical assemblies. They reveal a mind thoroughly familiar with current religious thought, able in clear language to bring before a congregation what the literature of the day has to say about religion, and to subject contemporary religion to critical and constructive analysis in the light of historic Christianity. And yet it is life, not literature, which is his main concern. With a rare gift for illuminating phrases he lights up the inwardness of man's needs and man's resources. "Part soil and part soul, man is at once earthbound and heaven-bent." "The Christian life is a God-possessed and a God-possessing life." The title of the book is the title of the initial sermon, but each chapter bears out its thesis that what men need most is the gospel of Christ.

MORGAN PHELPS NOYES.

Central Presbyterian Church,
Montclair, New Jersey.

A Philosophy of the Christian Revelation. By EDWIN LEWIS. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$3.00.

THIS is an admirable book. It succeeds in accomplishing a task the undertaking of which seems foredoomed to failure. For Doctor Lewis is by temperament incapable of even wishing to write a coolly intellectual appraisal of the Christian Revelation—or for that matter of anything else that is worth writing about. So he finds himself engaged in the business of writing what demands of him—and at the same time—powers of critical analysis, wide knowledge of the relevant literature, both friendly and hostile, a sound theological understanding, and a passionate devotion to the truth of the Revelation about which he writes. There is a paragraph in the last chapter which suggests that he is aware of the danger that is inherent in the mere effort to combine these qualities. "This attempt," he says, "to present a philosophy of the Christian Revelation ends with the assertion that while it is well for the purposes of intellectual satisfaction to ascertain what that philosophy is, the appeal of the revelation is most effective when it is clothed in language which kindles the imagination and moves the heart." What we ought to be everlastingly thankful for is just this, that Doctor Lewis has found for his philosophy a language worthy to convey thought that is at once full of intellectual light and glowing with Christian enthusiasm.

There is sound literary judgment behind the plan of the book, and its arrangement in chapters. It may seem to be too good to be true that anything so orderly should be just right—there are three main divisions, and twenty chapters

of nearly equal length! The plan succeeds, nevertheless. These short chapters with their excellent titles beguile the reader into starting to read almost at random. And we can do that with no small satisfaction. But it is soon discovered that what is here said is dependent upon something that has gone before. It is best to begin at the beginning. And any alert mind bent on another pleasant adventure in cursory reading will do just that. And having done so he will soon find himself not only deeply moved by that eloquence which according to the greatest critic of antiquity is the ring of a great soul, but caught and held by as firm a process of sound argument as the most professional discipline could demand.

Here is a piece of stout championship which will make the Christian reader rejoice to realize afresh what good reasons can be given for the faith that is in him. And if one of the busy intellectuals who have thrust the Christian Revelation aside should by chance (O faint hope!) read the volume through he will at least be aware of a substantial quantity of Christian apologetic with which so far he has not proved himself competent to deal.

J. V. MOLDENHAWER.

First Presbyterian Church,
New York City.

Let the Church Be the Church.

By ELMER GEORGE HOMRIGHAUSEN. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

DOCTOR HOMRIGHAUSEN refers in his Foreword to the coining of the phrase, "Let the Church be the Church," by the Oxford Conference in 1937. But he makes the words his own. It is his voice which speaks. And it speaks clearly.

The book is a searching message sanely but forcefully presented. It has the weight of scholarship but the drive of deep personal concern and conviction.

The chapters are "sermon-essays." They have an audience in mind. They were spoken and retain in written form the urgency of impassioned address.

Strictly speaking, the volume is not a book in the sense of a connected and orderly development of a single central theme. It is admittedly a collection of addresses, alike, it is true, in aim and emphasis, yet distinct and separate. There are nine of these and all have merit. Four of them seem to contain the message which the author burns to declare; the initial and title-giving, "Let the Church Be the Church," "The Eternal Cross," "My Church," and "Jesus Christ Is Our Religion."

Doctor Homrighausen calls the Church to repentance. But he does not forsake the Church as hopeless or cast it off as useless. To him the Church is still Christ's agency in the world. He very properly discriminates between the Kingdom of God and the Church and unhesitatingly puts the Kingdom first. But he adds, "If one were to ask me, 'Where is the Kingdom of God?' I should answer that for all practical purposes it is to be found in the Church and in those activities and agencies the Church has inspired and still sustains. The only Christianity I know is the Christianity that issues from the Church of Jesus Christ."

The primary thing about a religious book is, of course, its content, its message and the effectiveness of the presentation of that message. This is not so much an argument as an appeal; not so much a persuasion as a challenge. As a book it retains the urgency of direct address. It is a call, a summons, by one

who feels and believes what he has to say, and, moreover, wishes and intends that others shall feel it and believe it.

Yet another thing may be briefly touched upon. That is the style. Evidently Doctor Homrighausen believes in the short sentence as fully as did the late Charles E. Jefferson. The style is crisp, vigorous, incisive. Sometimes a whole paragraph is packed into a half a dozen words. And sometimes a paragraph contains a whole chapter. In fact, the author himself closes and sums up his chapters with a paragraph which might almost stand alone in its completeness, and then closes the last chapter and the book with two sentences quoted from G. K. Chesterton which but for the quotation marks might very well have been his own, so well do they summarize purpose and endeavor:

"We have found all the questions that can be found. It is time we gave up looking for questions and started looking for answers."

J. PERCIVAL HUGET.

Shelter Island, New York.

The Church and War. By ARTHUR C. COCHRANE. Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. \$1.50.

IT IS not easy to write a brief review of this book. It is an attempt on the part of a sincere Christian to justify the Church of Canada in its support of the war against Germany. Some of his pleas and arguments are sound; and his earnestness and honesty are evident. But it is regrettable that a disorderly mind leads him into grave and amazing misstatements. He asserts that pacifism is not only not justified by the New Testament, but is specifically condemned by it. He even goes so far as to declare that pacifists "repudiate the Old Testament," and should be placed "outside the evangelical

church of Jesus Christ—and in a class with the Nazis." He declares that the Church "must be ready to condemn a church which does not say 'Yes' to this war against National Socialism as a false, heretical church."

The book is marred also by unfair judgments, as when he states that "anti-Semitism is in the heart of every man. Every Gentile experiences a sense of estrangement toward every Jew." His description of modern Protestant theology on page 35 is nothing less than a calumnious misrepresentation.

He distorts and misapplies Biblical material amazingly. Many instances might be given, did space allow. The most remarkable instance is his use of the story of the woman taken in adultery (pages 54-68). His exposition and application of this beautiful narrative is utterly grotesque. His most serious misuse of Scripture, however, is in the twisting of the sayings of Jesus out of their plain meaning, so as to present Christ as a champion of war (cf. pages 30, 31ff.). The confusion of his thought is palpably manifest in such a statement as that "the nonexistent gods of this world are devils who are anxious to guard the secret of their nonexistence."

His statement that "nature and reason command man to worship idols and disobey the law" clearly involves the judgment that Christianity as he conceives it is unnatural and unreasonable. Perhaps it is. It is clear that his God is not the "Living God" of the real Bible, but a God confined within a book which admits of but one interpretation, and that a strange one—a God quite out of touch with man's ordinary life.

It is a pity that so earnest a plea should be marred by so unreasonable a faith. What might have been a strong and convincing defense of the right of Christians

to support the governments now waging war against Nazi Germany is vitiated by the fanatical superorthodoxy of the author.

WILLIAM PIERSON MERRILL.
New York City.

The Message of Jesus Christ. The Tradition of the Early Christian Communities. By MARTIN DIBELIUS. Translated into English by FREDERICK C. GRANT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00.

DOCTOR GRANT here gives a careful rendering in English of Dibelius' *Botschaft von Jesus Christus* (1935), with a valuable Foreword giving an account of the author's view of the composition of the Gospels, and a useful guide to the literature in English (Formgeschichte).

The original consists of two parts, the first a translation into modern German—here rendered in English—of those passages from the Gospels and Epistles which on Doctor Dibelius' principles of sifting are the earliest. This occupies one hundred and twenty pages. Like all such renderings, this is sure to irritate some to whom the familiar version is sacred, and it will please others, to whom it is dulled by familiarity and archaic turns of speech. The modernization, however, is not violent, and perhaps not consistently carried through. What about the retention of "publican" in a modern version!

The selected passages undergo an internal selection as well, and it might have helped the ordinary reader if the places where sentences or clauses are omitted had been marked with dots.

Thus Acts 10. 37-43, the second passage translated by Dibelius, omits the sentence that some of them "ate and drank with Christ after the Resurrection," and there is no direct indication of

this. Doctor Dibelius is, of course, as a critic working with an hypothesis entitled to think that this should be left out, and in his "explanation" at the end he may give his reasons. There are many instances of this kind.

As to the accuracy of the translation in some cases it is allowable to have one's own view. Personally I do not think that a passage like Philippians 2. 6-11 is very accurately rendered, and it is surely somewhat extravagant to say of it that it is "the only passage where Paul refers in extenso to the earthly life of Jesus." Again, Mark 6. 4 here reads, "No prophet amounts to much in his own country, and no doctor can heal his own kin." This is certainly not accurate, unless Doctor Dibelius has altered the text.

We have marked some two score passages where, in our judgment, the rendering is not so accurate as the Authorized Version, though in some instances the translation is refreshing.

The last section of the book, in some respects the most interesting, is the "Explanation," covering some sixty pages. Here Doctor Dibelius gives his principles of sifting out the later material of the Gospel narrative from the earlier. To discuss it as it deserves would require a critique of Doctor Dibelius' whole hypothesis of Formgeschichte.

He is aware of the offensiveness of using "myth" and "legend" in a good sense and he may well be aware of it; for one can say of these what Origen said of Eros, that it was so contaminated that even the Holy Ghost could not cleanse it.

To ordinary men "myth" and "legend" even when fabricated by piety smack of falsehood, cunningly-devised fables. Doctor Dibelius' approach is reverent but one wonders if the creative

consciousness of the Church is not credited with too much power, and its dogged adherence to facts unduly minimized.

The book is written in order to give guidance for the present day from this irreducible minimum of the words of Jesus. We hope it may do so, but there is danger that it may raise more doubts and create more perplexities to ordinary men than it can solve.

DONALD MACKENZIE.

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The Oxford Book of Christian Verse.

Chosen and edited by LORD DAVID
CECIL. London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. \$3.00.

THIS comprehensive collection of Christian verse comes as a timely legacy from the England which has enriched the world with its cathedrals, its mystics, its theologians and its troubadours of God. Between the covers of this beautiful volume—suitable companion to the new edition of *The Oxford Book of English Verse*—six centuries of man's worshipful spirit are revealed. The collection is a history of devotional thought, expressed by temperaments as varied as the somber seventeenth-century Andrew Marvell and joyous Thomas Traherne, a poet little known in America yet represented here by more than twenty pages of metaphysical poems. Elizabeth Barrett Browning has but one sonnet, including, however, that wonderful line, "By so much patience as a blade of grass."

Some of the pages offer dull reading to our twentieth century. Yet Lord Cecil has done us service in assembling the best religious verse of the successive centuries, so that we can trace the interest-themes from the folkly anonymous Christmas carols written before our language took its present form through "The

Testament of Beauty" by Robert Bridges. John Donne, who wrote during the rise of Anglicanism and Puritanism in the seventeenth century, is ranked by the editor as first among Christian poets. Robert Browning, rightly considered unique in his ability to make the gospel sound as fresh "as if uttered by a contemporary," is allotted more space than any other—for his "Saul."

It is refreshing to come upon such hymns as Tennyson's "Strong Son of God, immortal love," and the spontaneous lyrics of the evangelical Watts, Wesley and Toplady. Delightful surprises overtake us, too, as we come upon John Bunyan's "Shepherd Boy," beginning, "He that is down needs fear no fall," and Sir Walter Raleigh's delightful Elizabethan lyric, reminiscent of the crusading Palmer:

"Give me my scallop shell of quiet,
My staff of faith to walk upon."

Despite the difficulty experienced by Lord Cecil in selecting his poets and in choosing their representative verse, what strange circumstance led him to omit entirely the present poet-laureate, John Masefield, certain lines from whose "The Everlasting Mercy" impress us as fresh and powerful religious verse of our day? So, too, we ask why Kipling's "Recessional" has here found no place. Lord Cecil lets the American-born Thomas Sterns Elliott speak for our day. The truly powerful lines of this founder of the modern school of English poets who pours an orthodox Anglican faith into "unorthodox" verse forms, sums up thus our own splendid inconsistent epoch:

"Men have not left GOD for other
gods, they say, but for no god; and
this has never happened before."

The Oxford Book of Christian Verse

will find a welcome on the shelves of many a minister, beside other admirable anthologies of religious verse published in this country.

MADELEINE S. MILLER.

Brooklyn, New York.

Anno Domini. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.50.

HERE is a book which presents—and inspires—a hopeful view of history. “The record of the influence of Jesus supports the faith of the early Christians that ‘God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself,’ and that through His Spirit, which is here in a special and peculiarly powerful way because Jesus once lived in the flesh and died and rose again, God continues to work in the world of men for their transformation into . . . the perfect man whose likeness is seen in Jesus.” This is the belief of Professor Latourette, after a lifetime spent in historical research. It may well be the belief of any reader of *Anno Domini*, after he lays down this informing and convincing book.

Human history since the advent of Jesus is divided, for the purpose of this study, into four periods: (1) the first five hundred years, (2) from A. D. 500 to A. D. 1500, (3) from A. D. 1500 to A. D. 1800, and (4) from A. D. 1800 down to the present. The author finds that the influence of Jesus during these four periods has spread territorially, has given birth to new fellowships and movements, has affected every aspect of human culture, and has enabled increasing numbers of individuals to display such “fruits of the spirit” as are mentioned by Saint Paul. True, there have been recessions in the influence of Jesus, as well as advances. But the recessions, whether territorial or cultural, have been successively

less severe, whereas the advances have been successively more significant.

It is the judgment of the author, who surely speaks with authority, that “the impress of Jesus upon mankind has been broadening and deepening.” He is by no means unmindful of the conditions that now obtain in the world; but, all things considered, it is, he thinks, by no means certain that a recession is now occurring in the influence of Jesus. Undeniably, there are powerful forces making for destruction. But never have so many human beings been under the influence of Jesus. Never have so many “Christians” recognized the disparity between the profession and the practice of nominally Christian societies, and desired to have in themselves “that mind which was also in Christ Jesus.” Never have such evils as war, economic injustice, racial prejudice, and the deliberate exploitation of backward peoples been so widely or so thoroughly deplored. Never has such earnest effort been made to find a way to just and lasting peace for the whole family of mankind. And the Christian churches are coming more closely together.

Will God succeed in lifting all mankind to the level of Christ’s vision and spirit? Professor Latourette thinks that the record thus far does not permit of a dogmatic answer. It is his strong conviction, however, that Jesus is central in the human story, that He embodies the good toward which man strives, that the dominant forces in the universe are on His side, and that beyond, if not in, history, “God and His Christ will prevail.”

Let God be thanked for this book. The witness it bears to the validity of Christian faith is now desperately needed.

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Remaking Life. By ALBERT W. BEAVEN. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. \$2.00.

DR. ALBERT W. BEAVEN, president of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, usually has something to say, and in this book he quite definitely says it. It is a treatise for the time, starting with a "Where we are at" survey, and moving up fast to the challenging question, "Can Christianity really remake life?" It is a hard world Doctor Beaven finds the Church in today, with the twin evils of Nazism and Communism — brothers under their rather impervious skins — united outwardly in one respect at least — their hatred of the Church and everything it stands for. The present war broke after Doctor Beaven had completed the manuscript of this book, but the war itself but underlines his main contentions as found in his first chapter.

Doctor Beaven's answer to the challenge of today is, negatively, a warning lest Christian forces attempt to fight the devil with his own fire. "We must not hate because they hate; we must not lie because they lie . . . to turn the Church over to become the agency of a 'red hunt,' a sort of sanctified secret police; to allow it to become the main Nazi Bund opponent, or to make it the spiritual handmaiden of the gods of war, of force, and of hate . . . is certainly not the answer." The answer, asserts the author, striking heavily the positive note, is to be found in the agelong power of the Church "to produce quality attitudes in men's hearts and lives." In other words, to "remake life" after a far nobler pattern.

With force and directness the book proceeds to maintain the power of the individual to make his own destiny by exerting the power of choice—"The supreme and most divine of man's facul-

ties." Again he puts it: "It is our belief that Jesus, as the supreme revelation of God, . . . held that men could change, should change, and under His hand would change; and they did. It was upon the power of choice that Jesus depended." To be sure, psychology, psychiatry, heredity and the glands all have to be noted here, and their respective rôles appraised as by any modern scholar, but when all is added up the total effect falls short of the *I will* or *I will not* of the individual soul. Man's own choice makes or mars him.

An examination of the techniques which the Church may use to assist people to choose good and not evil comes next. Evangelism and preaching are heavily stressed just here. Not, however, after the pattern or likeness which these words have formerly conveyed. Doctor Beaven very truly observes that the mind of this age has become secularized and that old theological presuppositions (upon which the Fathers stood when evangelizing) have gone forever. No tub-thumping vituperationist is likely again to channel out to all men the prophets' cry. Methods change—but the thing itself must and shall abide. As for preaching, that is to be clear, far-sighted, brave. The preacher is always to be the teacher, and there is no place for inadequate knowledge. The author does not say so, but we gather that in his judgment an ounce of ignorance can spoil a bushel of piety when a man stands up to declare the counsel of God. (My metaphor may be mixed but the meaning is not.)

As the book proceeds it is not overlooked that life can be remade also through group fellowship, group action, and the vital comradeship which is at the heart of the True Church. One or two unusually interesting anecdotes appear when the discussion reaches this stage—

stories illustrating the power of normal churchmen to sympathize with and help each other in those deeper needs of which men speak so seldom but feel so profoundly. All in all, *Remaking Life* is a book full of good courage and of a wise, sane helpfulness. When read, it will be appreciated.

NOLAN B. HARMON, JR.
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The Sermon on the Mount. By MARTIN DIBELIUS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.50.

EVERY book by Professor Dibelius is an event in itself. This volume, which embodies the Shaffer Lectures delivered at Yale in 1937, is of special importance. Not only is it an interpretation of the heart of Christian ethics by one of the greatest of German theologians, but it was written by one with considerable insight into the contemporary scene, and on the eve of the present war.

Professor Dibelius properly begins with a critical study of the Sermon, and most of his judgments are already familiar to students of the New Testament. The discourse is not a sermon but a collection of sayings out of different contexts. A careful distinction must be drawn between what the discourse meant to Matthew and what the individual sayings meant in the mouth of our Lord. Form-criticism in Dibelius' hands does not, of course, lead to skepticism in dealing with Jesus' teaching; he explicitly says (pp. 82ff.) that many of the Christological sayings of the gospels, though recast after the resurrection, go back to references which Jesus made to His Messiahship. Indeed, the disciples followed Him "not because He uttered impressive sayings, like a wise rabbi, but because they believed that in connection with His work the Kingdom of God

would appear on earth." A good example of his method is his treatment of the Beatitudes. Those in Luke represent the original wording addressed to Jesus' hearers, and they are a prophecy of the Kingdom of God; Matthew wished to give a list of virtues for members of the Christian Church "and therefore he added some other sayings which perhaps are authentic too, but do not belong to the original group of beatitudes" (p. 63).

So much for his critical methods; now for his conclusions. Like many German scholars, he is a thorough eschatologist—the Kingdom of God, for Jesus, lay entirely in the future—and to many of us this will seem to throw the picture slightly out of focus. The purpose of the Sermon is to declare what righteousness will be in the coming Kingdom. Dibelius rejects various interpretations of Jesus' teaching: the traditional position of Western Catholicism, the notion of an "interim ethic," the idea that the sayings are a radical but practicable Law, and finally, the view that they form a Law impossible of performance, designed merely to convict man of sin and lead him to repentance and justification. Instead, the teachings are a declaration of the pure will of God, independent of any situation, to be taken seriously even in this world, though they cannot be fully performed; they are "signs of the Kingdom of God, nothing more and nothing less. . . . The radicalism of the Sermon on the Mount is our judgment, its announcement of another world is our hope" (pp. 101ff.).

In the final, powerful chapter, Doctor Dibelius tries to indicate what the Sermon means to us today. His explanation of the failure of the Church to hold the working classes—and therefore to stem the tide of the new mass movements—

is of the highest importance. His conclusions (pp. 136ff.) are: (1) The Sermon speaks wholly from God's point of view; it is a sign of God's will rather than a program for reform of the world. "We are not able to perform it in its full scope, but we are able to be transformed by it." (2) "We must stand for and uphold this will of God. . . . We must run the risk that only a few will recognize this will. Perhaps trouble will increase on this earth. Perhaps the world will withdraw still farther from the Gospel. We must risk this and we must wait. God does not reckon with decades but with centuries and with millenniums." (3) Our task as individuals, churches and nations, is to perform signs which will witness to God's Kingdom. This means that Christians should live on their own responsibility before God; it is a transformed, converted, sacrificial type of individual and community life which is demanded, rather than mere adherence to a code.

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The German Church on the American Frontier. By CARL EDWARD SCHNEIDER. St. Louis: Eden Publishing House. \$3.50.

TWICE Germans and German Swiss came in large numbers into the territory of the United States. First, in the colonial period from about 1683 to 1776. The frontiers then were the Blue Ridge Mountains, or, farther west, the Allegheny Mountains. Pennsylvania was the distributing center. Second, in the national period from about 1820 to 1890. The political, religious and ecclesiastical conditions of Germany in the first period were as different from the Germany of the second period as the conditions of the

colonial period differed from those of the national period. Indeed, the Germans of Pennsylvania were in many respects further removed from those who came from the Fatherland into the Mississippi Valley than they were separated from their English, Scotch, and Irish neighbors—a difference not simply of space but of spirit. Yet, in time, blood did tell when both groups were Americanized.

On one thing they agreed—both migrations were of the German race, spoke the German language, brought with them the religious, educational, and social ideas of their fathers. Furthermore, they settled in regions where English was spoken and English ways of life prevailed. On this account the German Church, if one uses the generic singular instead of the specific or distributive plural, the German churches, have a distinctive history among the denominations of America.

The author of this volume is the first church historian who has ventured to write not only the history of one German church, of which he is a member, but, through it, to show how "diverse German social and religious types were projecting themselves on American soil" on the Western frontier; in other words, how "in an undenominational sense the German Church [not churches], intimately related to the cultural, social and religious streams of the day, was being established in the West." That is a prodigious undertaking, requiring research not only in the historical records of his own denomination and of other German and English churches in America, but in the archives of Europe. This was not the original purpose of the author, for he tells us in the Preface that in the course of the years the scope of his plan enlarged. "The wider socio-historical perspectives which evolved pre-

vented this work from remaining denominational in the narrow sense of the word." Small wonder that his narrative covers 474 pages; the appendices, list of pastors of the *Deutsche Kirchenverein*, bibliography, and index, 105 pages. The footnotes, justified by "the unique nature of the sources employed," copious and of permanent value, would require a small volume if they were separately published. The reviewer is of the conviction that the author has successfully accomplished his purpose.

He depicts in a graphic and attractive style the beginnings of a small group, composed of devout and scholarly men and women, German by birth and training, under the name of the *Evangelischer Kirchenverein des Westens* in the Gravois settlement not far from St. Louis, in 1840. While they were thoroughly loyal not only to the faith, but also to the customs of their fathers, from decade to decade they were compelled, in the climate of opinion of the Midwest of the nineteenth century, to change their point of view, their way of worship and work, to become German-American, and finally, as the dropping of the word "German" from the name of their church indicates, to become wholly American. Through this transition, however, they preserved the spirit of their "Evangelical Mother Church," their desire for co-operation with other churches, their evangelical fervor, their enthusiasm for Christian education of ministers and laymen, and the application of the gospel of the kingdom of God not only to the individual but also to the social life.

The *Kirchenverein* was a distinctive association among the Germans in the West. It was compelled to struggle for life in its beginning against German free-thinkers who were bitter foes of all religion and who regarded the German churches, including the Evangelical So-

ciety, the Lutherans, and the Reformed, as forms of "obscurantist pietism" and "priestly ecclesiasticism." The latter charge also was brought against all those who organized synods or associations by ministers who served independent or free churches and warned their people against the tyranny of synods and the dictatorship of ministers united in associations of one or another sort. The Lutherans, some of the ultra and others of the mediating type, refused to unite with the *Kirchenverein* and opposed its establishment partly because it meant the addition of another sect to the many already in existence, and partly because they felt that the essential doctrines of Lutheranism were not maintained in the new organization.

This volume is only the first of a series of volumes to complete the story of the German Church on the American frontier. Others may be written by the author of the first; if not, he deserves credit for pointing the way and giving the pattern to future historians of his Church, or of other churches of German origin.

The Third Chapter—"Founding of the *Kirchenverein des Westens*"—one might call the vantage point from which one may look backward to Chapters I and II: "The German and American Background"; "Religious Origins Among the Germans in the West." The eleven chapters, following the third, describe in detail with an enormous amount of factual material and with remarkable accuracy and insight, the development of the *Kirchenverein* into the Evangelical Synod of North America, which in 1934 united with the Reformed Church in the United States under the name of Evangelical and Reformed Church.

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Civilization in East and West. By H. N. SPALDING. New York: Oxford University Press. \$4.25.

THIS book is an ambitious attempt to give the salient features of the great cultural groups of the world, with the object of showing how much like one another they are, and how hopeful are the grounds for an eventual "world civilization," which will combine the best features of all. The author is in possession of a remarkably wide range of materials, he enters appreciatively into the religious and cultural traditions of India and China; and he pleads with effectiveness for a greater understanding by the West of the rich gifts of the spirit which the East stands ready to contribute.

There are four types of civilization. These four are not mutually self-exclusive, but do show certain traits which are distinctive. The "materialist civilization," if that is not a contradiction in terms, has been known to every generation, and not least to our own. Its aim is power, its prophet is Machiavelli. Its ethics are reduced to blind patriotism; its worship is of a man or a state, and not of God. This section of the book is depressing, but illuminating. It shows with accuracy the depths to which men and groups descend in their tactics and ambitions. Long before the Christian era China lived through this kind of experience; India had her share of it, and now the West finds itself faced with the threat of a materialism stronger than the world has ever known. The author believes, however, that "Autocracy in modern Europe is an anachronism and rests on the error of supposing that the modern European is the ancient Asiatic revived."

From this dark background, which shows the shadows into which all civilizations can recede, the author moves on

to the brighter and loftier elements in the life of society. He finds humanity, in its civilized areas, divided into groups which he terms moral, moral-spiritual, and spiritual. In the first category are China and the Nordics, whose faith and practice is this—rather than other—worldly. God is believed in, but not so much for His own sake as for what He can do for society. The rules of conduct, not the mystical experience, are therefore the important consideration. It was so in the teachings of Confucius; it is so in Britain, Scandinavia, America, and, to lesser degree, in Germany where the mystic strain has always been more pronounced than in these other groups. The genius for organization which has given rise to constitutional government is the most striking characteristic of this civilization, and the attention which man pays to man has given birth to agencies of healing, education, freedom. So it is, at any rate, with the "moral civilization" in its better and, Spalding would say, its most characteristic aspect. Its faith is in men, and religion is but the energy needed to enable man to live harmoniously with man. The constant comparison here between the Chinese and the Nordics is one of the most illuminating features of this book.

Next are the "moral-spiritual civilizations," Catholicism, Islam, Judaism. These groups, less practical than either Nordics or Chinese, have an eye both to this world and the next. God is the supreme arbiter of man's destiny; His laws are to be disobeyed at our peril; yet He is also to be sought and loved for His own sake. The mystical and the practical merge. The constant danger in this group is that the concerns of society will result in a coarsening of the religious experience. Thus, in Judaism, the prophets who were intimately aware of God

and transmitted His commands of justice and mercy to man, were followed by lawmakers, who soon covered the spirit with the letter, and made the precept more important than the divine vision which alone could validate moral law. In Islam there was even more pronounced "stooping to conquer." Mohammed "taught a doctrine of God and human society founded on that of the prophets, but lowered to meet the needs of a rude and warlike people." And Catholicism soon found itself concerned with matters of authority, which made the institution supreme. "The chief defect of Catholic civilization: It directed too much: It educated too little."

It is in the "spiritual civilizations" that one finds the religious experience valued for its own sake. In this group are Hinduism, Buddhism and Orthodoxy. India's disregard of practical matters, her seeming indifference to human need, her caste system, have always baffled Westerners. By the same token, the West's indifference to the treasures to be found in God mystify the Hindu. It depends on what one considers important. "India seeks God as no other civilization has done." Hinduism's stress upon solitary contemplation; Buddhism's call to the life of the monastery—these are to help man so to identify himself with the Divine that no separation remains. The experience is beyond reason, beyond revelation; it is reserved for intuition to fulfill man's religious longing. To put Russia in this same category comes as a surprise to the lay mind. Yet, "unlike the Nordics, the Slavs are a naturally religious people." They fumble in their politics and organizations because their energies are centered upon the discovery of God. All life is permeated with the spiritual; "The calendar was full of meaning. The peasant, singing a *Te Deum*, would turn his cattle out on St. George's Day, and drive them

home on St. Michael's. Religion consecrated the family. Birthdays celebrated, not the man, but his saint. Marriage was the symbol of the union between Christ and His Church. Death was the symbol of Christ's death, the gateway of the resurrection to Eternal Life. Every act was sacred. A Russian built his house beneath the Cross of Christ; he entered to live in it with blessing and prayer. When he started on a journey, he prayed before the station ikon; were the journey long or dangerous, he would assemble his family, servants, and friends in solemn worship. Holy Russia had not a Church; she was a Church, a part on earth of the Church Universal."

And if present-day Russia does not seem like this on the surface, as one of Dostoevsky's characters says—"God will save Russia, for the peasant has God in his heart."

Doctor Spalding has thus provided us with a scholarly, even if condensed, survey of the great civilizations of the world. Each has its contribution to make. His final chapters are a plea that each group develop its own distinctive elements, reaching out meanwhile for the unique gifts of the other civilizations. In particular the West should learn from the East and cease scorning her background and gifts. Certain great syntheses of the world's higher life have been made in the past. Greece made such a synthesis of practical and spiritual, and in the teachings of Jesus the union is the most elevated of all. These point the way to a new world culture, and a world religion, to which each portion of humanity will bring its gift, and from which it will draw new insight. One is indebted to this book for so high a dream, implemented by so vast a survey of social facts.

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Christianity and Power Politics.

By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00.

THIRTEEN years ago Reinhold Niebuhr, then about thirty-five years of age, published his first book, *Does Civilization Need Religion?* Rarely has a religious leader so rapidly become first a national and then an international force. The devastating sincerity, the corrosive intelligence, the passionate moral earnestness, and the wide social vision of Doctor Niebuhr have carried his writings all about the world. He began by repenting of the sins of religious and social reactionaries. Then with equal energy and honesty he set about repenting of the sins of intellectual and social liberalism. The right-wing and the left equally felt the lash of his resounding whip. Withal, his books were characterized by so deep and honest a humanity, and so obvious a reverence for high spiritual values that men felt that they were listening to no mere Juvenal scourging the vices of Rome. With all the indignation there was clear, hard thought, and the thought was uplifted by great loyalties as it was terribly sharpened by cutting insights.

Doctor Niebuhr's latest book, *Christianity and Power Politics*, is more than a tract for the times written by another Carlyle. Here we find a poise and a sureness of movement which command a confidence it is not always possible to give to the doughty Scotsman who almost succeeded in becoming the conscience of Victorian England.

The analysis of the intellectual and ethical shortcomings of pacifism is particularly effective. The thesis of the book is "that the failure of the Church to espouse pacifism is not apostasy, but is derived from an understanding of the Christian gospel which refuses simply

to equate the gospel with the 'law of love.'" "Pacifism either tempts us to make no judgments at all, or to give an undue preference to tyranny in comparison with the momentary anarchy which is necessary to overcome tyranny." "Whatever be the moral ambiguities of the so-called democratic nations, and however serious may be their failure to conform perfectly to their democratic ideals, it is sheer moral perversity to equate inconsistencies of a democratic civilization with the brutalities which modern tyrannical states practice."

"It has become almost a universal dogma of American Christianity that any kind of peace is better than war. This always means in the end that tyranny is preferred to war."

As Doctor Niebuhr moves through various aspects of his theme, he drops many a sentence clear with important insight: "The utopianism of America and the pessimism of Germany are the two aberrations of modern culture in dealing with the complexities of the political order." "The isolationism of America belongs to the same category of political facts as the complacency of the British during the Munich crisis." Speaking of the "liberalism" in our colleges he says: "It has not prepared the young people to face the realities of our day." He lifts the far-reaching question: "Is liberalism . . . not too simple a creed to fit the complexities of our tragic era?" He describes the fashion in which "peace is lost for peace's sake." He turns to a very important matter when he declares that "Class interests tend to create centers of sympathy with Fascism in every democratic nation." It would be difficult to put the heart of the matter more succinctly than does Doctor Niebuhr in the words: "If the democratic nations fail, their failure must be partly attributed to

the faulty strategy of idealists who have too many illusions when they face realists who have too little conscience." The criticism of the pretensions of Russia is particularly effective. When he turns to Germany he brings the reader sharply to attention with the words: "Nazi barbarism may have destroyed the pure sciences but it uses the heritage of the applied sciences to full advantage." Doctor Niebuhr's sword is particularly sharp when it comes to the hypocrisy of the Tories and the utopianism of the radicals. His criticism of modern utopias is a powerful and significant discussion. When he calls for an end to illusion he sounds a note to which thoughtful men may well respond. He is at his profoundest when he declares that "man and nature are reconciled by faith in a center and source of meaning which transcend both man and nature."

"In America," he says, "the moral confusion is even worse than in Britain because our religious life has become so completely divorced from the classical Christian faith, with a profound understanding of the complexities and tragedies of history, and has become so completely enmeshed in the illusions of rationalistic utopianism that most of our religious idealists are quite ready to submit to tyranny in the name of peace, to enthrone a system of perpetual war in Western civilization in the interest of avoiding war, and to deliver a civilization of partial justice into the hands of a barbarism which denies every concept of justice because they have an uneasy conscience about the injustice from which civilization has been unable to free itself."

The reader himself is judged by such a book as this. The romantic and sentimental idealist will turn from it with distaste. The robust Christian may well listen to its words as to the blasts of a trumpet. For here once and again we

have flashes of that truth which will give us, if we heed it, such freedom as we may possess in this confused and broken world.

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The Gospel and the Church. By CHARLES E. RAVEN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.50.

Can Christianity Save Civilization? By WALTER MARSHALL HORTON. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.00.

Religion Yesterday and Today. By HENRY SLOANE COFFIN. Nashville: Cokesbury Press. \$1.75.

THERE are three things that men are always interested in—have always been interested in since the world began, and will be so long as the world endures—politics, science, and religion. Politics and science appear to alter people very little. As we look back over the centuries, we see all manner of political changes, and we are appalled at the slight changes that these political shifts have made in human nature. Nor has the fact of science altered men very much. It has altered their outward conditions of life, it has changed their circumstances of experience, but it has not really touched the deepest springs of human character and conduct. What politics and science cannot do, religion does do—it changes human nature.

As we witness and share in the evident disintegration of our Western civilization, it is not without encouragement to have a trinity of diagnosticians point the contemporary failure and need. Here three great Christians and competent scholars look at the "fall" of contemporary civilization. All three discern clearly the difference between the outer tools,

skills, techniques, and instruments that make possible an external civilization of speed, sport, and splendor and the inner resources, capacities, insights and understandings that hold the power of an internal culture of worth, meaning and value.

Canon Raven traces our cultural bankruptcy to the compromises between Christianity and paganism at the beginning of the fourth century. These were (1) the renunciation of nature, (2) the distortion of history, (3) the perversion of the Church. The remedy lies in the recovery of nature, the recognition of the necessity of history, and the realization of the Church as community. Nature is not an enemy and science has an indispensable right and share in the task of disclosing the nature of the universe we live in. History is not a series of disconnected episodes but an unfolding of the divine purpose. So the prophets read the politics and historic drama of their day.

Implicit in this triad of diagnosticians' reading of a life is a confidence in the power of the Christian religion to release the needed energies of redemption in our world.

As Christians we have a witness to bring, a gospel to announce. We face the fact of our own liability to fail to give a vital and competent witness. As Canon Raven points out:

"Only when men are aroused to a realization of the tremendous issues at stake, only when the tension of life becomes intolerable and the day of judgment draws near and decisions that involve life or death have to be taken, do the majesty and significance of God break in upon the prison-house of our mortality. Mankind easily settles down into a complacent acceptance of selfish satisfactions, is prone to exchange its spiritual birthright for a mess of pottage, and needs

the sharp surgery of calamity in order to recover health of soul and a knowledge of its true vocation" (page 243).

The dominating and creative center of every civilization is in its culture. The cultural power of a people is in its religion. There are two things that would have changed the world we have lived in during the past thirty years, but they have not operated very much. The first would have been a profound conviction of sin, an awareness of offence against a Higher Power, an awareness of not doing the will of God. But who has gone to the altar of repentance with a cry upon the lips: "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the Lord"? Our civilization has moved in selfish and comfort-desiring ways without a serious and heartsearching desire to do the will of God. The second: the conviction that a new and better life was within our reach. Christianity has again and again, at different periods, arrested cultural decay and saved the best values of society. This regenerative power remolded civilization when the Roman Empire crashed to ruin; it was a unifying factor in medieval feudalism and the creative rôle in the Protestant Reformation. Has Christianity a word for today? Professor Horton declares:

"Our Christian faith is that no totally new word is needed; the Word has been uttered forth in a life, and has now entered irrevocably into the historical process as a living purposive force, continually denied and crucified, but rising evermore to newness of life. The modern crucifixion of Christ is not yet completed. There are still some marks of scorn to be shown Him, some further cruelties to be practiced by the strong and proud against the weak and humble—of whom He said, 'Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye

have done it unto me.' When His cup of bitterness is again filled and drained, when He has again been nailed upon His cross and sealed in His tomb, He will rise in power; and this time it will be our whole planetary world, not just the Mediterranean or the Western world, that will witness His triumph. We know not whereof we speak, when we say these things; but this is our faith" (pages 159-160).

Certainly the faith in automatic progress which characterized the thinking of the opening of our century is now gone. The overconfidence in human nature and in man's power to save himself through his scientific controls and political methods is now deflated.

In six close-packed chapters, President Henry Sloane Coffin speaks with an historian's clear perspective and deals with the realities at the heart of this generation's religious situation. He goes back to the eighteen hundred and nineties and cites the spiritual turmoil that came with evolutionary science. The "Divine Immanence" brought a romantic confidence in man.

"Much of the philosophy now popular in Nazi Germany may be traced back to the immanentism held both here and there a generation ago" (page 56).

The effect of Biblical criticism seemed to make the Scriptures less important and "the Bible was spoken of as the record of man's developing religious experience, rather than God's word to His children" (page 82). Small wonder that it was not kept at the center of religious instruction.

Religious experience affirms God's search for man. The situation is well stated:

"No word has come into more frequent use than the term 'the given.' God is the Giver and in every experience man the recipient. And since, to the Christian, God has given His Son and is giving His Spirit through the Church and her heritage and fellowship, he does not go out on a voyage of discovery, but waits in expectation before Christ in the company of His people. A Christian philosophy, therefore, does not start with a variety of data in human experience and gradually push its way to distinctive Christian experience. It begins with the Christian premise—God's Self-disclosure and the consequent life of the Christian Church—and then relates what is thus 'given' to the total experience of man" (pages 113-114).

We have a right to be confident of the future as we face the keen analysis and the frank appraisal in this diagnostic triad. As President Coffin says:

"God has made known His eternal purpose in Christ and to seek to be ruled by that purpose and to strive for its embodiment in every sphere of life is surely preparing for God's reign. Its complete realization lies beyond history; but history should be the record of a race under education for fellowship with God and with one another in Him. He who is the Light of the eternal city is also the Light of the world" (page 146).

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Bookish Brevities

The Editorial Board of RELIGION IN LIFE announces with profound regret the decease, on December tenth, of Dr. John W. Langdale, who had been the responsible Editor of this magazine since its inception, although he modestly disclaimed such title. To his breadth of culture, catholic sympathies, critical judgment, and knowledge of contemporary currents in theology and philosophy the magazine owes much of the favor with which it has been received.

The article, "Philosophy and Theology," which appears in this issue of RELIGION IN LIFE, is the inaugural address recently given by Dr. Paul Tillich when he was inducted into the Professorship of Philosophical Theology at Union Theological Seminary in New York.

Among many notable papers read at the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion held recently at the Jewish Seminary in New York, was one on "Science, Philosophy and Faith," by Professor Jacques Maritain. We were fortunate in securing this paper for our readers.

Dr. Harold Pattison, who writes on "Like People, Like Priest," was for seven years Rector of Christ Church, Oyster Bay, N. Y., the church of which Theodore Roosevelt was a member and in which his son, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, is Superintendent of the Church School.

It is suggested by Dr. John Baillie that the five chapters in his book, *Our Knowledge of God* (Milford), are in a sense an expansion of Pascal's familiar words, "Thou wouldst not be seeking me, hadst thou not already found me. Be not therefore disquieted."

Dr. Jan B. Kozak, whose article, "Beyond the Possible," is found in this number, is now Professorial Lecturer in Philosophy at Oberlin College. Formerly Professor at Charles IV University in Prague, he is now a refugee from Czechoslovakia, where he was a member of the Parliament from 1935 to 1939, and a member of the Interparliamentary Union. He has written in Czech, English, French, German and Greek, and is an accomplished violinist.

At this Holiday Season, when the bells and carillons of Europe are so sadly mute, it is interesting to note this paragraph descriptive of Karl Barth's book, *The Church and the Political Problem* (Hodder & Stoughton). Once again, to use his own words, he has pulled the rope of the great cathedral bell and sent the deep clear note of faith resounding far and wide over the confusions of Europe.

The celebration of the Tercentenary of the Bay Psalm Book brings to light much of interest to students of hymnody.

Harvard University is gratified that it early received recognition in the English-speaking world for the production of hymn-writers.

It was at Harvard that Whittier was first appreciated as a hymnist; also Longfellow, Phillips Brooks, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and James Russell Lowell.

In our day, John Haynes Holmes, Walter Russell Bowie and Earl W. Marlatt have done much to foster the hymnic enrichments that Harvard loves to sponsor.

To quote Gannett's verse:

"From heart to heart, from creed to creed,
The hidden river runs;
It quickens all the ages down,
It binds the sires to sons."

The Times Literary Supplement says: "No reader of Doctor Johnson today credits the suggestion that he was largely invented by Boswell. Much of Johnson, as Leslie Stephen was one of the first to point out, lay outside Boswell's view, amplifying his incomparable biography and revealing even more of his hero's profound humanity. Mr. Hugh Kingsmill, who gave us a fresh portrait in his own study of the Doctor, presents a contemporary likeness from many sources in his *Johnson without Boswell* (Methuen's). This is a composite portrait, pieced together and edited from Johnson's own letters and autobiographical fragments, as well as from Mrs. Piozzi's Anecdotes, Sir John Hawkins's rambling memoir of his lifelong friend, Anna Seward's gossip and other witnesses."

It is said that the Library Company of Philadelphia has the distinction of being possibly the only library in the United

States that purchased a copy of *Leaves of Grass* when it was first printed in 1855. This volume in its original green cloth was the chief attraction in the recent fine Walt Whitman exhibition at the library. In addition to the well known first editions, there were displayed copies of *The United States Magazine*, which proves that Whitman was a writer of short stories away back in 1841, while Poe was still writing.

One of the unique treasures is a galley proof of the "Personal Sketch" of Whitman by John Burroughs, with an autograph inscription by Whitman. The poet is still remembered at the library, according to Austin K. Gray, the librarian. It seems that he spent more time walking round and round the reading room with his hat on his head than in actual reading.

"White walls encircle the land of our birth. This island . . . this England . . . this bit of God's earth; rain-swept and sun-kissed—beloved of all men. The soul of its beauty eludes brush and pen.

"Favored by Nature . . . this green garden-home; boundaries marked by the spray and the foam. . . Ramparts of rock guarding treasures untold—castles, cathedrals—things lovely and old. . . Rich with the legacy Time has amassed—Art, culture, glory—the wealth of the past. White walls—Impregnable—Washed by the Sea—guarding our England, this home of the free." (From *Paths of Peace*. One of the charming little books by Patience Strong, published by E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc.)